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Investment Trust Companies represent a significant proportion of the
equity capitalisation of the London Stock Exchange. The traditions
and development of the sector stretch back for more than 100 years to
the last quarter of the 19th century. In addition many Investment
Trusts have both strong historical ties with the development of the
Scottish financial community and currently occupy central positions
in that community.
Our research covers the main characteristics of the Investment Trust
sector during the ten years to December 1980 and includes legal and
tax points, foreign investment, achieved performance and perhaps
inevitably the discount. In addition we examine the concept of
financial intermediation with a view to establishing a role for
Investment Trusts. Unfortunately our overall conclusion suggests
that it is by no means clear that investment Trusts can re-establish
and maintain a role as financial intermediaries.
CHAPTER ONE
INVESTMENT TRUST COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Introduction
Section 1 : Financial Intermediation
Section 2 : Investment Trust Company
Intermediation Services
Summary
Appendix The First Scottish American Trust
Company Limited, 1973~1973 -
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INTRODUCTI ON : In this chapter our objective is to establish
the services that are supplied by Investment Trust Companies (ITCs)
to the financial community. While product identification is
comparatively easy to complete for manufacturing and commercial
companies the same cannot be said for financial intermediaries in
general and ITCs in particular. This is due at least in some
measure to the intangibility of asset claims which represent both
the inputs and outputs of the financial intermediation process.
However in spite of the difficulties the precise identification
of the services being provided is a necessary prerequisite to any
measure of achieved performance. We deal with this by looking
first of all at the characteristics of financial intermediation
in general (Section 1). Secondly we apply the results of this
analysis to ITCs (Section 2).
1. Financial Intermediation : We start by defining a financial
intermediary as an economic unit that issues claims on itself and
uses the funds received to purchase claims on other economic units.
Thus a bank for example issues claims on itself by accepting customers'
deposits and then through lending out the funds deposited acquires
claims issued by borrowers. Similarly ITCs issue equities to
fund portfolio investment. An important aspect of financial
intermediaries is that by definition the demand for their services
arises through the joint but differing requirements of various
market participants. This is perhaps seen most clearly in our
bank example where the differing requirements of lenders and
borrowers are reconciled through the bank intermediation function.
However we suggest that the same is the case for ITCs
3
where the equity holding requirement of investors are reconciled
to the wide range of equity claims available on the stock
exchange.
Although such definitional points are unexceptional and would be
accepted by most commentators a more fundamental concern is
why the need for reconciliation between the participants in
financial markets arises in the first place. Standard micro-
economic theory dealing solely with perfect and frictionless
markets provides little insight. In such a world there would
be no incentive for an institution to package or re-package
claims as market participants could achieve their utility
maximising positions without assistance. We are therefore
led to hypothesise that the presence of financial intermediaries
is due, at least in terms of micro theory, to market imperfections.
However we suggest that this interpretation must be used with some
caution. In particular care must be taken not to define
genuine economic activity involving both costs and benefits as
a market imperfection either because it is not specifically
considered by received theory or because although the costs may
be obvious the benefits may be subtle and more difficult to quantify.
While accepting the possibi1ity that there may wel1 be areas of
k
imperfection in the workings of the security markets particularly
in the field of taxation we suggest that many of the services
provided by financial intermediaries are in fact genuine economic
activities produced under competitive conditions and should be
considered as such.
In order to retain relevance we restrict our analysis of intermediation
functions to one financial market namely the equity market. We
define the equity market inasbroad a manner as possible and where
necessary we include within the definition operations involving not
only quoted securities but also unquoted. Our approach is not
to formally model intermediation roles but rather to determine the
areas of economic activity which have an intermediation potential.
As we implied above the costs associated with intermediation activities
are often more easily identified than the benefits. Our categor¬
isation is therefore on the basis of cost.
Two broad but not mutally exclusive strands of cost can be
identified as underlying financial intermediation. The first is
based on direct transaction costs while the second centres on
information costs and the crucial role that the production and
dissemination of information plays in the workings of markets. We
deal with each in turn.
i. Transaction Costs : The presence of a transaction cost function
and the possibility that a given transaction may be cheaper for
some market participants than for others creates the potential
for intermediation. The cost function facing market participants





Taxation affects all aspects of saving and investment. Thus savings
are made out of taxed income, the purchase of equities is subject
to stamp duty, dividends suffer income tax and realized gains are
assessed for capital gains tax. The presence of an extremely
complex tax framework suggests an intermediation role that through
statutory concession or tax planning can provide economically
efficient routes to the equity market. Indeed over the last fifteen
to twenty years the whole ownership structure of corporate equities
has changed reflecting in the main certain statutory tax efficient
savings concessions. The result has been an increasing
institutiona1isation of share ownership as individuals take advantage
of the concessions and channel their savings through pension funds
or insurance policies. The Wilson Committee identified four
key concessions.^
(i) The effect of redistributive taxation on the
wealthier classes who have now become net sellers
of equities.
(ii) The savings attractions of pension funds resulting
from contributions being allowed out of gross income,
(iii) The investment attractions of pension funds resulting
from their tax free status.
1. Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions.
(Wilson Committee). Evidence submitted by the Department of Industry
p.21 .
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(iv) The similar although less extensive reliefs than
in (ii) and (iii) available to savings and investments
via life assurance policies.
The effect of these concessions is described in Table l(i).
TABLE 1 (i)
Ownership of Corporate Securities
1963 - 1980
Ownership Group 19632 19802
Individuals and Nominees 65 51
Insurance Companies 10 18
Pension Funds 5 22
Investment Companies 11 9
Other 8 -
TOTAL 100 100
Ownership statistics are subject to a considerable degree of error.
In part this is due to them being based on survey samples. However,
a perhaps more contentious area is the assumption that the
beneficial owners of nominee holdings are individuals. While there
2. Wilson Committee, Evidence submitted by the Department of Industry, p.21,
and the
Stock Exchange Fact Book, December 1 981 .
isno sure way of identifying nominees the "individuals" assumption
based on the belief that nominees are primarily used by fiduciary
trusts (e.g. executorship trusts) appears reasonable.
Although we deal in detail with taxation in Chapter 2 we note in
passing that the tax concessions which have resulted in the
substitution of individual for institutional ownership shown in
Table l(i) are not available to ITCs. Therefore the provision of
a tax efficient savings service is a role they are unlikely to
fulfi1 .
While the tax concessions described above have had a major influence
on the direction of savings investors' expectations as to future
return distributions may be influenced not only by the presence
of alternative savings channels but also by the form they receive
their investment returns in. Here again taxation plays a major
influence. In general the institutions that are favoured by savings
tax concessions are also favoured in terms of both their own
taxation and in the tax efficiency of the various investment return
forms they can offer savers. Therefore to many savers there is an
absolute tax advantage covering both savings and returns through
choosing to gain access to the equity market by means of a
"favoured" institution.
Given the pattern of equity ownership established through tax
savings concessions we now ask whether or not the policies that
companies adopt to distribute returns influence investors' expectation
as to future returns. In particular does the balance between
dividend distribution and capital gain influence expected return and
8
thus equity valuation. Arguments along these lines are usually
based on assumed tax clientele effects which turn on the differential
taxation of gains and dividends^'^'^'^ Thus for example taxpayers
with high marginal rates of tax are considered to prefer their
returns in the form of gains which are taxed at a lower and non¬
progressive rate rather than dividends which are cumulated with
t
taxpayers' other income. Whether or not these effects exist and are
quantifiably important is extremely difficult to establish. On the
one hand to an individual tax paying equity owner the form of return
receipt will certainly influence any tax liability. On the other hand
to tax exempt gross funds or pension funds the form of return receipt
will have no tax implications. However it may be that the nature of
these funds, in particular their asserted need for income to meet
regular and committed disbursements, leads to a preference for returns
to be in the form of dividends rather than capital gains.
An interesting example of an intermediation vehicle specifically set
up to exploit differing shareholder attitudes to return form is the
split-level ITC. These ITCs repackage portfolios of claims into
income and capital streams. Market participants through purchasing a
combination of income and capital shares are effectively able to
3. E. Elton, M. Gruber, "Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele
Effect", Review of Economics and Statistics, 52, Part 1, 1970, pp. 68-74.
4. R. Brealey, "Marginal Investor Tax Rates - A Note. Investment Analyst,
43, December 1975.
5. W. Lewellan, K. Stanley, R. Lease, G. Shalbaum, "Some Direct Evidence
on the Dividend Clientele Effect", Journal of Finance, December 1978,
pp. 1385-1399.
6. S. Schaefer, "Tax-induced Clientele Effects in the Market for British
Government Securities. Placing Bounds on Security Values in an Incomplete
Market". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 10, No.2, July 1982,
pp. 121-159-
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select their own distributional form. Litzenberger and Sosin
have described how, if distributional form is important, the
welfare of shareholders will increase through the recapitalisation
of ordinary closed funds to dual or split-funds.^ Although the
original purpose of these funds was to exploit the dividend -
gains tax differential it may well be as we indicated above that they
have developed a role partly based on tax efficient gains for
individuals and partly based on the production of dividend streams
for institutions where what matters is not tax efficiency but
income generation.
Leaving aside tax-based intermediation we move on to consider the
second variable underlying the hypothesised transaction cost curve
namely scale economies. Scale economies in administration and
management may well result from the pooling of investment funds.
For example many managers argue that investment research, particularly
for small or unquoted companies, is more efficiently produced when
it is undertaken for several funds rather than for an individual port¬
folio. Undoubtedly the presence of management fees ensures that
there is an element of self-interest in maintaining this argument.
Indeed given the received evidence on fund performance which we
deal with below the realization of research efficiencies may well
be more potential than actual. However it is interesting to note that
common management has increasingly become a feature of the ITC sector.
From Table l(ii) it can be seen that by 1978 nine management groups
managed the 68 ITCs which in total accounted for bl% of the sector's
managed funds.^
7. R. H. Litzenberger, H. Sosin, "The Performance and Potential of Dual
Purpose Funds" Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1978, pps 56-67-
8. Touche Remnant & Co., Investment Trust Services, Electra Group Services,/
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TABLE 1 (ii)
Investment Trust Management Groups
1978
Value of Total Funds No. of Management No. of ITCs NaFunds under
Under Management Groups Managed Management
£m £m %
500 and over 2 25 1195 17-9
200 - 500 7 43 1931 29-0
100 - 200 1 1 46 1769 26.5
50 - 100 16 33 1289 19.3
OLTV1O<N| 7 16 229 3.4
10 - 20 15 17 211 3.2
5 - 10 2 2 15 0.2
1 - 5 12 12 29 0.5
Tota 1 72 194 6668 100.0
9
Notes : 1. Source: Wilson Committee.
Since 1978 the tendency towards management concentration has continued.
By December I98O of the 100 largest ITCs quoted on the stock market
twenty were managed by just 2 investment groups namely Investment Trust
Services and Touche Remnant 5. Co., while only 15 could be considered
truly independent.
/ Drayton Portfolio Management, John Govett S Co., F and C Management, Murray
Johnson, Ivory & Sime and Philip Hill Management.
9. Committee to Review the Functioning of the Financial Institutions,
Appendices, p. 451 .
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The extent to which administrative and management economies can be
gained from investment pooling are difficult to quantify precisely.
In particular as many management groups provide investment services
for a variety of investors including ITCs, unit trust, pension
funds and private clients the differing investment objectives of these
clients may well restrict the extent to which scale economies can be
fully realised. While hesitating to suggest that there is an optimum
mix of funds for any particular management group it is interesting
to note recent developments in the U.S. involving the splitting of
portfolios between different management companies. Perhaps trustees
consider that scale economies are advantageous only to the extent that they
don't interfere with the investment objectives given to management.
Sharpe has recently explored some of the implications of splitting
portfolios.^ Although his paper is exploratory rather than definitive
he does seriously question how, given the importance of security
covariances in determining portfolio risk, optimal results can be
achieved when as a result of the fund being split many of the
covariances are in fact ignored.
The third element we identified as underlying the transaction cost
function concerns broking commissions. In the U.K. the stock exchange
closely controls the terms of brokers' remuneration through the minimum
commission system. Under this system broking commissions measured
as a percentage of order value are, above a minimum level, a decreasing
function of the total transaction value. Therefore substantial cost
savings are available to those able to deal in large amounts of individual
securities. On the other hand those who deal in small amounts will
10. W. F. Sharpe, "Decentralised Investment Management", Journal of Finance,
May, 1981, pps. 217-23^.
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be faced with relatively high commission costs. In the light of
modern portfolio theory this latter point will act to reduce the
benefits to small investors of any attempts they make to construct
their own fully diversified portfolios.
Working together the effects of both a minimum commission level and
the sliding scale of rates is to reduce the divisibility of costs
associated with security purchase. If these costs are not perfectly
divisible then the attainable set of investment opportunities will
be an increasing function of investor wealth with those investors at
the lower end of the wealth scale being unlikely to reach their chosen
points on the efficient frontier. Klein has taken this argument
further and suggested that the indivisibilities stem not so much from
the costs of trading but from the prices of individual securities. ^
He suggests that as securities are available only in terms of fixed
denominations the construction of fully diversified portfolios may
well be constrained by investor wealth. Given the apparent ease
with which scrip or bonus issues can be made indivisibilities at the
individual security level are perhaps less important than those market
wide ones associated with security trading. Interestingly some
support for Klein's hypothesis can be found in the U.S. money market
funds. Fraser suggests that one of the intermediation functions
provided by these funds is that the pooling of investment funds allows
access to certain U.S. Government bonds that are only available in high
1 2
denominations. However it is important to note that the actual
divisibility achieved by these funds is considerably reduced by minimum
subscription levels. Similar minimum subscription levels or minimum
11. M. Klein, "The Economics of Security Divisibility and Financial Intermediation"
Journal of Finance, 28, No. k, 1973, pps 923-931•
12. D. Fraser, "The Money Market Fund as a Financial Intermediary", M.S.U.
Business Topics, Spring 1977, pps. 5~11.
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portfolio sizes exist in the U.K. Thus while the costs of trading
may well force small investors to search for an intermediation
vehicle the choice of vehicles may be limited to those like unit
trusts or ITCs where the minimum investment is the available purchase
cost. Unfortunately there is an element of "Catch 22" in this at
least for the purchasers of ITC shares. They can only be purchased on
the stock exchange where as we noted above the minimum commission
level does not favour the small investorl
Although the workingsof the minimum commission system imply scale
economies we have treated them separately from those related to
administration and management for two reasons. First of all they
arise from a fundamentally different source. The economies of scale
we discussed above are the result of the search for efficient production
within a market based pricing system. The scale economies that result
from the minimum commission system are based on an imposed or regulatory
pricing system. Secondly we wish to highlight minimum commissions because
although at first pass they appear to represent market imperfections
within the accepted meaning of the term they may well serve an important
economic function in relation to information costs which we deal with
below.
The final element of transaction costs we consider is the jobbers spread.
In stock markets like the London and New York stock exchanges trading
is continuous. This method of trading is in sharp contrast to the
call system practised on most European exchanges such as the Paris Borse
or the Borsa Valori in Milan. Under the "European" system shares are
traded in turn with the price being "called" when the referee considers
1 3that a particular price will clear the market. Trading is directly
13- On the Borsa Valori for example the major broking firms take it in turn
to provide the referee.
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between brokers acting for their principals without the
1 4
presence of a market-maker. Once the price has been "called"
trading in that particular security is over for the day.
This system is impractical for exchanges with large numbers of
securities. Thus in London the alternative system of continuous
trading operates. This allows all securities to be traded at any
time during and even a little after the official trading hours. The
most important characteristic of continuous trading is, following Demsetz,
the concept of "immediacy".^ In other words trading can only be
continuous if buyers and sellers can complete their transactions as
and when they wish. This "immediacy" or liquidity function is provided
on the London stock market by the jobbing system. The cost of
providing liquidity is the difference between the price the jobber is
willing to buy at (bid) and the higher price he is willing to sell at
(ask). This difference is known as the jobbers' spread.
in relation to the jobbers' spread the relevant question to ask is
whether or not different investors consistently face different
liquidity cost functions. If such a situation exists then the
possibility of cost effective intermediation also exists. Interestingly
the stock exchange rules governing jobbing competition, the anonimimity
of ultimate transactors and brokers' inquiries of jobbers' trading
terms are to a large extent designed to ensure that different investors
1 g
don't in fact face different liquidity cost functions. These rules
14. Where brokers can buy and sell on their own account their operations
may well be similar to that of a market-maker.
15- H. Demsetz, "The Cost of Transacting", Quarterly Journal of Economics,
82, No. 1, 1968, pps. 33-53-
16. The three rules mentioned ensure respectively that there is a minimum
number of two jobbers making a market in any one security, that the only
active market participants allowed into the market arena, the floor of
the exchange, are brokers and jobbers and that brokers when asking /
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as part of the stock exchange's regulatory framework attempt to
create a market environment where at any point in time a unique set
of clearing prices can be determined with the resultant price
signals leading to an optimal allocation of resource.
In order to assess whether these rules ensure equality amongst all
market participants it is necessary to look in more detail at the
determinants of bid-ask spreads.
Part of a market-maker's cost structure will consist of general
administrative expenses. These are likely to be more or less fixed
per individual transaction and therefore will be recovered more
quickly the higher the value of each individual transaction. Evidence
that small deals are not attractive to jobbers can be observed from
their unwillingness to take small odd-lots on to their books. They
do this by offering only a one-way price to the brokers' inquiry.^
In practice then small deals are not welcomed by market makers and
therefore there does exist a cost differential working against those
wishing to trade in small amounts. Together with the benefits from
a lower rate of broking commissions there is a clear cost advantage
to trading in larger amounts. An intermediation service that pooled
small transactions would indeed be providing an economic service. We
note in passing that many investment management firms have their own
in-house dealing companies where the transactions from the various
funds under management can be cumulated before the order is passed onto
the brokers. While the dealing company obtains the benefit of a
/ for a spread do not indicate whether they are acting for a buyer or
seller.
17- This would appear to flout the rule regarding brokers' inquiries.
However "another" rule ensures that "unusual" trading amounts or
terms must be made known to the jobber.
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lower commission rate it may well in practice be more problematical
as to whether or not the full benefit is passed on to the funds.
Unfortunately it may merely provide an expense "cushion" for the
investment management company!
In addition to administrative expenses there are two other aspects
of the market makers' cost function that may provide a justification
for intermediation. The first concerns the operational costs
involved in supplying a continuous liquidity service while the
second involves the role of information. We deal with the former
below and leave the latter to the following sub-section where we
deal more fully with information costs.
Although the market making function involves jobbers at some stage
having good title to the securities they provide a market in (in fact
it is difficult to see how the jobbing function would operate without
ownership transfer) they are perhaps best considered as traders
rather than investors. However, the characteristics of the security
commodity are the same irrespective of whether the holder is
marketing liquidity or purchasing an investment. In view of this risk
and return are relevant considerations for jobbers as is the risk
reducing property of diversification. Interestingly while
diversification is relevant the maintenance of a fully diversified book
is not. Indeed the very concept of market making involves taking exposed
positions in individual securities. However in the U.K. context as
jobbing firms tend to offer market making services across a wide range
of securities jobbing books may in practice be quite well diversified.
We note in passing that even if the books were not well diversified
17
shareholders in the jobbing firms themselves could diversify away
1 g
the risks associated with their company.
At the individual security level jobbers will have preferred positions
in each stock. If their books at any time don't reflect these
preferred positions then they will both expect higher returns for the
additional risk taken on and will make attempts to return to their
preferred positions.
Jobbers can obtain compensation for the increased risk through
charging more for their liquidity services. In other words by
increasing spreads. Portfolio adjustments to return jobbers to
their preferred holdings can be achieved through setting bid-ask prices
(the central price) above or below those expected by the market thus
19 20
inducing the necessary buy or sell orders. ' The critical
variable in this so-called inventory approach to explaining spreads
is the amount of additional risk taken on by jobbers when they make a
market in a particular security. For any given transaction this
additional risk will be greater the smaller the resources of the
jobber concerned.
18. Perhaps a reason for the wide cross section of securities covered by
most jobbing firms is that their shareholders can't in fact provide the
necessary personal diversification. If the shareholdings are not
widely held and shareholder wealth is not limitless then there would
indeed be case for the jobbing firms attempting to hold fully
diversified books. Jobbing firms in the U.K. may well fall into this
category.
19- Y. Amihad, H. Mendelson, "Dealership Market : Market-Making with
Inventory", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 8, No 1, March 1980,
pps. 31-5^.
20. Y. Amihad, H. Mendelson, "Asset Price Behaviour in a Dealership Market",
Financial Analysts Journal, May/June, 1982, pps. 50-59-
(Both these articles provide excellent descriptions of the inventory approach
to spreads.)
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Given the market rules of the stock exchange it is extremely difficult •
to see precisely how an intermediation service could achieve, ceteris
paribus, a narrower spread for any individual security. In addition
a necessary pre-requisite to such a service would be knowledge of
jobbers preferred position and their actual books. Jobbers we
suggest would not be willing to impart this information!
There is no doubt that transaction costs and particularly those that
relate to imposed or statutory pricing structures do provide an
21
opportunity for the successful provision of intermediation services.
However such operational conditions are transient and subject to
change. Many of the intermediaries we observe in practice are long
established companies and have therefore existed through successive and
differeing periods of regulation and control. Their operations can
and do change to match the changing business environment.
We tentatively suggest that the longevity and historical growth of many
financial intermediaries may well be sourced from a more permanent
raison d'etre. One such justification involves an area to which we now
turn namely information and the need for information production.
ii. Information Costs: The role played by information in markets in
general and in financial markets in particular, including the need
for information and the difficulties involved in information production
is complex and has not by any means been fully explored at either the
22 23theoretical or empirical levels. ' We start our development of
21. G. Benston, C. Smith, "A Transaction Cost Approach to the Theory of
Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance, 31, No. 2, 1976, pps.
215-231 .
22. J. Grossman, J. Stiglitz, "Information and Competitive Price Systems",
American Economic Review, May 1976.
23. M. Rothschild, J. Stiglitz, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets
- An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information". Quarterly
Journal of Economics, November, 1976.
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of this topic and its usefulness as a source of intermediation
services by considering the illustrative example of the importance
24
of information suggested by Ackerlof.
Observing the market for second hand cars Ackerlof offers the
following explanation for the well known difference in price between
new cars in the showroom and ones that have just left.
Consider that there are four types of car in existence - new, used,
good and bad. In purchasing either new or used cars the buyers take
on the risks of acquiring either good cars or bad cars. Ownership
for any length of time gives the proprietor an informational
advantage as to whether the car is good or bad over any future buyer.
A future buyer on the other hand with only the dubious advantage of
the vendor's word as to the quality of the car would not be willing
to offer the full price of a good car. In extremus the only price
available would be that of a bad car. This price must obviously be
less than the price of a new car or it would be possible to trade
a 'lemon'at the higher new car price and then buy a new carl In
Ackerlof's rather extreme example the market fails because of information
asymmetry between buyer and seller. However, given the observation
that markets for second-hand cars actually exist then the striking
price is more likely to reflect average expectations as to the quality
of second-hand cars rather than the specific attributes of bad cars.
This average price involves a redistribution of wealth in favour of
the 'lemon'sellers. They will receive a price greater than the true
value of their cars. The redistribution is at the expense of those
with quality cars to sell who will receive the lower average price
2k. G. Ackerlof, "The Market for Lemons; Quality, Uncertainty and the Market




The presence of an asymmetrical distribution of information amongst
market participants and the contractual difficulties it raises are,
following Arrow, usually described in terms of the moral hazard
25
problem. Hoag and Draper note that the key characteristic of
the moral hazard problem is, "the lack of observability of a variable
26
upon which ... two parties would like to contract". In Ackerlof's
example this variable was the quality of second-hand cars.
Unfortunately the effects of information asymmetry are not confined
to the second-hand car market. Indeed in any market where "quality"
is difficult to ascertain then there can be no guarantee that buyers
and sellers will reach the same expectational conclusions. In these
circumstances neither the buyers nor the sellers will know the
accuracy of their own expectations, the accuracy of the other parties'
expectations nor indeed the veracity underlying alternative
27
expectations.
To the extent that information asymmetry results in the redistribut ion
of wealth through incorrect pricing a reduction in its effects will
be societally beneficial. In some markets this can be achieved
relatively easily by the addition of guarantees or warranties to the
original contract. However these instruments themselves are not free
28
from consideration of quality. A more general approach would be
25. K. Arrow, "Uncertainty and Medical Care", American Economic Review, No.
53, 1963.
26. D. Draper, J. Hoag, "Financial Intermediation and the Theory of Agency",
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Economics, November 1978.
27. We are reminded of the differing expectations for project success that
may exist between a bank manager and a (potential) borrower.
28. M. Jensen, W. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm - Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 3, 1976, pps. 305-360.
to attempt to reduce or remove the information asymmetries. We
now turn to this problem within the specific context of the
securities market.
The effects of information asymmetry in the context of the securities
29 30
markets have been examined by Treynor (U.S.) and Hirst (U.K.) '
Consider the jobbing role again. A jobber undertakes to provide a
market for both buyers and sellers of a security. He does this by
buying and selling the security on his own account irrespective
of whether he has the securities to sell or the funds to commit.
His book will square either through the transactions being reversed
as trading continues or through the borrowing of funds or securities.
As they trade on their own account jobbers are exposed to market
fluctuations some of which they may find profitable and some not.
Provided they feel that none of the market participants have any
significant information advantages such exposure in itself would not
present more than the usual difficulties associated with making
investment decisions. However, in the situation where jobbers feel
they are at an information disadvantage with at least some of the
other market participants they may feel the investment game to be less
than fair. To protect themselves against the possibility of trading
with market participants possessing such superior information jobbers
much the same way as Ackerlof's car market participants will alter
their trading prices. In the case of jobbers ask prices will be
raised and bid prices lowered. As it is not possible for jobbers to
distinguish those participants who have superior information from
29. J. Treynor, "The Only Game in Town", Financial Analysts Journal,
March 1 971 •
30. I. R. C. Hirst, "A Model of Market Making with Imperfect Information",
Managerial and Decision Economics, February 1980.
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"ordinary" participants the entire market suffers the pricing effect
of information asymmetry. Thus the resulting market clearing set
of prices involves both a redistribution of wealth in favour of the
informational1y superior and incorrect pricing signals for resource
a 11ocation.
The extent of these wider spreads will depend on the jobbers'
assessments of the need to insure themselves against losses to well
informed investors. in this context it is important to note that the
potential cost to jobbers is a function not only of the specific item
of asymmetrically distributed price-sensitive information but also
of the length of time a particular investor could be expected to benefit
from it. The more quickly private information becomes public the
less will be the need for insurance and given competition amongst
jobbers the narrower will be the spreads.
We now note that our information approach provides an alternative
rationale for jobbers spreads. Rather than being based solely on
the inventory approach described earlier jobbers spreads will now
represent attempts to limit exposure to informationa11y superior
investors while at the same time being sufficiently attractive to
retain a competitive edge over rival jobbers. The identification of
this alternative, although not mutually exclusive alternative,
interpretation of spreads begs the question of relative importance.
Unfortunately there are no reported results based on a direct
comparison of the two approaches. What empirical work there is tends
31 32 33 34 35
to concentrate on the inventory approach. ' ' ' Whether
31. G. Benston, R. Hagerman, "Determinants of Bid-Ask Spreads in the Over-




this is through an assumed importance of holding costs or the data
difficulties involved with the information approach it is difficult
to tell. While there is a dearth of work in this area in general
there are virtually no reported U.K. results.^
To reduce information asymmetry and thus narrow spreads information
about securities must be produced and disseminated. Unfortunately there
are two considerations which make this a particularly difficult task.
The first is the public good aspect of information. As information
can be resold, passed on or merely given away without any value
reduction to vendors or donors information producers will only receive a
small proportion of the market's total valuation of the information
produced. Thus it may not be commercially viable to produce the
commodity information in the first place. The second consideration
brings us back to the rectitude aspect of the moral hazard problem.
How can good information be distinguished from bad information and
following Ackerlof given that bad information will tend to drive out
good information what incentive.: will there be to produce good information.
37This problem has been succinctly described by Leland and Pyle.
32. H. Demsetz, "The Cost of Transacting", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
82, No. 1, February 1968.
33- H. Stoll, "The Pricing of Security Dealers Services", Journal of Finance,
Vol. 33, No. k, 1978.
3^. S. Tinic, "The Economics of Liquidity Services", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 86, February 1972, pps. 79_93-
35- R- West, S. Tinic, "Competition and the Pricing of Dealer Services in the
OTC Market", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 7, June 1972.
36. Consideration of confidentiality make it extremely difficult to obtain data,
in particular transaction size and spread data, for the London Stock Exchange.
See:
I. R. C. Hirst, K. Lyall, "Bid-Ask Spreads and Transaction Size - Some U.K.
Evidence", Annual Conference of the E.F.A. - Jerusalem, 1982.
37- H. Leland, D. Pyle, "Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and
Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance, 32, No, 2, May 1977, pps.
371-387.
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"... it may be difficult or impossible for potential
users to distinguish good information from bad. If so,
the price of information will reflect its average quality.
And this can lead to market failure if entry is easy for
firms offering poor quality information. Firms which
expend considerable resources to collect good information
will lose money because they will receive a value reflect¬
ing the low average quality. When they leave the market
the average quality will further fall and equilibrium
will be consistent only with poor quality information ..."
Any production of information must then satisfy both the appropriabi1ity
and the moral hazard considerations. We suggest the following four





(a) Statute : The various Companies Acts require the disclosure of
information considered relevant to investors and in particular to
shareholders. In addition the Stock Exchange the various
accountancy bodies press, without statutory backing, for further
disclosure in areas where they consider the statutory requirements
are incomplete. The statutory requirement of disclosure removes
the problem of appropriabi1ity as the costs must be met by the
companies. In addition the audit opinion goes some way towards
ensuring the reliability of the information produced. Unfortunately
the publication of such information while useful is very often
long delayed and given the efficiency of the stock market will
usually be superceded by information either disseminated voluntarily
by companies or researched by other parties. We note in passing
that information asymmetry may be reduced by the Statutory prevention
of those with inside information on a company trading in
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that company's securities. This approach has been followed
by the authorities in both the U.K. and the U.S.
(b) Stockbrokers : Hirst has suggested that in the U.K. context
the minimum commission system which we described above may provide
stockbrokers with a revenue shield behind which information
o O
could be produced and distributed to clients. While this
approach on its own would round the public good problem it would
be insufficient to ensure either reliable research output or
indeed that research was in fact being undertaken by a particular
broker. Competition amongst brokers would help solve the former
problem while regulations regarding the uses to which commission
income could be put would help solve the latter.
(c) Companies : Companies can of course produce information about them¬
selves and market it either directly to the public or through the
stockbroking distribution channel. Unfortunately even the best
intentioned company is unlikely to disseminate "bad" news with the
same candour as "good" news. Thus the moral hazard problem remains.
A possible way round this has been suggested by Campbell and Kracaw
who suggest that firms may pay outside parties to produce research
information if it is felt that the results of such research efforts
39would lead to higher market valuations. In much the same way as
the audit opinion is independent of management and owners outside
"expert certificates" would also possess the mark of independence
and objectivity..^ . We note in passing that firms may employ
outside consultants to revalue assets and that it is not uncommon
for firms to pay for the relevant research output of stockbrokers.
38. I. R. C. Hirst, "The Case for Minimum Commissions", Investment Analyst,
January, 1982.
39- T. Campbell, W. Kracaw, "Information Production, Market Signalling and the
Theory of Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance, 35, No. A,
September 1980, pps. 863-882.
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In deriving their approach to information production the arguments
of Campbell and Kracaw while providing a solution to the
appropriabi1ity problem lead to a conclusion that the reliability
of information produced will be positively related to the size
of the stake the information producers have in the information
producing company. They note that the size of this stake may
act as a barrier to the entry of smaller and perhaps more
efficient information producers.
(d) Intermediaries : Leland and Pyle have suggested that the presence
of both the moral hazard and appropriabi1ity problems provide a
ko
rationale for financial intermediation. They argue that if
information production is undertaken by an intermediary then
costs and returns of information production will be internalised
and management success or otherwise will be evident from the
returns on the intermediary's portfolio. The moral hazard problem
would be solved they suggest by the information producers within
the intermediary holding equity in the intermediary. As in the
Campbell and Kracaw case th i s would act as a signal to the rest of
the financial community of the reliance to be put on the information
producing function.
In addition to their comments on intermediation Leland and
Pyle also derive a negative relationship between specific risk
and optimum debt levels based not on the presence of bankruptcy
costs but on the signalling solution to the moral hazard problem.
They note that as the portfolios of most intermediaries are
40. H. Leland, D. Pyle, "Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and
Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, No. 2, May
1977, pps. 371-387.
dominated by securities with low specific risks their analysis
provides not only a justification for financial intermediation
but also an explanation for a characteristic of many inter¬
mediaries namely high gearing.
There are however two points that should be noted with regard to
the rationale for intermediation suggested by Leland and Pyle.
Firstly, as the authors themselves note, the benefit received by
an information producing financial intermediary will be reduced
to the extent that outsiders can gain the same information merely
by examining its portfolio. Secondly as Campbell and Kracaw
have suggested there is an element of illogicality in the way
Leland and Pyle solve the moral hazard problem. In particular
if it is possible to signal reliability through ownership stakes
then there is no reason why such signalling should not be
undertaken by management investing in the firms they manage.
If this were possible the need for intermediaries in the Leland
and Pyle sense is obviated.
As well as offering the above criticism Campbell and Kracaw go
on to posit the following intriguing rationale for intermediation
"The answer (... to the intermediation problem ...)
would seem to be that intermediaries can profitably
emerge where they can jointly produce information
as well as other products or services valued by
investors".
Unfortunately they also note that :
"A complete model of the joint production approach
to intermediation awaits a separate treatment".
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The Leland and Pyle approach to information production certainly
provides an intuitively attractive justification for the
observed presence of financial intermediaries although the doubt
cast on their solution to the moral hazard problem is a drawback.
While we have no formal theoretical framework which will allow
the joint product suggestion of Campbell and Kracaw to be examined
it too has intuitive appeal. In particular our earlier discussion
on transaction costs could provide elements of the joint product
as too could some of the observed investor services offered by
intermediaries such as insurance contracts, taxation advice,
book-keeping services, etc.
With our review of the rationale underlying financial intermediation
now complete we turn to the more specific question of the intermediation
services being provided by ITCs.
2. Investment Trust Company Intermediation Services: In this section
our objective is three fold. First of all we look briefly at the
historical experience of the ITC sector. Secondly we look in slightly
more detail at the characteristics of the movement during the period
we are primarily interested in namely the 1970s. Finally we summarise
the main aspect of the intermediation services provided by ITCs.
i. The Development of the ITC Sector: It is not our intention to
provide a detailed history of the ITC movement. This has been
41 42 43 44
done more than adequately elsewhere. See for example, ' ' ' '
45 46 47' '
. In addition to these references many of the older
41. The Economist, "Investment Trust Supplement", December, 1934.
42. H. Burton, D. C. Corner, "Investment and Unit Trusts in Britain and
America", Elek Books, London, 1968.
43. A. Arnaud, "Investment Trusts Explained", Cambridge, 1977, p.4.
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ITCs have produced their own firm histories. (See Chapter 1,
Appendix 1). Rather our objective is merely to provide an
overview of the sector's development in order to help identify
the services being provided by ITCs. Our sources for this are
the references noted above.
Arnaud has suggested that the growth of the ITC movement has been
characterised by :
"... periods of intense activity followed by a financial
crisis and then by a long period of indigestion until
the next upturn".48
While such comments would serve to describe economic progress in
general they certainly highlight the changing perceptions of
using the ITC intermediation vehicle.
The first ITC is generally agreed to be the Foreign and Colonial
Investment Trust set up in 1868 to invest in overseas government
stocks. Arnaud describes the characteristics of the Foreign
and Colonial as follows :
"The Foreign and Colonial was formed to invest in a
selection of eighteen overseas government securities at
an average yield of 8%. Participants were issued £100
certificates, bearing interest at 6%, at a price of 85
to yield 1% at that price. A sinking fund derived from
surplus income and the capital surplus on the portfolio
securities was to be used to redeem the certificates at
par."^9
44. T. Jackson, "The Enterprising Scot", Edinburgh, 1968.
45. H. Bullock, "The Story of Investment Companies", Columbia, 1959-
46. W. G. Kerr, "Scottish Capital on the American Credit Frontier",
Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas.
47. G. Glasgow, "Guide to Investment Trust Companies", Glasgow, 1935-
48. A. Arnaud, "Investment Trusts Explained", Cambridge, 1977, p.4.
49. A. Arnaud, "Investment Trusts Explained", Cambridge, 1977, p.3-
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Initially the company was intended to have a life of 2k years.
However in 1879 the outstanding certificates were exchanged for
equity. Since then the Foreign and Colonial has grown to
control by the end of 1980 assets in excess of £250m. Some
idea of the popularity and overwise of the ITC intermediation
vehicle since the sector's beginnings in the late 19th century















































50. Data sourced from (i) Association of Investment Trusts, 1980 Handbook
and (ii) Extel Company Information Cards. The 153 ITCs covered
represent about 50% of the sector's numerical size but account for
over 35% of the assets under management.
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From the above Diagram there are clearly four periods of relative
popularity - 1871 to 1390, 1901 to 1910, 1921 to 1930 and 1971 to
1980. The decade of the 19^+0s on the other hand stands out as
one of relative unpopularity. It would be unwise to read too
much into dates of incorporation but several general points can
be made. The initial impetus to the movement came partly from
the Companies Act 1862 which provided the basis for the limitation
of shareholder liability and partly from the opportunities
especially international opportunities that the imperfect capital
markets of the time offered. Following the Baring Crisis which had
a real and pervasive effect on all aspects of investment the period
up to World War 1 was one of continued expansion for ITCs especailly
in the Empire. The War dramatically curtailed foreign investment
as the Government insisted on foreign holdings being exchanged for
domestic gilts in order that war loans could be secured and foreign
debts repaid. The nineteen twenties was a period of recovery from
the War years, re-establishment of foreign portfolios and some
growth especially in the new consumer based industries. The ITC
sector shared in at least some of the success of this period and by
the late 1920s there had been a significant shift in portfolio
structures to industrial investment and indeed there is also some
evidence of an increased exposure to the equity as distinct from the
fixed interest market. Compared to U.S. closed-end mutual funds
the ITC sector survived the depression of 1930s in remarkably good
shape. This was in part at least due to most U.K. ITCs having
avoided the "debt pyramiding" practices so prevalent amongst U.S.
firms in the 1920s.
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In many respects the end of the 1930s represents an important
turning point in the development of the movement. It is therefore
useful at this stage to summarise certain of the sector's
characteristics. The poor availability of relevant data
unfortunately precludes any detailed survey. However, the task is
made slightly easier by the existence of an extensive survey of
ITCs carried out by the Economist in 193^. We show certain results
of this survey in Tables l(iii) to Table 1 (v)
TABLE 1 (i i i)
Investment Trust Companies




Government S Municipal 12
Ra i 1 wa y s 15
Uti1ities 12
Other Industrial 61

























The experiences of the 1st World War with regard to foreign investment
holdings were repeated for the 2nd World War. Indeed not only the
war years but the post-war period up until 1979 were years when foreign
portfolio investment was strictly controlled. The period to the
mid-1960s however was one of very substantial growth for Western
economies. The re-generation of old industries, the development of
new industries together with the presence of low interest rates
provided ITCs with a period of significant growth and development.
Interestingly there was no substantial rise in the number of ITCs in
existence growth and success being largely confined to the long
established ITCs. The portfolios of these ITCs did however undergo
a considerable metamorphosis during this period. . Table 1 (vi) to
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Table l(viii) summarise various aspects of the sector in 1965.
TABLE 1 (vi)
Investment Trust Companies





Local Authority Stocks 1
Company Securities 97
52. Data sourced from
H. Burton, D. C. Corner,"Investment and Unit Trusts in Britain and
America," Elek Books, London, 1968, Chapters 6 and 7-











TABLE 1 (vi i i)
Investment Trust Companies






Rest of the World 6
Although for reasons of consistency great care must be taken in compar
the Tables for 1965 with those noted earlier for 1933 the differences
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are sharp. In particu 1 ar by 1965 portfolios were dominated by corporate
equities whereas the earlier portfolios were primarily characterised
by fixed interest debt and gilts. In addition there is evidence
of increased concentration in the U.S. and the U.K. at the expense
of the rest of the world.
These changes in portfolio composition and in particular the switch
to corporate equities represent a fundamental change in ITC portfolio
strategy. The two most important reasons underlying this change
are the attractiveness of the equity market during this period plus
the increased internationalisation of domestic capital markets
which substantially reduced the poss i b i 1 i ty of exp 1 o i t i ng the
historical raison d'etre of ITCs namely interest arbitrage opportunities.
The fifteen years to 1980 have been amongst the most difficult faced
by the ITC movement. Rigorous exchange controls including the
premium surrender, new capital, corporate and personal tax regimes
which have reduced the attractiveness of the ITC vehicle and perhaps
also a greater competitiveness for investor funds from other inter¬
mediaries have led to much heart-searching as to what role ITC should
play in current financial markets. Only towards the end of the
decade did answers to these questions arise. We return to this
area in Chapter 7- The surge of new ITCs in the early part of the
1970s was something of a false dawn. Many were formed to exploit
perceived opportunities arising from the U.K.'s entry into the E.E.C.
Several of these early 19701s ITCs have now either been wound-up
or amalgamated.
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(ii) ITC Characteristics - 1971 to 1980 : We now move on to examine the
characteristics of ITCs during the ten years to 1980 in slightly




(a) Sector Size : The equity capitalisation of the sector is
shown in Table 1(ix) .
TABLE 1(ix)
Investment Trust Companies
Size - Equity Capitalisat ion
1971 " 1980 (Decembe r 31)
£m %
Description 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Equity
Cap i ta1isat ion 4245 4931 4091 1486 3402 3171 4162 4028 3765 7588




50 6.3 5-9 5-5 6.5 5.8 5.3 4.7 4.3
109 6.1 5.4 6.2
53
Notes: 1. Sources (i) Stock Exchange
54(ii) Faculty of Actuaries
53- Stock Exchange Fact Book - various issued 1971-1980.
54. Faculty of Actuaries (Data made available by J.R.C.H. Brumwell).
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This Table indicates that the sector is significant both in relative
and absolute terms. The average capitalisation of the ten observations
is £4o86m with a high in 1980 and a low in 197^. Some care must be
taken with the comparability of these annual statistics. Changes and
reclassifications among constituent members make both the Stock Exchange
and the FTA groupings difficult to deal with on a time series basis.
However even allowing for this 1980 together with 1972 and 197^+ do
represent major points of interest.
In 1972 the sector expanded by some £A50m partly through rights issues
from existing companies and partly through the formation of new ITCs.
This was a substantial increase in the sector size and reflected a combin¬
ation of factors including the rather bullish expectations of many
investors as to the ability of equities in general to act as a hedge
against inflation. In addition as we noted above many of the new ITCs
were found to exploit opportunities arising from E.E.C. membership.
197^ and in particular December 197^ was the low point of the financial
crash which followed on from the secondary banking crisis. On
December 13th (Friday) the FTA-A11 Share Index bottomed out at 61.92
some k0% of its January 197^ level and some 26% of its mid-1972 level.
That the ITC sector retained its relative size in the equity sector
during this period does not hide the fact that many individual ITCs
especially the smaller ones were faced with a significant reduction in
the size of their portfolios.
The 1979~1980 period witnessed a dramatic change in the fortunes of the




Changes in the FTA All Share and
1 nvestment Trust Indices
During 1979 and 1980.
£
1 ndex 1979 1980
FTA - A11 Share 4.35 27.07
FTA - Investment Trust -5.08 46.44
Notes : 1. Source : Faculty of Actuaries"1''
Commentators have suggested many reasons for the growth in the sector
during the last year or so of the decade. These include the abolishing
of capital gains tax on ITC portfolio transactions and the complete
removal of exchange controls in 1979. However while capital gains
tax may have been a restriction on the freedom of ITC managers a credit
system had been devised to virtually exempt tax paying shareholders from
any elements of double taxation when they realised their ITC shares.
Non-tax paying shareholders such as pension funds had no access to the
credit. Similarly while ITCshad over the years built-up a considerable
expertise in foreign investment which involved the additional decision
parameters of currency and premium expectations it is not clear that
investors consider the attractions of ITC intermediation vehicles purely
in terms of the general institutional framework within which ITC managers
operate. Managerial skill at achieving success within a given framework
55. J.R.C.H. Brumwell, "Notes on the FTA Indices", Transactions of the
Faculty of Actuaries, 1979, 1980.
would perhaps be more important. In the context of foreign investment
we note later that there appears to be no obvious relationship between
the discount and the premium. To the extent that the mere existence
of the premium market and the surrender rule were important to the
relative attractiveness of ITCs a positive relationship could have
been expected.
We suggest that changes in the relative size of the sector may reflect
not so much changes in the institutional environment but the relative
attractiveness of particular intermediation services being offered by
management at particular times. It is interesting to note that the
relative size of the sector in the crash of 197^ was higher than in
the previous year. The ability of managers to re-balance their
portfolios defensively may have offered investors a slightly more
attractive alternative than they could have achieved themselves. Similar
in the stock market rise of 1979-1980 additional exposure to particular
sectors, securities or indeed gearing could have been gained by adding
a suitable ITC investment to a direct investment holding. If the
particular sector or security was in great demand this may well have
been the only way to gain a desired level of exposure. We return later
to look more closely at these market timing aspects of intermediation
together with the relevance of the discount mentioned above.
Although 1972, 197^ and 1980 are the obvious points of interest the
slight decline in the sector's size between 1975 and 1976 is worthy
of note. The period saw several major take-overs of ITCs by in
particular pension funds. In total some £300m in terms of equity
capitalisation was removed from the sector. This period is generally
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considered as one of great difficulty for the sector.
In addition to equity capitalisation a further size perspective is to
consider the underlying portfolios of ITCs. Table 1 (xi) compares
the assets managed by ITCs with those managed by unit trusts a broadly
comparable financial intermediary.
TABLE 1(xi)
1nvestment T rust Companies and Unit Trusts
Gross Assets Managed
1971 1 oo o (December 31)
£m
Description 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
ITCs - Assets 5759 7515 5598 2729 5650 6066 6564 6676 5995 7458
Unit Trusts
- Assets 1953 2553 2097 1405 2555 2622 3432 3873 3937 4968
Notes : 1. Source : Financial Statistics
It is clear that the ITC sector is considerably larger than the unit trust
sector. This size differential is further reflected in the average size
of the individual ITCs and unit trusts. At December 31, 1980 the
average size of an individual unTt trust (£37m) was more than double that
56. Financial Statistics (CSO) , various issues 1971-1980.
of an individual unit trust (£15m). However both sectors pale
considerably when compared to pension funds and insurance companies.
At the end of 1980 the assets managed by these two sectors totalled
£20,000m and £47,000m respectively.
(b) Ownership Patterns : We noted earlier in this chapter the increasing
institutiona1isat ion of the stack exchange due primarily to the post
1965 tax regime. The ownership patterns of ITCs show a similar
concentrating of equity in the hands of the institutions at the expense
of individual investors. Tables l(xii) and l(xiii) provide the detail
In addition to the problems associated with the classification of
nominee holdings discussed above a further data weakness in Table 1(xi?
arises from the use of different sample sizes. Unfortunately there
is a considerable range of sample sizes in the data presented in this
Table. For example the 1976 and 1980 figures cover 23 and 36 ITCs
respectively while the 1971, 1974 and 1977 figures cover approximately
80% of the AITC membership.
A comparison between Table l(xii) dealing with the market as a whole
and Table l(i) suggests that the move to institutional ownership has
been greater in the case of ITCs and especially so in the years towards
the end of the decade it is noticeable that the institutional stake
has tended to be proportionately greater for the market as a whole than
for the ITC sector. This would certainly accord with the views of
many ITC managers that individuals are the ownership group that ITCs
are best suited to serve. However the 1980 ITC figures suggest that
this position may be in the process of change. We re-emphasise however
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TABLE 1(xii)
Ownership of ITC Equity
Selected Years 1971 - 1980
(%)
Ownership Group 1971 1974 1976 1977 1980
1ndividua1s 46 40 42 40 28
Banks S Nominees 24 24 20 24 18
Sub-Tota1 70 64 62 64 46
Insurance Companies 14 18 19 N/'A 27
Pension F-nds 2 2 4 8
Investment Companies 7 7 6 8
Other 7 9 9 \ f 11
Sub-Tota1 30 36 38 36 54
100 100 100 100 100
Notes : Sources - 1. Years 1971, 1974 ^
2. Years 1976, 1980 58
3. 1977 59
57. Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth;
Supplementary Evidence submitted by the Association of ITCs 1975,
pp. 5-6.
58. Annual accounts of 23 ITCs for 1976 and 36 for 1980.
59- Wilson Committee, Evidence submitted by the Association of ITCs and
published separately, page 13 (1978).
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the need for great care with ownership statistics and suggest more
evidence is required to fully support the 1980 figures.
Within the ITC sector there is a considerable variation of ownership
characteristics. Table l(xiii) details some of these differences
for 36 ITCs in 1980/81.
Given the limitations on the data and the relatively small and
perhaps unrepresentative sample it is difficult to be more than
tentative about any underlying relationships. However, a relation¬
ship is suggested between ITC size and institutional holding.
The large purchasing capacity of many institutions combined with
the substantial trading economies that can be obtained from dealing
in large blocks of stock suggest that institutional investors would
find it easier to trade in the larger and perhaps more marketable
I TCs.
Graph l(i) plots institutional holdings against ITC market
capita1isat ion.
Contrary to the result we anticipated there is pronounced negative
relationship between size and institutional holding. Indeed the
correlation Coefficient on the data was reported as -0.45^7. It
would appear then that the hypothesised marketability advantage of
investing in the larger ITCs was either incorrect or was less important
than expected.
TABLE 1 (x i i i)
Ownership of Selected ITCs
1980 - 1981
{%)






1 nst i tutional
£ Other
Alliance Investment 33 67 T rustees h3 51
Atlas Electric £ General 58 hi 1nvestors' Capital 39 61
Continental Union AA 56 RIT 59 h]
Gua rd i an 53 hi Wi tan 58 hi
Murray-Caledonian 55 A5 UBS 53 hi
" -Clydesdale A2 58 Mercanti1e 27 73
11 -Northern 39 61 Aberdeen Trust 60 AO
" -Western 59 h 1 Scottish Mortgage 63 37
Scottish Northern 75 25 Monks 61 39
Sphere AO 60 London Trust A8 52
Bankers A8 52 Drayton-Premier 23 77
British Assets 51 h3 " -Commercial 16 8A
Ceda r VwO 00 62 " -Consolidated 32 68
CLRP 2h 76 English £ International 35 65
General Investors 39 61 Scottish Eastern 60 AO
Industry £ General 67 33 Securities Trust 28 72
1nternationa1 35 65 St. Andrew 76 2A
Scottish United 60 AO Edinburgh Investment 68 32
Notes : 1. Source : Annual accounts 1980/81.
2. The companies included represent virtually all the ITCs
that published ownership details in I98O/8I. Insufficient
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The data does suggest however, that the middle sized ITCs are the
ones attracting the most institutional attention. Given the
pressure that many of these ITCs face to unitise or liquidate it
is certainly plausible that some of the institutional stakes represent
tactical positions taken in expectation of the capital profit that
would follow an ITC liquidation or unitisation at underlying net
asset values. As many ITCs can be purchased at substantial discounts
the possibility and extent of such gains may well appeal to some
institutional investors.
(c) Delegated Management : As we noted in Section 1 financial inter¬
mediation involves the repackaging of financial claims. Successful
repackaging involves both portfolio selection and the choice of
rights that attach to ITCs1 own equity. In practice considerably
more time and attention is given to the portfolio aspects of the
process than to the characteristics or appeal of the repackaged
claims.
The decision to delegate investment decisions to the management
function of an ITC turns very much on the investors' perception of
the performance being achieved by the ITC management. Therefore
it is crucially important that investors are able first of all to
identify the management function and secondly that they have
sufficient information to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
particular managements and their strategies. Unfortunately the
increasing concentration of ITC management into management groups
which we noted in Section 1 has mitigated against the accurate
identification of management functions. On the other hand there
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is now increasing use of "statements of objectives" for particular
ITCs which may allow investors the opportunity to assess particular
management strategies.
The publication of management objectives was given a major boost
in 1978 following the first edition of the Association of Investment
Trust Companies Handbook in which member ITCs were required to
specifically state their objectives.
Given a repackaging function for the intermediation vehicle there
is a considerable number of available strategies for management to
follow. Some will highlight the portfolio aspects of their work
indicating for example an intention to maintain a significant
proportion of the assets abroad. Others may prefer to emphasise
the quantitative aspects of their repackaging efforts in terms
of the income or capital growth their investors could expect.
At first pass statements of objectives would appear to give an
extremely useful method of identifying and assessing management
functions. However on closer examination it is clear that in
practice many managements are only committing themselves to the
very broadest of objectives. Some examples of statements are
as fol1ows :
1. "Designed to achieve a diversified portfolio of investments
with good prospects of income and capital growth."
2. "Growth of income and capital."
3. "To obtain capital and income growth through a portfolio
with a broad geographical base."
k. "The company's business is that of an orthodox investment
trust with an international spread of investments and
with a degree of capital gearing. The objective is to
provide members with long term capital appreciation and
a steadily increasing return."
5. "Capital growth with steady increase in dividends"
6. "To utilise the resources of the trust by active and
flexible management, including geographical shifts of
emphasis, aimed at progressive annual distributions
supported by a growth of asset value performance."
7. "This trust aims for growth both in capital and dividends
through an increasingly international portfolio of high
qua 1ity equities."
8. "To invest mainly in the shares of smaller companies."
9. "Growth of capital for high tac paying individuals."
10. "To invest primarily in securities of companies carrying on
£q
business in Japan with a view to growth."
60. Association of investment Trust Companies Handbook, 1978.
The last three statements are particularly interesting in that they
are considerably more specific indicating either a reasonably
precise investment objective - Japan or smaller companies - or the
particular investor category that the management are attempting to
service - high tax payers. Unfortunately in many cases the
statement of objectives provides little more than a minimum
indication of the strategy management intends following.
There is then a very real difficulty in identifying both management
functions and the repackaging services they are offering to investors.
Comments such as "poor marketability" and "homogeneity" that are
often used to describe the ITC sector are at least partly due to
these problems of identification.
While there may be difficulties in determining what ITC managements
intend to do it is slightly easier to detail the services they have




(iv) Managment Intermediation Costs.
(i) Ownership Instruments : Ordinary equity represents the largest
source of funding for ITCs. We noted above that 1972 and to a
lesser extent 1980 represented the principle years of expansion in
the equity base of the sector. However while the changing appeal
of ITCs as intermediation vehicles will usually lead to periods of
contraction and expansion the underlying capital base of ITCs can
best be considered as fixed in all but the long-term. This contrasts
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with the open-ended characteristic of unit trusts. Company Law
effectively prevents regular capital reductions and the discount
to net asset value at which most 1TC equities stand considerably
limits the possibility of raising new amounts on the stock market.
The characteristics of the equity claims offered by ITCs are in
essence no different from those offered by industrial and commercial
companies. The risks of ownership involvement are taken on by
investors in return for an uncertain dividend stream and the
possibility of a capital gain or loss.
Traditionally the dividend component of the total return attached to
1TC equities has assumed a greater importance than the capital
component. As we suggested earlier the historical roots of this can
be traced back to the initial raison d'etre of many ITCs namely to
exploit interest arbitrage opportunities between bortowing in the
U.K. and investing abroad in foreign utilities and mortgages.The
importance attached to repackaging investment portfolios into high
dividend streams for ITC equity holders has today become enshrined
in many of the regulations surrounding the operations of ITCs.
However with the increasing internationalisat ion of financial markets
the opportunities available for such arbitrage operations have
been reduced considerably and consequently ITC portfolios have become
equity orientated. Given the need to incur expenses in the
intermediation process it is no surprise to note that the dividend
yields obtainable from ITCs working with equity portfolios have
consistently been lower than that obtainable in the market generally.
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During the nineteen fifties and early sixties ITC equity holders
found no particular difficulty in accepting this new role for their
intermediation veh i cl es . They could satisfy their income requirements
through holding ITC debt or preference equity and also make
substantial capital gains as ITC managements took advantage of the
gearing aspects of these instruments in the low interest and generally
bullish markets of the period.
Unfortunately the tax changes of the mid-nineteen sixties and in
particular the introduction of capital gains tax reduced the attraction
of ITCs as a vehicle for capital appreciation. At roughly the same
time and also for tax reasons it became more efficient for savings
to be channelled into equities through either net or gross funds.
Indeed this period saw the first major shift to the institutiona1isation
of the stock exchange described in section 1. A characteristic of
pension and insurance funds is that their liabilities must usually
be met in annuity form. It is then important for such funds to ensure
that their portfolios generate sufficient income to meet regular and
large cash outflows. While the major portion of these liabilities
will be met from gilt-edged investments an involvement in equities
provides both diversification and indeed necessary outlet for funds
given the sheer size of institutional cash inflows. These cash
inflows consistently make institutions net purchasers of securities.
Therefore the need to cover liabilities plus the effect of being net
purchasers tend to orientate institutional equities investment
policies towards returns with a significant dividend weighting.
Although to the extent that funds are willing to meet current liabilities
out of current contributions this effort would be reduced. As a
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large sector of the stock exchange ITCs found themselves under
pressure from this new breed of investor to gear their repackaging
efforts to the production of high dividend streams. With capital
gains tax effectively undermining an "asset growth" defence to
this pressure and perhaps with memories of the traditional ITC
role the sector acquiesced to this change of direction. However
as we noted above intermediation expenses and reduced arbitrage
opportunities made this a hazardous path indeed. The fact that
ITC dividend yields in spite of the discount have been consistently
and significantly lower than those on the rest of the market for
the major part of the decade is a partial indication both of the
sector's lack of success in meeting the requirements of the new
institutional owners and indeed of the difficulties involved in
achieving them. Dividend yields have also been influenced by
exposure to non-U.K. markets in particular the U.S. where the
dividend component of total return tends to be lower than in the U.K.
This lack of success was undoubtedly a factor in prompting the rush
of take-overs in the post 1975 period although as we noted earlier
the possibility of gaining access to an underlying ITC portfolio at
a discount would also be a relevant consideration on the part of any
aggressor.
Towards the end of the decade, perhaps as a result of the abolition of
capital gains tax and exchange controls creating an easier operating
environment but perhaps also as a result of the take-over pressure of
the previous years leading to a greater awareness of the need to
carefully define the intermediation product being offered the sector
began to investigate alternative services to those dominated by yield
and dividend considerations. Indeed since 1979 there has been
an increase in the number of ITCs that offer foreign exposure or
a specialisation in growth situations. It may well be that
during the nineteen eighties the sector can persuade institutional
investors of the merits of this change in direction. Certainly
in view of the nature of the institutional liabilities noted above
it is at least arguable that these new developments represent
investment strategies not readily available to the institutions.
The equity product being supplied by the ITC sector is then under¬
going a change of emphasis. It is however too early to judge
success or failure.
The sector has in addition to ordinary equity several other forms of
ownership interest outstanding. The various instruments are
summarised in Table l(xiv).
It is clear from Table (xiv) that ordinary equity is by far the
most important ownership instrument. Preference equity which
traditionally provided a limited ownership interest in return for
a constant and "preferred" income is something of an anachronism
given that debt can provide a similar income with the advantage
that service charges are tax deductible. Convertible debt by
offering a guaranteed income combined with the option of conversion
to ordinary equity has provided a reasonably attractive alternative
to both share issues at substantial discounts and direct borrowing
at high nominal rates. While the value importance of the other two












Ordinary Equity 70 95
Preference Equity 61 3
Convertible Debt 23 1
"B" Shares 23
Warrants 1 1
Notes : 1. Source : (i) Annual Accounts
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(i i) L. Messel1 S Co.
(iii) Laing & Cruickshank^
2. The percentage of total value is based on
full conversion and taken at market value.
Their introduction represented an attempt to provide an intermediation
product specifically geared to high tax payers. In distinguishing
between investors in different tax brackets "B" shares are similar
in this respect to the capital shares available from split level trusts.
62. L. Messel1 5 Co., Investment Trust Companies 1980.
63. Laing & Cruickshank, Investment Trust Handbook I98O.
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Although we deal with the tax status of "B" shares in chapter 2
we note in passing that as these advantages were eliminated in
64
1975 they too represent an anachronism.
(ii) Gearing Characteristics : The sensitising of an equity
involvement in an ITC by allowing management to borrow has tradition¬
ally been one of the most publicised advantages of the ITC inter¬
mediation service. Although the precise effect of borrowing will
vary depending on the characteristics of the debt instrument
introduced there are several general points which should be noted.
Borrowing allows managers to obtain higher returns for a given equity
stake under two circumstances. First of all they must correctly
anticipate a bull position for their investment portfolios. Secondly
the results of their investment decisions must cover the cost of
borrowing. As debt servicing costs are tax allowable and contain no
elements of profit sharing the income benefits from gearing can be
considerable. However what are benefits under bull conditions tend
to be disadvantages in bear markets. If investment returns are
reduced then the fixed nature of prior charges may well become a
real burden to the equity interest. While the suggested advantages
of gearing are to a large extent determined by managements' ability
to make correct investment assessments the ability to raise
substantial borrowings is certainly a facility that many individuals
and institutions do not have access to.
At this stage it should be noted that there is a substantial literature
in finance centred on analysing the effects of gearing on company
64. Finance Act (No. 2), 1975, H.M.S.O.
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valuations. If gearing effects the market value of a firm the
possibility of an optimum gearing level exists. On the other hand
if valuation is determined purely by the economic value of the
underlying assets and not by the methods of financing them then
company valuations will be insensitive to any substitution of
debt for equity. This latter position is of course the one
initially proposed by Modigliani and Miller.^ While their first
pass at the area has been modified considerably over the years and
in particular with regard to taxation and the observable existence
of investor groups wi thdiffering marginal tax rates the essence of
their initial article at least at the individual company level is
66
sti11 persuasive. A direct implication of the Modigliani and
Miller proposition is that while the overall valuation of the
company will not change as the equity proportion is reduced the
expected return on this equity will rise to compensate shareholders
for the fact that the unchanged business risk of the company is now
concentrated on a smaller equity investment. The relationship
between the expected return to shareholders and changes in risk
arising from changes in gearing levels has been investigated by
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Hamada. His results indicate that the trade-off is positive as
predicted by Miller and indeed that gearing may account for between
21 to 2k% of priced or systematic risk.
Virtually all ITCs have some elements of gearing. However to
obtain a noticeable effect on performance the amount of borrowing
65. F. Modigliani, M. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance, and the Theory of Investment", American Economic Review,
June, 1958, k8, pp. 261-297.
66. M. Miller, "Debt and Taxes", Journal of Finance (32), 2, May 1977.
67. R. Hamada, "The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the System¬
atic Risk of Common Stocks", Journal of Finance, 1972, pp ^35-^52.
may have to be considerable. Thus the debt instruments involved
tend to be debentures or loan stock and usually secured. A
characteristic for such instruments is that they are essentially
long-term. In taking on this form of funding then management
are "betting" not on short term market fluctuations but rather
on their long-term investment strategies. This of course exposes
the geared ITCs to short-term market falls. To meet this danger
many ITCs cover an anticipated bear market by switching from equities
to either cash or gilt-edged securities. If anticipations are
realised this will effectively neutralise the disadvantages of being
geared in a bear market.
Table 1(xv) details the gearing levels for the 101 largest ITCs.
As the data in Table 1(xv) is based on account year ends which vary
considerably from ITC to ITC any conclusions must be considered
tentative. It is apparent that adjusting for the fixed interest
elements in ITC portfolios substantially reduces and in many cases
removes completely any gearing effects. Indeed the average gearing
level is reduced from 8% of gross assets to 1%. However these
average figures hide the very real differences in gearing levels
between different ITCs. On an "actual gearing" basis the range is
from 0 to 23% of gross assets while on the "effective" basis the
range is -17% to 16%. There is no single explanation of these
differences. While the data problem noted above is undoubtedly




Gearing Levels as a Percentage of Gross Assets




















Aberdeen Trust 2 0 Continental Union 12 9 Investing in Success 16 -1 Scottish American 7 1
Alliance Investment 20 8 Drayton Commercial 6 2 Investors' Capital 13 b Scottish Eastern b 0
A11iance Trust 3 -8 Crayton Consolidated 9 -1 Keystore 6 1 Scottish Investment 12 -1
American Trust 3 -6 Drayton Premier 5 0 Lakeview b 3 Scottish Mortgage 2 -2
Anglo-American Sec. 5 0 Edinburgh American 18 1 London £ Holyrood 2 -1 Scottish National 9 -7
Anglo-Scottish 15 -2 Edinburgh Investment 18 10 London £ Lomond ]b 5 Scottish Northern 10 3
Ashdown 3 -2 Electric £ General b -6 London £ Montrose 1 -2 Scottish Ontario 2 -5
Atlantic Assets 12 -2 English £ International 7 b London £ Provincial 2 0 Scottish United lb 10
Atlas, Electric £ General 8 7 Eng1ish £ New York 2 -8 London Trust 29 16 Second A11iance 5 -9
Bankers 2 -b English £ Scottish b 3 Mercantile 13 -7 Securities Trust 10 3
Berry 25 6 Externa 1 0 0 Merchants 1 -7 Sphere 10 3
Bishopga te 9 b First Scottish Am. 6 6 Monks 8 7 Ster1ing b 7
Border £ Southern 2 1 Foreign £ Colonial 20 8 Murray Caledonian 17 -1 Stockho1ders 5 0
British American £ General 1 -13 General Consolidated 5 b Murray CIydesda1e 13 3 Temple Bar 3 -1
British Assets 13 3 General Funds 27 9 Murray Northern b 0 Throgmorton 5 3
British Investment 3 -9 General Investors ]b -1 Murray Western 13 1 T rans-Ocean 3 -b
Broadstone b -1 General Scottish 12 -5 1928 7 3 T r ibune 0 -13
Brunner 2 -b Glasgow Stockholders 10 9 North Atlantic Sec. 7 9 Trust Union 9 8
Capital £ National 2 -1 G1 obe 3 5 Northern American 11 7 Trustees b 3
Ca rd i na 1 28 12 Great Northern 3 -7 Outwich 6 b United British Sec. 1 -3
Cedar 2 b Guardian 3 2 Pent 1 and 3 -3 US and General 1 0
Charter Trust 5 -3 Hambros 10 -11 Raeburn 3 -6 US Debenture 2 0
CI averhouse 0 0 Phi1ip Hill 8 5 .Romney 7 5 Wi nterbottom 8 -1
CLRP 1 2 10 Industrial £ General 6 6 RIT 29 -17 Wi tan 7 1
Colonia1 3 -b 1nternationa1 8 7 St. Andrews 6 -6 Yeoman 6 b
Continental £ Industrial 8 -5
Notes: 1. Source; L. Messel & Co.68
2. The gearing elements consist of all prior charges valued at market (Excludes convertibles).
3- The effective gearing percentage is calculated as follows : Actual gearing level x
Less : Fixed interest portion of the ITCs1 portfolios <x>
Plus : Nominal value of convertibles x
Effective gearing level xx
68. L. Messel £ Co. Investment Trust Companies.
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requiring different levels of borrowing and indeed different
managerial expectations as to interest rates and market conditions
will also be relevant.
From the late sixties onwards rising interest rates made it extremely
difficult for ITCs to take profitable advantage of their gearing
potential. Indeed this is to some extent borne out by the quite
conservative levels of gearing indicated by Table 1 (xv) . However
even at these low levels interest changes accounted for up to
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approximately 20% of the sector's gross revenue.
Some idea of the various types of debt instruments used by ITCs
during the nineteen seventies can be gained from Table l(xvi).
We have included convertibles and preference stock in this table.
As they have characteristics common to both ownership and debt instruments
the decision of including them under either equity or debt rather
depends on the purpose of the analysis.
Overseas loans are the largest single element and they represent an
alternative although as we note later a less preferred route to
foreign securities compared to the purchase of investment currency.
We deal in detail with these items in Chapter 2 .
However perhaps the most important point to emerge from Table (xvi)
is confirmation that gearing levels have for the reaons noted above
been extremely low during the nineteen seventies. We summarise




Outstandinq Prior Charges at Market Value
(150 ITCs)
£m {%)
Debt Instrument 31/12/76 30/11/78 31/10/79
Convertibles 150.A (15) 86.3 (9) 53.6 (7)
Overseas Loans; 418.9 (44) 495.8 (51) 366.1 (45)
Back to back S Swaps 99.8 85.6 66.5
EEC Supplement 35 N/A 27.4 10.7
Mu 11i-Cu rrency 319.1 382.8 288.9
Debentures; 245.3 (26) 224.1 (23) 235.2 (29)
Redeemable 213.3 192.8 203.4
1rredeemab1e 32.0 31.3 31 .8
Preference Stocks 132.8 (14) 127.2 (13) 128.6 (16)
Other 14.2 (1) 36.1 (4) 30.0 (3)
TOTALS 961.6 (100) 969.5 (100) 813-5 (100)
Notes : 1. Source, Wood Mackenzie S CoJ®
70'. Wood Mackenzie S Co. Investment Trust Annual 1980.






Gearing 31/12/76 30/11/78 31/10/79
Prior Charges/
Gross Assets 16 15 11
Notes : 1. Source : Tables l(iii) and l(xvi)
(iii) Investment Strategies : iTC portfolios represent the raw
material input for the repackaged claims we described earlier. We
noted that historically ITCs had exploited the interest arbitrage
opportunities that arose between the U.K. and foreign fixed interest
securities but that this had given way in the post-war period to
strategies based primarily on equity participation. The extent to
which equities dominated ITC portfolios in the 1970s can be seen
from Tables l(xviii) and l(xix). The data for these tables is
sourced from CSO and Bank of England publications and covers ITCs




Investments at December 31
'97' - '980 (£m)
Asset Caption 1971 1972 1973 1974 ' 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Short-term Assets
U.K. 136 281 460 558 347 345 268 321 250 200
Non-U.K. 22 37 95 112 37 52 37 62 66 64
Short-term Liabilities
U.K. 52 116 110 55 53 61 68 49 45 60
Non-U.K. 6 16 57 47 12 14 14 19 28 16
Net Current Position 100 186 440 611 319 322 223 315 243 188
Gilts 105 64 65 82 158 164 321 232 260 234
Local Authority Securities 1 2 25 25 11 6 5 3 2 _
Overseas Government Securities 1 1 2 24 7 4 2 28 2 2
Total Public Sector Securities 107 67 92 131 176 174 328 263 264 236
U.K. Company Securities
1. Quoted; Loan 113 168 1 10 54 76 84 95 68 42 30
Preference 80 73 55 37 46 48 54 61 40 39
Ordinary 35^7 4099 2560 1148 2606 2584 3591 3513 3251 3758
2. Unquoted; Loan 20 23 20 17 23 17 21 28 13 18
Preference 10 11 10 8 8 7 7 1 1 12 23
Ordina ry 97 162 160 171 183 127 138 156 158 250
3. Other 42 62 65 86 779 79 87 91 116 111
Total U.K. Company Securities 3909 4598 2980 1521 3021 3021 3993 3928 3632 4229
Non U.K. Company Securities
Loan 45 62 50 41 65 93 70 74 55 74
Preference 24 20 23 21 16 19
12 12 8 12
Ordina ry 1545 2553 1990 1385 2016 2459
1891 1999 1766 2696
Other 29 29 23 29 37 53 47 85 27 23
Total Non-U.K. Company Securities 1643 2664 2086 1476 2134 2624
2020 2170 1856 2805
Net Assets - Total 5759 7515 5598 3739 5650 6066 6564 6676 5995 7458
Notes : 1. Sources, Bank of England, Quarterly Review^
Financial Statistics^
7». Bank of England QuaiLerly Revicw - Various Issues 1970-1978.
72. Financial Statistics (C.S.O.) - Various Issues 1975-1980.
TABLt 1 (xix)
Investment Trust Companies
Investment Proportions; Summary Statistics
1970 ~ 1980
(%)
Ca tegory 1971 1972 1973 197^ 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
A) Balance Sheet Categories :
Neet Current Position 2 2 8 16 6 5 3 5 b 2
Public Sector Securities 2 1 2 b 3 3 5 b b 3
Corporate Securities 96 97 90 80 91 92 92 91 92 95
B) Fixed Interest and Equity :
Fixed Interest 9 8 ]b 25 13 13 ]b 12 11 8
Equity 91 92 86 75 87 87 86 88 89 92
C) Quoted and Unquoted :
Quoted 97 96 95 92 3b 97 95 3b 95 96
Unquoted 3 b 5 8 6 3 5 6 5 b
D) U.K. and Foreign :
U.K. 71 6b 61 57 62 56 69 66 68 62
Foreign 29 36 39 " b3 38 bb 31 3^ 32 38
Notes 1. Source : Tabl e-1 (xv i j i)
It is clear from these tables that corporate securities and in
particular quoted corporate equities consistently dominated ITC
portfolios throughout the decade. Noteworthy is the 197^+
portfolio composition. As we detailed above December 197^
represented the lowest point in the bear crash of that year. However
while there will obviously be differences between ITCs the overall
move to liquidity although significant was not dramatic. The net
current position went to 16% and the fixed interest involvement
to 25%. Corporate securities however still accounted for 80% of
assets with equities alone accounting for 75% of assets.
The allocation of ITC portfolios between quoted and unquoted
securities emphasises just how small is the sectors' involvement
with off-market securities. Again there will be variations between
ITCs which would hide the extent of a particular management's
involvement. In addition the unquoted exposure is usually measured
at the lower of cost or directors' valuation which may well understate
the true economic value of these investments. However given the
publicity that very often surrounds an ITC involvement in unquoted
situations it is revealing that the sector's involvement as a whole
is so limited. It could well be that the institutional pressure
is to deliver dividend dominated products noted previously has
mitigated against allocating search expenditure for the possibility
of capital dominated returns.
The international exposure of many ITC portfolios is well known and
indeed this is reflected in U.K. ; non.U.K. portfolio proportions
described in Table l(xix). Foreign investments accounted for more
than 30% of the sectors' assets in seven of the 10 years. Given
the difficulties of investing abroad caused by the premium currency
pool it is perhaps surprising that non-U.K. exposure was maintained
at such a high level. Undoubtedly traditional expertise in
dealing with foreign investments and the perceived benefits of
international diversification were important factors in sustaining
foreign portfolio levels. Table 1(xx) details the geographical
spread achieved by the sector during the decade.
The U.S. was clearly the main recipient of ITC funds. Indeed 20 to
25% of the sector's assets were deployed there. The U.S. markets
in terms of size dominate those of other countries and therefore
a substantial U.S. concentration is to be expected. Australia
and Japan provided opportunities for the bulk of the remaining
international funds.
A critical variable in maintaining a foreign portfolio is the
additional risk implied by currency movements. The most practical
way of insuring against this is to match currency investments with
currency borrowings. Table l(xxi) gives a very approximate
comparison between foreign assets and foreign funding.
It is clear from Table l(xxi) that the bulk of foreign security
purchases were made through the premium market and not by foreign
currency borrowing. The risk reduction properties of hedging were
apparently less than the costs of gearing. We return to this area





Geographical Spread of Non-■U.K.





Country 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
U.S. 19 20 21 22 22 26 19 18 18 22
CANADA 2 2 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 3
m m o N/A 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
JAPAN N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 5
AUSTRALIA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 2 2
STERLING AREA 4 6 6 6 5 4 3 N/A N/A N/A
OTHER 4 5 5 8 5 8 5 9 5 4
TOTAL 29 36 39 43 38 44 31 34 32 38
Notes : 1. Sources : As per Table l(xviii)
TABLE l(xxi)
Investment Trust Companies
Foreign Debt & Foreign Assets
31/12/76, 30/11/78, 30/10/79
(£m)
Description 31/12/76 30/11/78 30/10/79
Foreign Assets 2669.0 2269.8 1918.4
Foreign Funding 418.9 495.8 366.1
Notes : 1. Source : Tables l(xvi) and l(xviii)
International diversification has traditionally been accompanied by
sector diversification. The concept of risk spreading has been an
important aspect of ITC management and provides a promotional base
for the sector's appeal to the individual investor in particular.
Until recently it was difficult to find any ITC where the portfolio
distribution did not include securities from virtually all the main
stock market sectors. However towards the end of the decade some
of the smaller ITCs made moves to specialise in the more technologica11
complex investment areas. A particularly attractive investment
area given the two oil crises of the nineteen seventies was energy
and several ITCs developed substantial interests in this sector.
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Whi1e diversification i s sti11 seen.as an important aspect of the
intermediation service offered by ITCs this is now being achieved
with a smaller number of securities than has previously been the
case. Indeed based on the available published information for the
one hundred largest ITCs the average number of securities per
portfolio has dropped from 308 in 1971 to 216 in 1980. Interestingly,
and it is an area to which we return, results based on modern portfolio
theory suggest that adequate diversification may be obtained with
as few as 20 or 30 securities.
In.addition to diversification most ITC managers maintain that a
decision to use an ITC intermediation vehicle is essentially a
long-term investment decision. ITC management in assessing the
various investment opportunities is not it is suggested actively
trading securities for short-term gains. Instead investment
decisions are reached on the basis of long-term considerations. Thus
>1
in order to gain the full rewards of management endeavours shareholders
in turn should not actively trade their ITC holdings. Given the
assumed efficiency of capital markets this of course would not be
considered a theoretically valid claim. Indeed attempts to distinguish
between the short and long term could be viewed as attempts to cover
poor management performance! Whether or not investors consider an
ITC investment as long term or not they will certainly be interested
in the portfolio trading strategies and the resulting expenses
incurred by managers.
(iv) Management Intermediation Costs : The use by investors of the
intermediation services offered by ITCs is not a costless exercise.
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The three most obvious costs are trading expenses, management
expenses and tax charges. We deal with taxation in Chapter 2.
From an accounting point of view trading expenses are capital
items dealt with through the balance sheet. Indeed these expenses
are invariably netted off against the investment realization
account and are not shown separately. The majority of ITC
managers would consider the disclosure of such information imprudent.
However following various informal discussions with managers it
would appear that trading expenses would approximately double the
disclosed management expenses.
ITC income statements highlight management expenses as a general
caption including salaries, administration expenses, investment search
fees etc. With the independent ITCs these will be the actual
expenses incurred. However management groups very often charge
central expenses to member ITCs on a contractual basis. Table l(xxii)
details the management expenses incurred by the 101 largest ITCs.
At first glance the level of management expenses being incurred by
ITCs is reasonably moderate. Approximately 6% of gross revenue as
an allocation to cover operating expenses would not appear excessive.
However ITC managers consider such expenses as a critical operating
variable. The reason for this is not difficult to identify. Indeed
given the comments noted earlier it is clear that institutional
investors with their preference for income may well actively pressure
ITCs to minimise these expenses. In addition as many institutions
have their own equity research departments they will tend to place
a limited value on the intermediation expenses incurred by ITCs.
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TABLE 1(xxii)
ITCs - Management Expenses as a Percentage
of Gross Assets and Gross Revenue
(101 1 TCs 1980 Accountin g Year
(%)
Gross Gross Gross Gross Trust Gross Gross Gross G ros sTrust Assets Revenue Assets Revenue Assets Revenue Trust Assets Revenue
Aberdeen Trust 0.293 5-21 Continenta1 Union 0.389 6.15 Investing in Success 0.455 9-37 Scottish American O.36O 5.62
Alliance Investment 0.1476 7.90 Drayton Commerical 0.388 5.46 Investors' Capital 0.334 5.47 Scottish Eastern 0.236 3.75
Aliiance Trust 0.200 3-29 Drayton Consolidated 0.320 5.29 Keystone 0.454 4.98 Scottish Investment 0.226 4.27
American Trust 0. A18 7.76 Draylon Premier 0.355 4.98 Lakeview 0.367 5.22 Scottish Mortgage 0.299 4.50
Anglo-American Sec. 0.2149 3-70 Edinburgh American 0.429
11 .34 London £ Holyrood 0.348 5-74 Scottish National 0.273 5-94
Anglo Scottish O.I456 7.28 Edinburgh Investments 0.239
3.99 London £ Lomond 0.433 6.11 Scottish Northern 0.402 6.82
Ashdown 0.1437 6.85 Electric £ General 0 .*420
8.20 London £ Montrose 0.258 5.65 Scottish Ontario 0.356 4.94
Atlantic Assets O.5I46 1 1 .31 English £ International 0.485 6.23 London £ Provincial 0.236 3-96 Scottish United 0.312 5-51
Atlas, Electric £ General 0.287 I4.3I* English £ New York 0.3145 4-99
London Trust 0.478 6.76 Second A11iance 0.195 3.67
Bankers 0.377 i* • 95 English £ Scottish 0.^78 7.15 Mercanti1e 0.320 4.37 Securities Trust 0.301 4.08
Berry 0.391* 8.68 Externa 1
0.481 5-94 Merchants 0.319 4.97 Sphere 0.277 4.14
Bishopgate 0.281 1*. 17 First Scottish Am. 0.245
3-85 Monks 0.321 5.06 Ster1ing 0.300 4.62
Border £ Southern 0.295 6.37 Foreign £ Colonial 0.338 6.51 Murray Caledonian 0.301 6.76 Stockiol ders 0.418 6.82
British American £ General O.I4I49 5.66 General Consolidated 0.357
4.21 Murray Clydesdale 0.301 6.93 Temple Bar 0.411 4.38
British Assets O.I483 7.7i* General Funds 0.393 8.37 Murray Northern 0.442 8.52 Throgmorton 0.475 5-67
British Investment 0.252 3.70 General Investors 0.653 9-35 Murray Western 0.319 6.13 T rans-Ocean 0.363 5-93
Broadstone O.36I4 5-60 General Scottish 0.533 6.96 1928 0.355 4.08 T ribune 0.428 7.24
Brunner 0.355 5-1*0 Glasgow Stockholders 0.363 6.77 North Atlantic Sec. 0.219 4.31 Trust Union 0.295 4.45
Capital £ National 0.271 5.27 Globe 0.5Q9 5.90
Northern American 0.226 3.69 T rustees 0.286 4.52
Cardinal 0.531 8.28 Great Northern 0.281 3.68 Outwich 0.328 5.30 United British Sec. 0.173 3.44
Cedar 0.31*1* 5-97 Guardian 0.252 3.79 Pent 1 and 0.345 4.94 U.S. £ General 0.309 4.47
Charter Trust 0.1407 5.26 Hambros 0.316 6.45 Raeburn 0.324 4.33 U.S. Debenture 0.411 5.42
C1 averhouse 0.388 I4.9O Phi 1ip Hill 0.350 4.25 Romney 0.349 4.99 Wi nterbottom 0.452 7.44
CLRP 0.1+00 7.07 Industrial £ General 0.202 3.20
RIT 0.145 2.98 Wi tan 0.363 6.04
Col onia 1 0.531 8.OI4 1nternationa1 0.327 4.96 St. Andrew 0.378 5.16 Yeoman 0.557 6.96
Continental £ Industrial 0.291 3.58
Notes: 1. Source : L. Messel £ Co .73
2. Averages (i) Management Expenses/Gross Assets - 0.35%
(ii) Management Expenses/Gross Reyenue - 5-67%.
73. L. Messel £ Co., Investment Trust Companies, 1980.
) Aspects of ITC Intermediation Services : We now turn to consider the
intermediation services offered by ITCs during the 1970s. We do this
under the two intermediation categories suggested in Section 1 namely
transaction costs and information costs.
(i) Transaction Costs : The following four areas of transaction






Although we deal in detail with taxation in Chapter 2 it is
already clear that compared to other equity intermediation
vehicles ITCs do not provide a tax efficient savings route.
In looking at the potential for economies of scale in relation
to information production and assimilation the pooling of
investment funds may well lead to scale based cost reductions.
However given the doubts about the extent of such economies of
scale for management groups it may well be that these
benefits are more appropriately considered in relation to the
independent ITCs.
As we noted earlier the minimum commission system favours the
management of large portfolios and to the extent that ITCs do
not undertake excessive portfolio changes this is an area of
cost efficiency. This efficiency has particular relevance in
the context of MPT where ITC equity may provide investors with
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cost effective access to a diversified portfolio. On the
other hand, given the rules of the stock exchange, it is
unlikely that on a transaction cost basis ITCs have any
particular advantage over other investors as regards the
purchase of the liquidity services provided by jobbers.
We find it difficult to establish a significant role for ITCs
based solely on an ability to exploit the transaction cost
function. There are certainly benefits available through the
pooling of investment funds but these benefits are common to
most other equity intermediaries. In addition the tax
inefficiency of using ITCs would very probably outweigh any
scale benefits.
(ii) Information Costs : As we suggested earlier the production of
information that can be used privately to construct portfolios
is a possible intermediation rationale and indeed one that is
particularly applicable to ITCs. The information produced could
be used for a variety of portfolio purposes including security
selection, market timing and the maintenance of well diversified
portfolios. Given the increasing presence of small and sometimes
unquoted investments in many ITC portfolios it could be argued
that an additional effect of information production is the
dissemination of information about these companies. Any resulting
increase in marketability is clearly beneficial to the company.
Unfortunately the problem of signalling information quality
remains. To some extent past performance may act as a signal.
However this may be but a poor guide to the future. In addition
ITC managers do not usually hold the size of equity interest in
p
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the ITCs they manage implied by our earlier arguments.
Interestingly it is widely known that ITCs are considered
as first class bank customers and can usually radse loans
and establish facilities in many different currencies with
relative ease. Clearly elements of signalling are present
but the format is more complex than mere equity stakes.
We suggest that although transaction costs may well have a role to
play the production and use of information is at the centre of the
ITC intermediation service. The precise form that the production
of information takes will vary from ITC to ITC. As we noted above
some managers may prefer to exercise skills at security selection
others at diversification and still others may attempt to time markets.
Finally we note, perhaps a little nervously, that although we have
taken a positive view that ITCs do in fact have an intermediation
role to play we do recognise the strong alternative hypothesis that
there may not in fact be such a role! Writing in a different context
Miller has noted that;
"... neutral mutations that serve no function but do no
harm can persist indefinitely1^
Summary : In this chapter we have developed and explained the principal
characteristics of financial intermediation under the two headings of
transaction costs and information costs. From this position we
reviewed both the history of ITCs in general and the decade of the
nineteen seventies in particular. Finally we suggested the relevance
of the various aspects of financial intermediation discussed to ITCs.












ISSUE of £150,000, in CERTIFICATES of £100 EACH at PAR,
of which a large portion has been already subscribed.
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The Certificates will bear interest at £6 per cent, per annum, payable Half-
Yearly, on 1st May and 1st November in each year, at the Head Office, or any of the
Branches of the British Linen Company's Bank, in Scotland, or at Messrs Smith,
Payne, & Smith's, London.
The first Coupon of £3 per Certificate will be payable on 1st November 1873.
A portion of the Certificates will be redeemed annually out of surplus income to
the extent of the available Funds, by Tender from the Certificate Holders.
The Trust to terminate at the end of ten years, when the Investments will be
realized, and the proceeds divided pro rata among the holders of the Certificates re¬
maining unredeemed.
JTrusttts.
THOMAS H. COX, Esq. (.Messrs Cox Brothers, Dundee.)
JOHN GUILD, Esq. (Messrs J. & R. Guild, Dundee.)
JOHN SHARP, Esq., Dundee.
THOMAS SMITH, Esq. (Messrs Henry Smith ii Co., Dundee.)
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The British Linen Company's Bank.
Sjulixitors.
Messrs SHIELL & SMALL, 5 Bank Street, Dundee.
Itfrflktrs.
ANDREW OGILVIE, Esq., Royal Exchange Buddings, Dundee.
Messrs "W. <k R. RITCHIE, G Panmure Street, Dundee.
RICHARD A. MILLER, Esq., 27 Panniure Street, Dundee.




1 Royal Exchange Place, Dundee.
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75. Published as a Supplement to the 1973 Annual Accounts.
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On Friday, 7th February, 1873 a prospectus was published in the Dundee
Courier and Argus and the Dundee Advertiser inviting the subscription of
£150,000 for a new Trust to be called "The Scottish American Investment
Trust," whose funds would be "invested solely in the Bonds of States,
Cities, Railroads and other corporations and undertakings in the United
States, but chiefly in the Mortgage Bonds of Railroads there."
The great movement to the West was under way in America and demand for
money to finance railroad construction was high. Robert Fleming, later
to found the Merchant Bank that bears his name, was then confidential
clerk to the Chairman of Baxter Brothers, a firm of jute spinners in
Dundee, and following a visit to the U.S.A. in 1870 he became enthusiastic
about the possibilities that existed for investment in that country. It
was decided that an investment trust would be the best medium for this, and
under his guidance a trust deed was prepared, sponsored by a number of
prominent local men, and a prospectus was produced setting out the detailed
proposals so that members of the public could participate. Industry in
Dundee had prospered during the American civil war, with the result that
substantial funds were available locally.
The stated advantages of the Trust were the high rate of interest - six
per cent - the distribution of risk by spreading the funds over a number
of investments and the prospect of repayment of capital at a profit at the
end of ten years. The public response to this invitation to provide funds
for professional investment management was a substantial oversubscription
as a result of which an amended prospectus was issued on 10th February,
1973 increasing the size of the Trust to £300,000. This again was ovei—
subscribed.
The enthusiastic reception given to this issue led to a flood of similar
flotations elsewhere, and in consequence it is regarded by many as marking
the start of the investment trust movement as we know it today, although
it was not in fact the first investment trust, being partly modelled on
the Foreign S Colonial Trust which had been founded five years previously
in London.
A financial crisis developed on Wall Street shortly after the formation,
and it is a tribute to the early management that the investments performed
well during the difficult initial period.
Two almost identical issues were made in the following two years described
as the "Second Issue" and the "Third Issue" of The Scottish American
Investment Trust respectively, and then in 1879, in view of doubt cast on
the legal status of similar trusts in England, the three issues were incor¬
porated as separate limited companies called the First Scottish American
Trust Company Limited, The Second Scottish American Trust Company Limited
and The Third Scottish American Trust Company Limited with similar capital
structures consisting at that time entirely of Ordinary Stock.
In 1910 the investment powers were extended to include Stocks and Bonds of
companies in the U.K. and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, partly
because a sister Company, The Northern American Trust Company Limited,
whose more modern capital structure included fixed interest securities, was
increasing its revenue more rapidly than this Company, borrowing powers
were introduced and issued of Debenture Stocks followed shortly thereafter.
These were relatively substantial, no less than £250,000 Debenture Stock
being issued in one year at a time when the valuation of investments was
only £620,000. The next major change took place in 1927 when the Ordinary
Capital was divided into Ordinary and Preference Stock, the effect being
to reduce the nominal amount of Ordinary Capital from £300,000 to £120,000.
These measures, and subsequent issues of Debenture Stocks over the years
created very high gearing which caused considerable concern during the
difficult years of the thirties, but also made possible the very rapid
increase in the net asset value per Ordinary Share which took place after
the Second World War.
During all this time the policies of the three Companies were identical.
Indeed on some occasions in the early days meetings of the Stockholders
of all three were held simultaneously, and more than once reference was
made at the meeting of one Company to decisions which had been taken in the
case of the others. The desirability of amalgamating them was discussed at
intervals throughout their existence, but it was not until 1970 that this
step was finally taken and the Second and Third Companies were merged into
this Company by means of a Scheme of Arrangement.
Now, one hundred years after its inception, the Company has investments of
well over £40,000,000 and almost 6,000 Ordinary Shareholders as well as
about 4,000 holders of the different categories of fixed interest stock.
It is interesting looking back over the years to note some of the major
changes in emphasis and policy which have taken place. For example until
1910 the portfolio was entirely invested in fixed interest securities
and thereafter the percentage in equities grew slowly. Twenty years later
the Companysti 1.1 had only 20% in Ordinary Shares, and in 1938 39%. By
1948 this proportion had risen to 56% and the equity percentage has risen
steadily since then to the present, an almost total reversal of the
original state.
Big changes have also taken place in the areas chosen for investment. The
initial portfolio was invested entirely in securities in the U.S.A. (where
the pound at that time commanded a premium over the dollar) and this
continued until the early years of this century when growing percentages
in South America and Cuba were recorded, but the percentage in the U.K.
was still minimal. At the beginning of the 1914-18 War a proportion of
the U.S. securities were sold and reinvested in U.K. Government securities
for patriotic reasons and the balance of the U.S. securities were deposited
on loan with the Treasury. Between the Wars the funds in the U.S.A.
remained at a low level, and in the years immediately before the outbreak
of the Second World War the proportion there varied between twenty and
thirty per cent. Incidentally, in 1938 when the valuation of The First
Company was some £1.3 million, there were no less than 844 separate holdings
During the Second World War virtually the entire U.S. portfolio was liquid¬
ated by the Government to provide dollars for the War effort, leaving the
Company at the end of the War almost exclusively in U.K. investments. In
the early post war years new considerations had to be taken into account.
The dollar was very strong in relation to the pound and the now familiar
dollar premium first came on the scene at this time and continued despite
devaluation of the pound. As capital controls were eased the U.S. percent¬
age was steadily built up again, and although the dollar premium and, more
recently, currency surrender requirements and tax considerations have
prevented a return to the very high historical percentages held in the U.S.A
a substantial part of the portfolio has been there ever since. The Company
has for many years had Canadian holdings also, and in the last few years
investments in the flourishing economies of the Far East have made their
appearance as well. The risks of investing in equities in such areas
sometimes appear very great, but one should not be misled by the fact
that the early investments were all in Bonds, into thinking that they
were therefore risk-free. The first few years of the Trust coincided
with heavy falls on Wall Street, particularly in railroad securities and
it is amusing to see that the telegraphic code word chosen to report
that all interest payments had been made on the due dates on the Trust's
early holdings was 'MIRACULOUS.' Dollar loans were introduced in 1968
order to increase the flexibility with which the dollar holdings could














1NTRODUCTI ON : The provision of an ITC intermediation service is
conditioned by several institutional parameters within which ITC
managers must operate. It is very difficult to accurately quantify
the effect of having to comply with regulations and indeed compliance
does not necessarily imply cost. For example in the field of taxation
there are considerable benefits to ITCs in organising their operations
in such a way as to fall within the tax definition of an ITC.
Our objective in this chapter is therefore not a quantitative one.
Rather we are concerned with describing the operating environment
over which managers have no direct control but within which they must
make decisions as to nature of the intermediation service they can
best provide. An understanding of the operating environment is a
necessary pre-requisite to any attempt at suggesting the current inter¬
mediation gap ITCs are best suited to fill.
This chapter is divided into the following four sections which we





1. Statutory Environment : As limited liability companies incorporated
under one of several Companies Acts ITCs are like other incorporated
companies subject to certain statutory controls. These statutory controls
are mainly found in the Companies Act 19^+8. This Act codified and
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extended both the then existing statute law and much of the relevant
case law. Since 1948 there have been four more Companies Acts in
1967, 1976, 1980 and 1981. In addition further statutes may be
required to enact legislation under the EEC's harmonisat ion of company
law proposals. However in spite of these additional statutory
instruments the 19^8 Act remains very much the foundation of current
company law with subsequent legislation best being considered as
extending the legal parameters in certain specific directions.
While the Companies Acts deal with the general legal environment for all
incorporated companies other statutes cover specific business areas.
For example the problem of investor protection in the secondary markets
is covered by the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958. Other
areas of statutory involvement include banking (Banking Act 1979),
insurance (Insurance Companies Acts 197^, 1980, 1981, Policy Holders'
Protection Act 1975, Insurance Brokers Registration Act 1977) and
building societies (Building Societies Act 1962). There are no
specific statutes controlling the operations of ITCs or indeed unit
trusts although the latter are subject to rules issued directly by the
Department of Trade.
In reviewing the statutory environment in which ITCs operate our approach




(i) I ncorporation: The various implications that follow from
incorporation are perhaps the most fundamental result of U.K.
company law. We suggest that the implications that are of
most relevance to ITCs can be grouped into the following three
broad categories - legal form, limited liability and market
access. We deal with each in turn.
Following the decision in RE SALOMON it is clearly established
that an incorporated company has its own legal personnae.^ The
authority vested in this corporate legal personna is documented
in what is loosely called the company constitution. The two
main constituting documents are the Articles of Association and
the Memorandum of Association. Very broadly the Memorandum of
Association deals with the relationship between the company and
the public while the Articles of Association provide the internal
rules for the orderly running of the business.
A key aspect of all company constitutions is the objects clause
in the Memorandum of Association. We dealt with management
objectives in chapter 1. The statement of objectives included in
the Memorandum is considerably more general and indicates the broad
areas of business that the company can be involved in rather than
the specific repackaging services being offered by management.
The importance of the objects clause in the Memorandum is that it
sets out the activities that are legally within the remit of the
company. Transactions undertaken outwith this remit are ultra
vires and therefore null and void. This obviously puts a
considerable burden on those having dealings with an incorporated
company. It is their responsibility to ensure that any
1. RE SALOMON (1897), discussed in Charlesworth £ Cain "Company Law"
Ed. T. E. Cain, London (1972), chapter 1.
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transactions they involve themselves in with the company can be
legally enforced against the company. If the transactions are
ultra vires enforcement will not be possible and irrecoverable
losses may be incurred. Given the complexities and scale of the
current business world the doctrine of ultra vires appears unduly
onerous. Indeed both the Jenkins Report on company law reform and
the current E.E.C. thinking in this area accept that it is not
practical to expect those involved in dealings with companies to
be continually referring to objects clauses before entering into
2 3business transactions. There is in fact a strong recommendation
in the Jenkins Report that contracts made in good faith with
companies acting ultra vires should not be invalid. As this is not
U.K. law at present the doctrine of ultra vires retains its important
place in corporate law.
The objects clause of a company can of course be altered although
not retrospectively. The legal grounds for alteration which is
by special resolution of numbers are as follows;
11 i To carry on the business more economically and
efficiently.
ii To attain a main purpose by new or improved means,
iii To enlarge or change a local area of operations
iv To carry on a business which under existing circumstances
may be conveniently or advantageously combined with the
business of the company,
v To restrict or abandon any of the objects specified
in the memorandum.
2. Jenkins Report (1962), Cmnd 17^+9, para 2.
3. E.E.C. Fourth Directive on Company Law Reform.
8U
vi To sell or dispose of thewhole or any part of
the undertaking,
vii To amalgamate with any other company or body of
persons
While generally allowing the alteration or abandonment of existing
corporate objectives these "grounds" do not readily permit the
addition of new objectives. To avoid ultra vires transactions
corporate promoters attempt to ensure that "objects clauses" are
as all embracing as possible.
The objects clause of an ITC would typically include the following.
" i Dealing in property and all forms of securities,
ii Participating in company promotions and the underwriting
of new share issues,
iii Participating in the financial operations of syndicates
iv Dealing in life assurance policies - purchase or sales
of and loans there on.
v Making advances on, buying or selling or dealing in
commission claims on land and property,
vi Accepting, discounting and issuing promissary notes,
bills of exchange and other negotiable instruments.""'
In addition to a statement of objects the enabling documents of all
ITCs will contain details of the various investment and borrowing
powers available to the company. In particular the borrowing
powers of ITCs must be specifically documented. Interestingly
k. Companies Act, 19^8, S(5)•
5. H. Burton, D.C. Corner, Investment and Unit Trusts in Britain and
America. Elek Books. London, 1968, p.3-
85
this requirement is not nearly as rigorous for trading companies
where some level of indebtedness is assumed necessary to attain
6
corporate objectives.
In order to take advantage of either certain tax concessions
or of a stock exchange listing the Articles of Association of
ITCs, must specifically limit their investment policies both in
terms of certain types of investment and in their exposure to any
one investment. While such restrictions on investment policies
reflect current institutional regulations they have their roots
firmly in the long historical tradition of investor protection
promoted by the movement.
Not all financial intermediaries have an incorporated legal form.
For example unit trusts are trusts in the strict legal sense.
Funds managed under trust involve a more onerous responsibility
on managers than funds managed under commercial circumstances.
Gearing funds managed under trust is for example not permitted
under trust law. Thus unit trusts cannot normally borrow.
The second implication of incorporation we consider is limited
liability. The vast maj'ority of incorporated companies including
all the ITCs we are concerned with are incorporated with limited
liability. However it is possible to have incorporation with
either unlimited liability or by guarantee.^ The liability that is
limited is not that of the company but of its shareholders. Thus to
6.
7.
RE GENERAL AUCTION ESTATE CO. (1891), 3 CH. 432.
Companies Act 1948, S(l).
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the extent that a company has no uncalled amounts on equity in
issue the downside risk of an equity involvement in the company
is limited to the purchase price paid for the shares. Such
shareholder protection is not usually available to either partnership
participants or members of investment clubs. As creditors cannot
"see through" a limited liability company to 'the underlying owners
it is vital that the assets they can identify as belonging to the
company and therefore available to meet any liabilities are not
entirely distributable to the members. Indeed a considerable
proportion of company law is concerned with the maintenance of
what is often referred to as the "creditors' buffer" namely the company
assets.
To the shareholder the benefits of limited liability are clear.
Only in exceptional circumstances, usually related to fraud, can
liabilities in excess of the purchase price be incurred. Thus if
an ITC records substantial deficits there is no requirement on
individual shareholders to make good the losses. This protection
would be particularly important to the shareholder in a highly geared
ITC or one that involved itself in investment situations where the
potential liability was not limited. However we noted in chapter 1
that gearing levels in recent years have tended to be moderate and
portfolios have been dominated by quoted equities. At least to this
extent the protective shield provided by limited liability has not
been particularly important. Historically however gearing has
been at higher levels than at present. For example the arbitrage
operations we described in chapter 1 involved significant levels of
direct borrowing and in addition were often supported by an equity
base that was only partly paid. Similarly there is some evidence that
highly speculative ventures involving not arbitrage operations
g
but joint-venture or partnership stakes did attract ITC funds.
The final implication of incorporation we consider is market
access. Limited liability companies can be divided into private
companies and public companies. The shareholders in a private
company are restricted with respect to their total number and
their ability to transfer shares. The majority of private
companies are in fact small and very often owner-managed. Public
companies do not suffer any of these restrictions and as a con¬
sequence their shares tend to be widely held and easily transferabl
Public companies themselves can be divided into two categories -
those that have a stock exchange listing and those that do not.
We are concerned only with ITCs that do in fact have a stock
exchange quote.
Access to the stock exchange is of course important both in terms
of raising new capital and in providing liquidity for investors.
In addition as the product being supplied by ITC management is
packaged into the ITC's own equity the stock exchange represents
the market place for ITC services. It is important to note that
in terms of making the ITC product available to investors as wide
a market as possible is desirable. The stock exchange provides
such a market. We deal in section 3 with the questions of the
market environment.
8. T. Jackson, The Enterprising Scot. Edinburgh (1968).
The three implications of incorporation we have examined
are those with the most direct relevance to ITCs. They do not
however represent an exclusive list of the various effects of
incorporation. There are many others including some that assist
the day to day operations of ITCs. For example incorporation
allows ITCs to hold title to assets, to enter into contracts
and to undertake other legal obligation in the name of the ITC.
) Reserves : The reserves of ITCs occupy the most important and
perhaps the most controversial place in any discussion of the
institutional parameters within which ITCs must operate.
Reserves can be divided into capital reserves and revenue
reserves. The capital reserves of ITCs include the share capital
the net profits and losses on portfolio realisations and the
balancing adjustments required to show investments at market value
The revenue reserves represent the net income retentions after
distributions.
By far the most important legal aspect of reserves for all
incorporated companies is the distinction between the reserves
that are distributable and those that are not. We noted above
that creditors can only look to the company for settlement of any
outstanding liabilities and not to the underlying equity holders.
It is important then that the claims equity holders have over the
reserves of companies be restricted in order that distribution
policies do not adversely affect the claims of other interested
parties. Until the Companies Acts 1980 and 1981 statute law
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gave very little guidance either on the distributional status
of different reserves or on whether distributable reserves
were confined to those that had been realised. Exhibit 2(i)
summarises the position prior to the Companies Act 1980.
EXHIBIT 2(i)
The Availabi1ity of Corporate Reserves
for Distribution
(Prior to the Companies Act 1980)
1 . Share Capita1 : (i) Only distributable for certain
strictly defined purposes
usually connected with capital
reorganisation schemes.
(ii) Court approval required before
any distribution can be made.
2. Other Reserves : (i) There must be a reserve surplus
from which a distribution can
be paid.
(ii) A current year surplus can sup¬
port a dividend even although
the balance on the accumulated
reserve is in deficit.
(iii) A past surplus can support a
dividend even although a current
loss has been reported.
(iv) In England an unrealised surplus
can support a dividend. In
Scotland the surplus must have
been realised .
It is clear from Exhibit 2(i) that while share capital can only be
reduced in certain closely defined circumstances the distribution of
other reserves was less restricted. In practice and for reasons
related to investor rather than creditor protection the constituting
documents of most ITCs tend to be more restrictive than is laid down
by statute. For example capital distributions are not considered
prudent. We deal with investor protection below.
A major attempt was made in the 1980 Act to determine a set of rules
for calculating distributable profits. The basic rule is as follows;
"... a company's profits available for distribution are
its accumulated, realised profits, so far as not
previously utilised by distribution or capitalisation,
less its accumulated, realised losses, so far as not
previously written-off in a reduction or re-organisation
of cap i ta1 ..."9
However to guard against the possibility of a company with accumulated
net profits but severe liquidity difficulties attempting to make a
distribution the Act includes the following distributional restrictions
"... a public company may only make a distribution at
any time -
(a) if at that time the amount of its net assets is not
less than the aggregate of the company's called-up
share capital and its undistributable reserves; and
(b) if, and to the extent that, the distribution does
not reduce the amount of those assets to less than
that aggregate." 10,11
The main points of change introduced by the 1980 Act are as follows :
9. Companies Act 1980 S(39) para 2.
10. Companies Act 1980 S(A0) para 1.
11. A method of calculating undistributable reserves is given for
this specific section in S(4o) para 2.
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(i) There must be a net balance of accumulated profit;
12
(ii) This profit must be realized; and
(iii) There is an absolute limit on the level of distributions.
As it stands the above sections of the 1980 Act represent a useful
codification and extension of the law. However this usefulness
was noted at the drafting stage as being rather limited in regard
to ITCs. Two problems were identified. First of all for
distribution purposes these rules effectively removed any requirement
to distinguish between capital and revenue reserves. This distinction
as we noted above and will develop below is important to ITCs. Secondly
since 1970 there had been a tax definition of an ITC which if complied
with resulted in a substantial reduction in the tax intermediation
cost of using an ITC. In particular under the tax definition capital
dividends were not allowed and a high rather than a restricted pay-out
ratio was required. We deal with taxation in detail in the following
section.
Clearly the situation where two statues presented both different
definitions of distributable reserves and indeed took opposite views
as to the level of these reserves available for distribution was
undesirable. Indeed while it was certain that ITCs taking full
advantage of the 1980 Act would be in breach of both their Articles
of Association and the Taxes Act it was also possible that certain
ITCs especially those with objectives of capital growth could in
maintaining a high pay-out ratio as per the Taxes Act infringe the
restricting provisions of the 1980 Act.
12. While this is the general rule there are statutory exceptions.
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In order to avoid these problems 1980 Act defined "investment
companies" as a category of company distinct from other incorporated
companies and prescribed separate distribution rules for them. The
definition and rules are as follows;
Definition : "(i) That the business of the company consists of
investing its funds mainly in securities,
with the aim of spreading investment risk and
giving members of the company the benefit of
the results of the management of its funds.
(ii) That none of the company's holdings in companies
other than companies which are for the time
being investment companies represents more than
15% by value of the investing company's
investments.
(iii) That distribution of the company's capital profit
is prohibited by its memorandum or articles of
association.
(iv) That the company has not retained otherwise than
in compliance with this Part of the Act, in
respect of any accounting reference period more
than 15% of the income it derives from
securities."13
Rules : "... an investment company may also make a distribution
at any time out of its accumulated, realised revenue
profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution
or capitalisation, less its accumulated revenue losses
(whether realised or unrealised) so far as not previously
written off in a reduction or reorganisation of capital
duly made -
(a) if at that time the amount of its assets is at
least equal to one and a half times the aggregate
of its 1 iabi1ities and
(b) if, and to the extent that the distribution does
not reduce that amount to less than one and a
half times that aggregate."^
As the above definition is broadly the same as that for tax purposes
the possibility of statutory conflict has been removed. Similarly,
13- Companies Act 1980 S(4l) para 4.
14. Companies Act 1980 S (41) para 1.
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the separate rules provide a practical limit on distribution policies
that is reasonable for all ITCs irrespective of their stated management
obj ectives.
Following the 1980 Act it is now established that a key definitional
characteristic of ITCs is the provision specifically prohibiting
capital dividends. More recently this has led to a considerable
difficulty in relation to one particular component of capital reserves
namely share capital. Share capital has always occupied a special
place in company law. It represents the very minimum level of assets
that a potential creditor could expect a company to have available
to meet its business liabilities. Indeed it is clear from the
definitions of distributable reserves for both investment companies
and other companies described above that share capital does not represent
an accumulated surplus and therefore it is not available for distribution.
To this extent the 1980 Act confirmed both accepted practice and the
earlier 1948 Act. We noted in Exhibit 2(i) the very restrictive
conditions under which share capital could be reduced.
However from the mid-1970s onwards arguments developed suggesting that
there were certain additional situations in which it may be appropriate
for share capital to be reduced. In particular the "mature industry"
argument gained a significant following. It was argued that the
level of new profitable opportunities in a particular line of business
may eventually decline to the point where they were either very few
in number or did not command an adequate level of return. A company
faced with this problem had two alternatives. It could either diversify
into other business areas or it could merely accumulate liquid surpluses
from its existing investment programmes. These two alternatives were
9^
exemplified by B.A.T.s and G.E.C. respectively. There were
considerable doubts as to the potential benefits of the diversification
alternative. These centred around both the practical difficulties
of building up management expertise in a business area new to the
company and the perhaps more telling arguments that the company's
shareholders may well be able to mirror the diversification achieved
by their company through operating in the stock market themselves.
Indeed there is no prima facie case that if the company distributed
its surplus funds then shareholders would not be at least as efficient
in achieving a similar level of diversification to that planned by
their company.
The alternative strategy of accumulating cash surpluses suffered
from disadvantages too. In particular the only way to distribute
these reserves is by dividends which could attract higher rate tax
and investment surcharge in the hands of shareholders.
As the "mature industry" problem was essentially one of what to do
with the "fruits of success" given the limited opportunities in the
company's chosen area of operations the solution appeared to be some
method whereby the company could be reduced in size through a tax
efficient distribution to shareho1ders . The specific suggestion
was that surplus funds should be applied to purchasing the company's
own equity. Thisitwas argued would involve a capital receipt to
shareholders and would therefore attract lower rates of tax. In
addition shareholders would be free to reinvest or not as they wished.
While carefully avoiding the implication that ITCs had outlived their
usefulness many ITC managers were quick to note the effect that such
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redemption schemes would have for ITCs. As the price of ITC equity
usually stands at a discount to the net asset value of the underlying
portfolio the redemption of an ITC share would increase the net
value of the fund to the remaining shareholders by the amount of the
discount. The possibility of gains through re-purchase would be
quickly recognised by the market resulting in ITC prices moving upwards
towards the underlying net asset values. To the extent that many
ITC managers perceive the discount as a key performance indicator the
possibility of reducing it through a systematic redemption of equity
was attractive. The attraction lay not in the possibility of
completely eliminating the discount. Indeed this would only occur
with a redemption policy that was equivalent to a speedy liquidation
of the ITC. Rather it lay in the greater "flexibility" that
managers "felt" they would have in correcting what they considered
to be short-term "discount anomalies". Presumably the use of this
additional flexibility would involve both share redemption when
discount levels were considered wide and share re-issuing when discount
levels were considered narrow. We return in later chapters to
consider the discount and the validity of many of the arguments
surrounding this controversial statistic. However for the present
we note that the division in the ITC movement over this issue broadly
followed the division between those managers who consider the discount
as important and those who do not.
In response to arguments favouring some relaxation of the restrictions
surrounding share capital reductions the 1981 Act proposed a major
change in the then existing share capital provisions.^ The changes
are complex and to the best of our knowledge have not as yet been fully
15. Companies Act 1981, Part III S(3&) to 62.
tried in practice. The main characteristics of the new proposals
that are of most relevance to our purpose are as follows :
1. Purchase by a company of its own shares is now permitted.
2. Shares may only be purchased out of either distributable
reserves or the proceeds of a new issue made specifically
for that purpose.
3. Shares purchased by the company are considered as cancelled.
While these provisions effectively meet the "mature industry" arguments
supporting capital reductions they do not in practice provide IT.C
managers with any "additional flexibility" over share capital. There
are two reasons for this. First of all the Act clearly states that
purchases can only be made out of distributable reserves. We noted
above that an ITC1s distributable reserves are restricted to its
revenue reserves. We also noted that the Taxes Act and the 1980 Act
insist on a high pay-out ratio from distributable profits. Indeed
both Acts require at least 85% of net revenue to be distributed. Any
decision to redeem share capital will in all probability then require
a substantial dividend reduction. The possibility of obtaining
relief from the capital dividend restrictions of the 1980 Act and the
Taxes Act was explored by the movement. However the Inland Revenue
made it clear that no exemptions would be available. In addition
they pointed out two effects that would follow on from an ITC using
its capital reserves to purchase equity. First of all the ITC would
lose its privileged tax status in relation to capital gains tax.
Secondly as the purchase provisions of the 1981 Act only applied to
distributable reserves any use of capital reserves would be considered
as a normal dividend distribution on which advanced corporation tax
would be due and which would also expose ITC equity holders to
potential higher rate and investment surcharge liabilities. These
tax implications for the ITC shareholder would represent a real
cost over the alternative of a share redemption scheme within the
terms of the 1981 Act. A share redemption scheme within the terms
of the 1981 act would be considered as capital transactions for tax
purposes the potential tax liabilities would be zero for ITCs and
limited to 30% of any chargeable gain for ITC equity holders. Given
the restriction on applying capital reserves to a share redemption
scheme together with the effects of ignoring the restrictions then
the usefulness of the 1981 Act to ITC managers turns very much on the
willingness to fund capital redemptions through dividend reductions.
While there is some support for capital redemption schemes in general
within the ITC movement there is very little support for such schemes
unless they can be funded from capital reserves. ITC managers would
certainly consider the balance of advantage to be on the side of
maintaining dividend levels.
The second aspect of the 1981 Act that restricts its potential use¬
fulness to ITC managers concerns the provision that redeemed equity
is considered cancelled. We note above that the "flexibility" that
ITC managers wanted over share capital was a "flexibility" that
allowed for both redemption and re-issue. Clearly there is no place
for re-issuing redeemed equity in the "mature industry" arguments
that support the 1981 Act.
While the 1981 Act may well prove a helpful statute for companies in
the industrial and commercial sectors the restrictions noted above
will in practice limit its applicability for ITCs.
We conclude this section by noting that in addition to these
statute imposed parameters ITCs must also follow the various
16
stock exchange listing regulations and annual disclosure rules.
These rules and regulations are similar in spirit to the tax and
statutory requirements. For example they insist on among other
things that only revenue distributions be allowed and that managers
maintain diversified portfolios which are dominated by quoted
securities. It is interesting to note that the U.S. OTC market
is considered for stock exchange purposes as "listed".
Regulations whether statutory or otherwise have always been very much
a part of the ITC movement. This is largely due to the knowledge
that ITCs are the delegated recipients of investors' savings. The
rules help to ensure that managers are prudent and fully appreciate
the fiduciary nature,a 1 though not requirement,of their actions.
However we note a perhaps revealing comment by Robert Fleming to
Calvin Bullock in 1924 on the setting up by the latter of the
Nation-Wide Securities Company
"Don't tie yourself with too many restrictions.
Restrictions you put on today that you think are
for the protection of your shareholders, will
rise up someday to plague you." 17
16. Stock Exchange, "Admission of Securities to Listing", Chapter 9-
17- H. Bullock, "The Story of Investment Companies", New York, 1959,
p .24.
2. Taxation : As incorporated companies ITCs are subject to
the usual assessment rules governing the computation of taxable
receipts. These rules are revised periodically through the
various Finance Acts which set out the Government's budgetary
strategy. In addition occasional codifications are introduced
18
as specific tax statutes. It is not our purpose to provide
a detailed chronology of the tax developments over the decade.
Rather it is to deal with the general principles of tax as they
relate to ITCs. However it should be noted that the decade has
witnessed some major changes in taxation. For example the
Finance Act 1972 introduced a fundamentally new form of corporation
tax. Similarly with more specific reference to the taxation
of ITCs there was a gradual reduction in the liability of ITCs to
corporation tax on capital gains throughout the decade culminating
in the eventual removal of ITCs from the scope of this aspect of
corporation tax.
There are several philosophies underpinning U.K. taxation and two are
of particular relevance to our purpose. The first is a distinction
between taxable capital transactions and taxable income receipts
and the second is that within the broad definition of income receipts
the relevant tax rules are determined by the income source from which
the receipt arises. This latter aspect of the U.K. tax system is
becoming increasingly controversial following the widespread publicity
given to the various forms of expenditure orientated tax advocated by
1 9the Meade Report.
18. Perhaps the most important recent codification is found in the
Income and Taxes Act 1970.
19- J. E. Meade, "The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation",
Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1978.
While ITCs are subject to the same rules as other incorporated
companies the sources of taxable receipts differ significantly.
Manufacturing and commercial companies have relatively few taxable
capital transactions and the bulk of any tax liability centres on
the tax due on trading profits. On the other hand for the majority
of the 1970s ITCs incurred liabilities following the profitable
realizations of portfolio securities. In addition ITCs have
few if any income receipts liable to trading profits tax. The
bulk of their taxable income receipts are sourced from unfranked
and uncovered investment income.
In this section we have three objectives. First of all we describe
the basic elements involved in the taxation of ITCs. Secondly as
ITCs are financial intermediaries providing a delegated management
function it is important to appreciate not only the tax rules
governing ITC tax computations themselves but also how the various
rules interact with the computation of shareholder tax liabilities.
After all if significant tax penalties are involved in using ITC
intermediation services then their potential attractions will be
considerably reduced. Finally as ITCs are one of several methods
by which investors can obtain stockmarket exposure we assess the
relative efficiency of the ITC vehicle. To deal with these four
areas we adopt the following approach.
(i) The Taxation of ITCs.
(ii) The Tax Effects of Holding ITC Equity.
(iii) The Relative Tax Efficiency of ITCs.
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(i) The Taxation of ITCs : ITCs are liable to corporation tax
on certain income receipts. Throughout the 1970s this
liability was extended to net gains on portfolio transactions.
Both forms of receipt will consist of elements sourced from
U.K. and non-U.K. investments. As the vast majority of ITCs
are U.K. incorporated and managed companies all income and
gains must initially be brought into computational consideration.
We noted above that U.K. taxation involves a distinction between
income and capital receipts. We follow this distinction dealing
first with the former source. Exhibit 2 (ii) shows a typical
pro-forma tax computation for an ITC without any taxable gains.
The three sources of income shown on the left-hand side of
Exhibit 2(ii) include all the main credits to be found on the
income statements of most ITCs. Franked investment income (F1 I)
20
defines distributions paid out of U.K. taxed profits. The most
important receipts within this source are U.K. corporate dividends.
Unfranked income (UFI) describes receipts paid out of profits prior
to tax. In other words a corporate payer is allowed tax relief on
these disbursements. The most important receipts within this
source are interest receipts from loan stock and debentures.
However also included in this caption are the interest receipts from
government securities. The third category of income namely overseas
income includes all foreign income irrespective of whether it has
20. Franked investment income or franked payments (FP) are technically









Income: A Franked Investment Income 110 1 . Foreign Tax : £
B U.K. Unfranked Income - Gross 10 Withholding Tax at 15% on C 7
C Overseas Income - Gross 48
£168
2. Corporation Tax: £
Total Income
52% on (B+C) - (D+E) 15
£ Less:
Expenditure: D Management Expenses 10 Advanced Corporation Tax 3
E Debenture Expenses - Gross 20 Tax Credit on Withholding Tax 7
Total Expenses 30 Mainstream Corporation Tax 5
Net Income £138
3. £Tota1 Tax Liabi1ity:
Dividends paid 84
Dividends received 77
Taxation (See opposite) 48
7
Dividends (Cash paid) 84 ACT of 3/7 of 7 3
Tax credits on Franked Income at
Retentions £6 3/7 of A 33
36
Tota1 Tax Liabi1ity £48
Note : 1. This pro-forma was collated from several sources including L. Messel 5 Co.
2. The tax and ACT rates used in the above example correspond to those in force during fiscal 1980.
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been paid out of profits either before or after they have
suffered tax.
All three sources of income will be received by an ITC under some
form of tax adjustment. U.K. dividends are accompanied by a tax
credit which represents an additional amount paid by the dividend
payer to the Inland Revenue and is equivalent to the basic rate
of tax on the gross dividend paid. To the dividend payer this
additional disbursement is considered as a first or advance payment
of corporation tax (ACT). The recipient ITC must add the tax
credit to the dividend received in order to record the full amount
of the Fll. UFI is usually paid under deduction of basic rate
21
income tax which is then passed on to the Inland Revenue.'1' As with
Fll the computational accounting to record UFI receipts is to add
back the income tax deducted. A similar procedure is adopted to
account for any overseas income which has been subject to a
foreign withholding tax. Since 1965 no relief has been available
on any underlying foreign tax such as foreign corporation tax
22
unless the foreign payer is a "related" company. However the
grossing-up procedure for a U.K. tax computation excludes the
adding back of any underlying foreign tax suffered by a non-related
company. Therefore while no relief is given it is not in fact
required in the sense that only the net distribution before with¬
holding tax is taxable in the U.K.
Having determined the gross receipts from the various income
sources the taxable amounts can then be computed. Fll is not subject
21. Deposit interest and a small number of government securities pay
interest gross.
22. In order for the foreign company to be considered as "related"
the U.K. company must control 10% of its voting power.
]Qk
to U.K. corporation tax. Thus to the extent that an ITC makes
distributions dividends received flow through the intermediation
vehicle without suffering any tax. THe situation is more complex
if Fii does not exactly equal FPs. If Fll is greater than FPs
a refund is available from the Inland Revenue. However any
refund is restricted in two ways. Firstly it is limited to any
ACT amounts already paid within the same accounting year. Secondly
any surplus Fll at the end of the year is carried forward rather
than repaid. On the other hand if FPs exceed Fll ACT will be
payable by the ITC. In our example the ACT amounted to ^/7 of £7
or approximately £3. This ACT subject to certain restrictions can
23
be used to reduce any mainstream liability. The accounting for
ACT to the Inland Revenue is completed quarterly with any payment
or refund being made within a few days following the end of the
accounting quarter.
Unlike Fll UFI and overseas income are liable to corporation tax.
However the gross amount from these two income sources can be reduced
by operating expenses including any debt servicing costs. In
addition a credit equal to the foreign withholding tax suffered
is available against the U.K. tax on the relevant overseas income.
We noted above that unfranked payments are made subject to an income
tax deduction. The majority of ITCs have both UFI and unfranked
disbursements. A similar method of quarterly accounting to that
for ACT deals with any income tax payments due on interest payments
made. Unfortunately if UFI exceeds unfranked payments the income
tax suffered must first be deducted from any mainstream corporation
23. To the extent that the available ACT set-off is restricted in
any one year it may be carried forward indefinitely.
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tax liability before the excess is refunded by the Inland Revenue.
We have now dealt with the basic aspects of taxing an ITC's income
receipts. However before moving on to describe the computation
of capital gains liabilities it should be noted that the amount of
tax actually payable by the ITC is not necessarily the same as the
total tax liability suffered by the ITC. In our example £5 of
mainstream corporation tax would have to be paid by the ITC. The
balance of the total tax liability is made up of the foreign tax
and ACT. The latter is split between that paid by the corporate
source of the ITC's dividend income and the excess of the ITC's FPs
over its FN.
In terms of the tax cost directly identified with the ITC intermediation
function the total cost will be made up of mainstream liability plus
any unrelieved foreign withholding tax. Underlying foreign tax
while representing a cost is not one specific to ITCs. Indeed relief
from underlying tax is only available in the "related" company example
noted above.
We noted in the previous section that ITCs have historically kept their
capital transactions separate from the returns available for equity
distribution and that this division usually enshrined in the Articles
of Assocation is now established by statute. As a result of this
capital gains and losses are considered balance sheet transactions
accounted for through a capital reserve account and thus having no direct
effect on ITC income statements. Similarly any tax due on these
capital transactions is debited to the balance sheet capital reserve
account. The tax implication of both separating capital and
106
revenue transactions and of limiting ITCs distribution to revenue
items is particularly important. Indeed if the Inland Revenue
considered portfolio trading to be at such a level that the ITC
was effectively a dealing company then it is quite possible that any <j
gains would be treated as revenue items and liable to the full rate
of corporation tax which as we note below is higher than the effective
rate of corporation tax on gain.
Between 1965 and 1980 corporation tax was charged on the net gains
resulting from ITC portfolio transactions. The effective rate of
tax was initially 30% but this was reduced in 1972 to an amount
equivalent to half the basic rate of income tax. A further reduction
to 10% after April 1 1977 was followed by the removal of ITC portfolio
2 k
transaction from the scope of this tax after April 1 1980. It
should be noted that although we quote the effective rates of gains
tax technically the gains were liable to the full rate of corporation
tax. However the legislation specifically exempted a portion of
corporate gains from tax. With a corporation tax rate of 52% and
a capital gains tax rate of 30% only ^/26 of the chargeable gains
were liable to corporation tax. By bringing gains into the scope
of corporation tax it allowed them to be^treated in much the same way
as UFI. In particular they were available to cover management and
25
interest expenses.
There is little doubt that the taxation of gains represented a
potential cost to ITC portfolios. In addition the computational
2k. Strictly these reduced rates only apply to Inland Revenue "Approved"
ITCs. We deal with approval in the next sub-section. However we
note in passing that if no approval is obtained the gains are
liable to the full 30% effective tax rate.
25. Realized losses were offsettable against realized gains and if
still uncovered could be carried forward.
107
aspects of the tax were extremely complex especailly in the earlier
years when various rules were required to avoid taxing the pre-1965
element of any realized gains. The fact that tax was only charged
on realized gains rather than valuation gains provided some relief.
Unfortunately this was to a large extent offset by the tax being
charged on actual gains rather than inflation-adjusted gains. One
particular point of contention with the gains tax legislation was
that while gains on foreign transactions were taxable losses on
exchange fluctuations were not allowable. Given these costs and
complexities it is no surprise that the post April 1 1980 exemption
from gains tax was welcomed by the sector.
Having described the main computational aspect of ITC tax assessment
one or two further points are required on ITC tax management. The
most important point concerns the interaction between the various
taxable elements of the computation. Exhibit 2 (iii) highlights
these elements.
From Exhibit 2(iii) it is clear that by using foreign tax credits
and expenses ITC managers can remove any potential liability to
U.K. corporation tax. There are several elements of tax law that
allow this possibility to arise. First of all the ITC can choose
the order of expense set-off. In our example the liability on
gains was removed first followed by that on UFI with the balance
going against overseas income. The corporation tax then due on the
overseas income was exactly equal to the foreign tax credit. As
surplus foreign tax credits can neither be carried forward, refunded,
or as we noted above offset against the U.K. tax on non-overseas
income it is prudent planning to follow the offsetting priorities
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EXHIBIT 2 (i i i)
Investment Trust Companies
Tax Management





7455 1000 1386 9930
Expenses S Interest <1000> < 986> -V <1986>
7455 400 - 7944
Corporation Tax (52%) 208 208
Foreign Credit (15%) 208 208
Foreign Tax (15%) 208 208
UK Tax Credit 2263 2263
2263 208 - 2471
Available for
Dividend 5281 192 5473
Cash Dividend Paid - ^ 5281 Cash Dividend Paid -> 5281
1. Dividend short-fa
made up in future
11 can be
years
1. ACT will reduce corporation
tax charge.
2. Unrelieved foreign
will be reduced and






adopted in our example. Finally we noted earlier that any
surplus ACT could be used to reduce the mainstream liability.
However as ACT must be offset before any foreign tax credits there
is the danger that too high a pay-out policy would also result in
the foreign credits being lost.
ITC tax management therefore involves the maintenance of a fine
balance. Too high a liability to corporation tax will represent
a real cost to the ITC. However reducing taxable income in
relation to expenses may also lead to a real cost in terms of lost
foreign tax credits and delay in utilising operating expenses. The
management of tax exposure is of course only one of the investment
variables that ITC management must deal with. It may well be that
some tax intermediation expense must necessarily be incurred in
order that management can follow its chosen portfolio strategy. For
example we noted in chapter 1 that some ITCs attempt to minimise the
effect of an anticipated bear market by taking positions in short-
term government securities. Such a move will tend to raise UFI and
thus increase potential tax exposure. A switch into foreign
securities would have a similar effect. The importance of tax
planning varies considerably from ITC to ITC. Table 2(i) shows the
tax intermediation costs for forty ITCs as reported in their 1979
annual accounts. The bulk of the cost comes from U.K. mainstream
corporation and in fact most ITCs appear to be reasonably successful
in fully relieving foreign withholding tax.
It is clear from Table 2(i) that ITCs incur substantial intermediation
tax costs. The average charge against gross revenue is approximately





T rust A B Trust A B
Alliance Investment 5 1 .0 G1 obe 5 0.2
American Trust 14 0.3 Investing in Success - 0.8
Anglo Scottish 3 0.3 1nvestors1 Capital 15 0.4
Ashdown 8 0.5 Keystone 10 0.4
Atlantic Assets - 1 .5 Lakeview 6 0.1
Border S Southern 7 0.2 Monks 8 0.5
Broadstone 9 0.5 Murray Caledonian 7 0.7
Brunner - 0.7 Murray Western 13 0.2
Cap i ta1 & Nationa1 7 0.9 Outwich - 0.2
Ca rdina1 7 0.2 Pen 11 and 2 0.1
Charter Trust 10 0.2 RIT 8 -
Continental S Industrial 5 0.2 St. Andrews 1 0. 1
Edinburgh Investment 10 0.5 Scottish Investment 9 0.1
Eng 1 i sh S- Soctt i sh 5 0.6 Scottish United 12 0.4
First Scottish American 1 - Second Aliiance 6 0.6
Foreign 5 Colonial 5 0.2 Ster1ing 11 0.6
General Consolidated 5 0.2 Tribune 3 -
General Funds 0 0.2 US and General 18 0.3
General Investors 4 0.5 US Debenture 7 0.2
Genera 1 Scottish 10 0.5 Wi tan 2 0.4
Notes: 1. Source : Annual Accounts
2. Code : A - Mainstream Corporation Tax (excluding gains)
plus unrelieved foreign tax as a percentage
of gross revenue.
B - Corporation tax on gains as a percentage of
gross assets .
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7% which is slightly greater than the average gross management
expense charge of 6% noted in chapter T. The importance of gains
tax liabilities is small in terms of portfolio size. The average
charge against gross assets is less than ?%. Indeed given the
various reliefs available to tax paying shareholders which we describe
below the intermediation costs of gains tax to tax paying shareholders
can in fact be reduced to zero.
Returning to the intermediation expense of revenue tax it is extremely
difficult to completely explain both the variation between ITCs and
the high average exposure to this expense. Undoubtedly the investment
strategy reasons noted before will be relevant. However even allowing
for this it is difficult to escape from a conclusion that would not
include elements of inefficient tax planning as an explanatory variable.
(ii) The Tax Effects of Holding ITC Equity : An interest in an ITC can be
obtained as we noted in chapter 1 through the purchase of ordinary
equity, debt, preference shares, convertibles, B shares or warrants.
By far the most important participation instrument is the ordinary
equity share and it is on the tax effects of holding this instrument
that we concentrate. However at a later stage in this sub-section
we briefly mention the relevant tax implications of holding these other
inst ruments.
The precise tax status of each ITC equity holder whether institutional
or individual is of course unique. However it is possible to indicate
the general effects of holding ITC shares without recourse to the tax
elements specific to each holder. Very simply we can consider the
effect of holding ITC shares from the point of view of two extremes -
taxpayers and non-taxpayers. This latter category may appear somewhat
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unrealistic. However many institutions and in particular pension
funds are gross funds whose receipts are not liable to tax.
Those investors liable to gains tax on their asset transactions
have suffered this tax since 1965- The legislation is not retro¬
spective and hence in computing the chargeable gain only the post
April 1965 gain is brought into charge. There exist complex rules
of computation both for assessing the gain on different types of
27
asset and for allocating the pre and post 1965 elements.
We noted above that the basic rate of capital gains tax is 30% of the
chargeable gain for both individuals and corporate payers. There are
several reliefs on small disposals which are of particular interest to
individuals. While the 30% tax rate has remained the same since 1965
the monetary value of these reliefs on small disposals has in general
increased. In part this has been necessary in order to limit the
number of assessable transactions. This is considered desirable in
view of the administrative expense involved in applying a complex
tax to small transactions.
As a chargeable asset the profitable sale of an ITC security will lead
to a gains tax liability in the hands of an investor. To the extent
that the ITC has already paid corporation tax on its realised portfolio
gains this clearly involves a significant element of double taxation.
In order to provide relief against this double taxation a system of
tax credits was initially available to investors. Following the
exemption of ITCs from gains taxation on portfolio realisations after
April 1 1980 the credit system was removed. Since then investors have
been liable to the full rates of gains tax on their ITC disposals
27. For example in computing the chargeable gain on a security rights
issues, bonus issues and take-overs represent complex sources of
adjustments.
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as no elements of double taxation are now involved.
The reduced rates of tax on ITC portfolio gains which were noted
earlier together with the system of credits available to ITC share¬
holders and the exemption of ITC portfolio gains from tax after April
1 1980 are only applicable to Inland Revenue "Approved" ITCs. Approval
which must be sought each year is conditional on ITCs meeting various
statutory requirements. These requirements are set out in S(359) of
the Taxes Act 1970 and are as follows :
"S(359) -
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter 'investment trust1
means, as respects any accounting period, a company which
is not a close company and which is approved for the purposes
of this section for that accounting period by the Board, and
the Board shall not approve any company unless it is shown
to their satisfaction:-
(aa) that the company is resident in the United Kingdom,
and
(a) that the company's income is derived wholly or
mainly from shares or securities, and
(b) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, that
no holding in a company, other than an investment
trust or a company which would qualify as more than
15 per cent by value of the investing company's
investments (but see Note below), and
(c) that the shares making up the company's ordinary
share capital (or, if there are such shares of
more than one class, those of each class) are quoted
on a recognised stock exchange in the United Kingdom,
and
(d) that the distribution as dividend of surpluses arising
from the realisation of investments is prohibited by
the company's memorandum or articles of association,
and
(e) that the company does not retain in respect of any
accounting period more than 15 per cent of the income
it derives from shares and securities"
Note: "For the purposes of paragraph (b) of Section 359(1) and
the other provisions having effect in relation thereto :-
(i) holdings in companies which are members of a group (whether
or not including the investing company) and are not excluded
from that paragraph shall be treated as holdings in a single
company.
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(ii) where the investing company is a member of a group,
money owned to it by another member of the group shall be
treated as a security of the latter held by the investing
company and accordingly as, or as part of, the holding of
the investing company in the company owning the money, and
for the purposes of this paragraph 'group' means a company
and all companies which are its 51* per cent subsidiaries."
* S.93(6) (b) F.A. 1972.
"(2) Subsection (1) (b) above shall not apply -
(a) to a holding in a company acquired before 6th April,
1365 which on that date represented not more than
25 per cent by value of the investing company's
investments, or
(b) to a holding in a compnay which, when it was acquired,
represented not more than 15 per cent by value of the
investing company's investments,
so long as no addition is made to the holding.
"3) For the purposes of subsection (2) above -
(a) 'holding' means the shares or securities (whether of
one class or more than one class) held in any one
company, and,
(b) an addition is made to a holding whenever the investing
company acquires shares or securities of that one
company, otherwise than by being allotted shares or
securities without becoming liable to give any
consideration, and if an addition is made to a holding
that holding is acquired when the addition, or the
latest addition, is made to the holding, and
(c) where in connection with a scheme of reconstruction or
amalgamation, a company issues shares or securities to
persons holding shares or securities in a second
company in respect of and in proportion to (or as
nearly as may be in proportion to) their holdings in
the second company without those persons becomeing
liable to give any consideration, a holding of the
shares or securities in the second company and a
corresponding holding of the shares or securities so
issued shall be regarded as the same holding."
These rules effectively put three restrictions on an ITC in order that
/
it can achieve the "Approved" status. Firstly income must come
"wholly or mainly" from shares or securities. In practice "wholly or
mainly" is taken by the Inland Revenue as 70%. Secondly no more than
15% of the ITC's portfolio may be invested in one holding. This
H5
restriction does not apply to holdings in gilts, investments in
other ITCs and unit trusts or holdings acquired before April 1965
if at that date these holdings were equivalent to no more than
25% of the ITC portfolio. Perhaps more importantly this
restriction is only applicable at the time of acquisition.
Finally 85% of the net income of each accounting year must be
distributed. Net income excludes any realised gains.
These restrictions do not in practice limit the scope of most ITCs.
For example we noted previously that diversification, high
dividend pay-outs and investment strategies orientated to securities
together form a large part of the historical role played by ITCs.
On the other hand the benefits of approval in terms of reducing
the gains tax intermediation cost of using the ITC vehicle are
considerable. Indeed to tax paying investors this aspect inter¬
mediation cost was effectively eliminated.
The system of credits available to ITC shareholders was in itself




Capital Gains Tax Credits





Net portfolio gains attributable
to stockholding were added to the
cost of the ITC equity.
1972 -
(i) 1977 i the basic rate
of income tax
(ii) 1979 i the basic rate of income tax
allowed as a credit against gains
on ITC equity disposals but
restricted to ensure the credit









10% on net gains subject to
similar restriction as above.
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Several points should be noted from Exhibit 2(iv). First of all the
credit system up until April 1972 although cumbersome in terms of
the records and computations required did have the advantage of accuracy
in the sense that it provided a direct link between the portfolio
liability and the shareholder credit. In general however the post
April 1972 system while somewhat "rough and ready" was easier to administer
and to this extent was considered superior. Secondly the lag in
reducing the shareholder credit to 10% was to avoid shareholders losing
a substantial credit "overnight" on ITC securities they had purchased
prior to April 1977. The April 1980 change did not require a similar
transition period as it was announced a year in advance. Finally the
rules of credit computation were to ensure that any credit available was
restricted to any gains tax actually payable by the investor. In other
words the credit was neither refundable nor available for carry forward.
While these reliefs removed any tax intermediation costs related to
portfolio gains for tax paying shareholders the position was very
different for non-tax paying shareholders. This latter status could
arise through tax allowances in the case of individuals or statutory
exemption in the case of for example gross pension funds. To those
investors who had no tax liabilities against which to offset the shareholder
credit any corporation tax on ITC portfolio gains represented a real
tax intermediation cost. With the removal of portfolio gains from the
scope of taxation in April 1980 non-taxpayers are now in the same
position as tax payers in that they suffer no intermediation gains tax
costs through using the ITC intermediation vehicle.
Taxpayers who receive dividend distributions from ITCs are required to
gross up the cash dividend by the related tax credits. Corporate
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taxpayers like ITCs themselves do not pay tax on this franked income.
Individuals are however liable to income tax at either the basic or
higher rates. In addition individuals may also incur a liability
to the investment income surcharge if they receive sufficient unearned
income. The tax credit deducted by the payer ITC can be offset
against these income tax liabilities. This distinction between
individual and corporate ITC equity holders is not particularly important
as any ITC dividend received by a dividend paying corporate holder may
well end up in the hands of an individual investor where it is treated
in the same way as the ITC dividend received direct. Non-taxpayers
who receive dividend distributions from ITCs also receive them net of
the tax credit. This credit can usually be claimed back from the
Inland Revenue. The availability of a tax credit refund effectively
puts non taxpayers in the same position as taxpayers who we noted above
either don't pay tax on franked income or can offset the tax credit
against any income tax or investment income surcharge liabilities.
However while the mere receipt of a dividend distribution incurs
neither an intermediation cost nor differentiates between taxpayers and
non taxpayers it must be remembered that these franked distributions have
been paid out of income streams which as we noted in Exhibit (i i) have
been charged to intermediation tax. This tax made up of mainstream
corporation tax and unrelieved foreign withholding tax represents a real
intermediation cost that can't be relieved by ITC shareholders. Indeed
the presence of this cost, its size and the potential we noted above
for minimising its effect are perhaps the most important points to
stress with regard to the taxation of ITCs.
In concluding this sub-section we turn to the main tax effects that
result from holding the other ITC participation instruments.
The credit systems available to offset the double taxation of portfolio
gains were only available against securities which on a liquidation of the
ITC would secure the whole or a substantial part of the net assets. The
credits were therefore not available on preference shares, warrants,
convertible stocks of B shares. However when ordinary equity was
obtained through either the exercise of a warrant or on the conversion of
B stocks or convertible stocks the resulting ordinary shares did quality
for a tax credit calculated from the date of the initial instruments'
pu rchase.
Perhaps the most interesting of these other instruments from a tax viewpoin
are B shares. To the taxpayer who suffers high rates of income tax the
possibility of receiving an investment return in terms of capital gain
rather than the higher taxed dividends is attractive. B shares until
the Finance Act (2) 1975 provided such an investment vehicle. These
instruments offer either a very small cash dividend or no dividend at
all. Instead holders receive a scrip issue of B shares equivalent to
a cash dividend together with an annual option to convert the B shares
into ordinary equity. The high taxpayer could obtain income by
selling the B shares. Any tax liability was restricted to capital
gains tax which at 30% was considerably lower than the higher rates of
income tax. Unfortunately the 1975 Act provided that such scrip issues
would be considered as cash dividends with tax including investment
income surcharge being assessed on the dividend received grossed up by
a notional tax credit. While this notional credit was available to
reduce any assessed tax it was not available as a tax refund. This
change in the law removed all the tax advantages associated with B shares
and indeed as we noted in chapter 1 they are now considered as
having little investment merit.
) The Relative Tax Efficiency of ITCs : Individuals wanting to
gain stock market exposure have a wide range of alternative inter¬
mediaries available to them. They may of course decide to forego
intermediation and invest directly in the stock market. In this
section we briefly compare the relative tax efficiency of using an
ITC intermediation vehicle with that of either direct investment
or investment through one of three other investment intermediaries
namely pension funds, unit trusts or life assurance.
Direct investment in the stock exchange by an individual can of
course only be undertaken from post-tax income. In addition any
returns received may be subject to capital gains tax, income tax
and perhaps investment surcharge. This position is identical to
that of using an ITC. However direct investors will have no relief
against any underlying corporation tax on the gains suffered by the
constituent companies in their portfolios. Similarly given that
most investment strategies will involve both some expense and some
exposure to a tax liability then accumulating the expenses within
an ITC may provide some relief in that expenses incurred managing
a private portfolio would not be tax deductable. However as we
noted earlier ITCs in practice incur tax intermediation costs in
excess of those required to cover operating expenses. Therefore
unless there are over-riding investment reasons justifying this
tax exposure any potential tax advantage ITCs may have over direct
investment may well be lost.
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Pension funds offer a significantly more tax efficient savings medium than
ITCs. This conclusion holds for both occupational schemes and the
retirement annuity schemes designed for those not in pensionable
employment. Within certain restrictions contributions to both types
28
of scheme can be paid out of gross income. The purchase of TTC shares
however can only be made out of taxed income. Similarly the pension
funds themselves are effectively exempt from U.K. tax on gains and
income receipts. This exemption ensures that no tax intermediation costs
are incurred. Finally the beneficiaries of pension schemes receive
their returns in terms of earned income rather than the potentially higher
taxed unearned income which ITC holders may suffer. As we have noted
several times these benefits in terms of tax efficiency have led to a
significant increase in the popularity of saving through pension related
schemes. The current tax legislation is undoubtedly of major benefit
to the pensions industry and a point of competitive disadvantage to ITCs.
The taxation of unit trusts is broadly the same as that for ITCs. Indeed
neither intermediation vehicle possesses significant advantages of tax
efficiency over the other. This similarity of tax treatment extends
to revenue receipts, portfolio realizations, operating expenses, foreign
earnings and to the relief against the double taxation of portfolio gains.
Undoubedly unit trusts benefit considerably from being treated almost
"as if" they were incorporated ITCs. In particular if they were treated
strictly as fiduciary trusts management expenses would be considered as
an annual charge deductable only after the trust income had been assessed
to income tax. While unit trusts themselves possess no significant tax
28. Untaxed contributions to a retirement annuity scheme are limited to
17-2% of "net relevant income" which is very broadly equivalent to
earned income. Similar contributions to an occupational scheme are
limited to 15% of the employees income. However employers' contrib¬
utions are also a tax deductable business expense.
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advantages over ITCs the fact that they are not treated as fiduciary
trusts certainly removes any potential tax advantage allowed to ITCs
through incorporation.
There are many different types of life assurance policy available.
They range from simple term policies which pay an assured sum on death if
within a certain specified period to the more complex endowment policies
which pay on the earlier of death or maturity and which in addition
contain significant elements of investment as well as insurance. Within
this latter category two types of policy stand out as potential rivals
to ITCs. They are unit-linked policies and with profits endowment
policies. Under a with profits endowment policy the insurance company
assures a minimum sum to the policy holder plus a bonus element based
on the profits of the insurance company. The bonuses can either be
added to the sum assured during the life of the policy or paid as a
terminal bonus. The profits of the insurance company and therefore
the size of the available bonuses will depend upon the returns the
company earns from investing the premium income received from the
policy holders. It is therefore very much operating as an investment
intermediary. Unit linked policies are perhaps even more geared to
investment than with profit endowment policies. Under a unit-linked
scheme the life insurance policy payable on the earlier death or maturity
is linked to an underlying investment fund set aside by the insurance
company. This fund is divided into "units" and allocated to policy
holders based on the amount of their premium payments. The amount
payable to a policy holder over and above the guaranteed minimum is
dependent on the value of these units at the time the policy falls due.
Therefore like the with profits endowment policy the value of a unit
linked scheme to a policy holder very much depends on the investment
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skill of the managers operating the fund. Within each of these two
broad categories of policy there is a considerable range of potential
investment exposure. For example a policy with a small sum assured
in relation to the premium paid is quite obviously a policy written
predominantly for an investor rather than an individual seeking life
insurance. In managing the underlying funds insurance company managers
have considerable investment discretion subject to meeting their fixed
policy liabilities. Interestingly the Insurance Company Regulations
now restrict unit-linked funds to investments in listed equities, unit
trusts, gilts and various forms of deposits. Such restrictions tend
to remind the insurance sector that the tax benefits which we describe
below are primarily to assist life insurance rather than the promotion
of an investment vehicle.
The tax implications for holders of life insurance policies depend on
whether the premiums are payable at regular intervals or in a lump sum.
Regular premiums on "Qualifying Policies" attract a tax relief for the
policyholder equivalent to half the basic rate of income tax times the
29
premium paid. In order to qualify a policy must meet certain
conditions. For example there must be regular (at least annual) premium
payments and the policy must be capable of lasting at least ten years.
While this premium relief is clearly less than that available to pension
fund contributors no such relief is available to assist purchasers of
ITC equities.
When the policy falls due the total benefits are exempt from both
29. The tax relief available is restricted. In 1980/81 it is limited
to one sixth of taxable income (after charges) with an overall
maximum of £1500.
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capital gains tax and income^ tax. Again these represent substantial
tax benefits for policy holders as compared to ITC equity holders who
usually suffer tax on their investment returns.
Single premium policies are virtually all unit-1inked. Unlike the
regular premiums on "Qualifying Policies" the single premium does not
attract tax relief. During the life of the policy there are no tax
implications for the holder. However unlike the regular premium policies
the maturity of the single premium policy may be a taxable event for
the policy holder. This will crucially depend on the policy holders
taxable income in the year the policy matures. THe computational
procedure is as follows.
The "profit" on the policy is calculated by subtracting the premium
paid from the surrender value of the policy. The profit is then
divided by the number of years the policy was held for. The resulting
"slice" is then added on to the taxpayer's total taxable income for
the year and if this additional income shifts the taxpayer into either
higher rate or investment income surcharge tax brackets then that rate
of tax net of the basic rate is applied to the policy profit. For
example if the profit on a policy maturing after five years was £1000
and this shifted the taxpayer into the 45% higher rate and the 15%
investment income surcharge bracket the tax payable assuming a basic
rate of income tax of 30% would be :
(.45 + .15 - .30) (1000) = £300.
30. Tax legislation provides that the tax benefits of life assurance
policies are only available to the original beneficial policy
holder or the spouse.
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Clearly no tax would be payable if the profit on the policy did not
take the taxpayer into the scope of either higher rate or investment
su rcharge.
In spite of this potential tax liability when the single premium policy
matures the reduced rates of tax and the delay in tax payment until the
policy matures do represent significant elements of tax efficiency
over the use of the ITC intermediation vehicle.
The taxation of insurance companies as distinct from their policy
holders is significantly different from that of the other intermediaries
we have considered. Capital gains are taxed at the full 30% rate.
UFI less operating expenses is taxed at 37.5% and FN received under
deduction of the tax credit is effectively taxed at the basic rate of
income tax as the tax credits cannot be reclaimed by the insurance
company. There is then the potential for insurance companies to incur
substantial tax intermediation costs. Even allowing for the effective
taxation of FN and capital gains it is usually considered that the
contribution and settlement benefits described above imply insurance
based intermediation is a more tax efficient route to the stock market
than an ITC. This view is supported by the comment of the Wilson
Committee detailed in chapter 1 on the reasons for the institutiona1isation
of the stock exchange. They suggested that the relative tax efficiency
of pension funds and life assurance policies over other investment
approaches was a key variable promoting institutiona1isat ion.
Before leaving the area of relative tax efficiency one further point
should be noted. The securities of listed companies and unit trusts
are fairly easily marketed through the stock exchange. The realised
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proceeds suffer transaction costs and of course any gains may be
liable to capital gains tax. The rights that accrue to the holders of
pension contracts and life assurance policies are not as easily encashed.
Indeed substantial management expenses are often incurred on early
cancellation. In addition there may well be tax implications following
a cancellation. For example the surrender of a full endowment policy
within the 10 year minimum period may involve the drawback of premium
relief and the taxation of the policy profit at higher and surcharge
rates. Single premium policies usually allow for partial cancellation
during the life of the policy and these will not attract tax penalties
unless more than 5% of the proceeds are withdrawn in any one year.
In concluding this sub-section it is reasonably clear that ITCs tend to
be less tax efficient than pension or insurance funds and potentially
more tax efficient than a strategy of direct stock exchange investment.
Unit trusts we noted are taxed in the same way as ITCs.
3. Market Environment : The London Stock Exchange provides a market
environment in which ITC equity can be exchanged for new capital and
thereafter continuously traded. In chapter 1 we described the various
equity instruments outstanding and the experience of the sector in the
primary market during the nineteen seventies. Our objective in this
chapter is to examine the secondary market.
The principle function of secondary trading is to allow the development
of a continuous market for securities. It thus provides investors
with liquidity. In doing so the jobbers strike prices which equate
demand and supply for any particular security. However the importance
of the striking price is far greater than the mere closing of a deal.
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It provides a means of valuing a company which in turn implies
the return required by investors for any project undertaken by
their company. As the required rate of return bears directly
on the demand for investment funds the stock exchange is essentially
providing an allocation mechanism for the resources in any economy.
Given this importance of the stock exchange as an allocative
mechanism it is vital that it provides prices that accurately
represent the market consensus. The ideal conditions for this
are well known and underpin much of micro-economic price theory.^
While it is of course not necessary for theoretical assumptions
to be perfectly reflected in reality it is clear that the successful
operation of the stock exchange in correctly allocating resources
32
does hinge on certain conditions being reasonably fulfilled,
in particular we would expect any market process to react quickly
and accurately to information about either an individual security
or indeed the general economic environment. To the extent of any
delay or inaccuracy in assimilating information the market will be
producing erroneous price signals and can be considered as being
inefficient.
Empirical research on assessing the efficiency of stock markets
occupies a significant and non-trivial proportion of research in
finance. Work in this area comes under the general heading of
tests of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). An efficient market
is described for this purpose as a market where
"
... security prices at any time fully reflect all ,
available information."
31. P. Samuelson, Economics (McGraw-Hill Kogakusha) 9th ed. chapter k.
32. M. Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics" in M. Friedman,
Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago, (1935).
33- E. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets : A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work", Journal of Finance (25), May 1970, p.383-
128
The market scenario that underlies this definition of efficiency
considers the stock market to be made up of many investors all
actively attempting to determine future security prices based on
the price sensitive information currently available. These
estimates of future prices imply an expected return from each
security and thus provide investors with the justification to
either trade or not.
The condition that the EMH puts on this investment process requires
that the set of price sensitive information available to the market
at any one time does in fact represent the complete set of such
information. An implication of this condition is that the market
as a whole accurately assesses the importance of the various
information inputs and that the resulting prices are in fact the
correct prices.
While the EMH is intuitively attractive it is unfortunately a
difficult hypothesis to adequately test. There are two reasons
for this. Firstly the theory as described above is not directly
testable. As we cannot observe a future set of security prices
we cannot test whether or not expectations are being accurately
reflected in current prices. However we can to some extent get
round this problem by establishing parameters for one particular
item of price sensitive information. We might not be able to
currently observe future prices but we can certainly hypothesise
an equilibrium pricing model against which the market's efficiency
in processing information can be tested. The implications of
assuming a particular model in different tests of market
efficiency is often ignored but its importance is well established.
"Any (efficiency) test is simultaneously a test of
efficiency and of assumptions about the characteristics
of market equilibrium. If the test is successful -
that is if the hypothesis that the market is efficient
cannot be rejected - then this also implies that the
assumptions about market equilibrium are not rejected.
If the tests are unsuccessful, we face the problem
of deciding whether this reflects a true violation of
market efficiency ... or poor assumptions about the
nature of market equi1ibrium."3^
The second difficulty that testing the EMH presents is that the
generality of the hypothesis precludes its full testing. In
consequence we find reported empirical results centre on the
market's efficiency in dealing with specific sub-sets of information.
Three broad categories of information sub-sets are usually
identified in the literature. They are the weak, semi-strong and
strong forms of the EMH. As a result of this necessity to
test the EMH "piece meal" drawing conclusions as to the overall
efficiency of the market involves a judicial "balancing of the
evidence".
Table 2(i) summarises the key characteristics of the three forms
of the EMH together with the equilibrium pricing models usually
assumed for the particular tests.
34. E. Fama, Foundations of Finance. Blackwell (Oxford), 1977, p.l
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TABLE 2 (i)
Tests of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
Characteristics
Test Category
Weak Form Semi-Strong Form Strong Form
information Sub-Set





(0 E(R.) = 0





(i) E(R ) = < + B- E(R )
i i r i m m
Information Content of Stock
Splits
Information Available to any
1nvestors
(i) E(R.) Rf +p.m[E(Rm) - Rf]
<M) E(V " E(V " E<R0>]
The Identification of Consistently
Superior Performance
Expected Return on Security
Expected Return on the Market
Return on a risk free asset.
Expected return on a security whose co-variance with the market is 0.
Linear coefficients






Whether or not the equilibrium pricing models are reasonably accurate
representations of the price-determining process is primarily an
empirical matter. However to the extent that it is difficult to find
evidence in favour of rejecting the EMH then the adequacy of the models
woulcf "be confirmed. Although this is indeed the case with the
majority of EMH tests the evidence against rejecting efficiency and the
underlying model is relatively more conclusive for the weak and semi-
strong tests than for the strong form tests.
Our approach to reviewing the empirical evidence is selective. While
the majority of reported EMH tests are sourced from U.S. stock markets
and in particular the New York Stock Exchange our main concern is the
efficiency of the ITC sector on the London Stock Exchange. With this
in mind we present only a brief cross-section of the available evidence
concentrating principally on the reported conclusions rather than the
detailed methodology.
Looking first at the reported U.S. results on weak form tests the key
• , • , . , »/. m35,36,37,38,39,40,41aspects are summarised in Table 2(uJ
35. S. Alexander, "Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or
Random Walks" Industrial Management Review, May 1961, pp. 7~26.
36. C. Granger and 0. Morgenstern, "Spectral Analysis of New York Stock
Market Prices", Kyklos (1963), pp. 1-27.
37. "Some Characteristics of Changes in Common Stock Prices", in
P. Cootner, The Random Character of Stock Market Prices (Cambridge,
Massachussetts) 1964, pp. 139—161.
38. S. Alexander, "Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or
Random Walks", Industrial Management Review, Spring 1964, pp. 24-46.
39. E. Fama, "The Behaviour of Stock Market Prices", Journal of Business,
January 1965, pp. 34-105-
40. E. Fama and M. Blume, "Filter Rules and Stock Market Trading", Journal
of Business, January 1966, pp. 226-241.
41. R. Hagerman and R. Richmond, "Random Walks, Martingales and the OTC."
Journal of Finance, September 1973, pp. 897-909.
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TABLE .2 (i i)
Weak Form Tests of Market Efficiency
U.S. - Evidence
Authors Test Approach and Data Results
A1 exander
(1961, 1964)
Filter trading strategies applied
to daily price data 1897-1959 from
the NYSE. Filters ranged from
1-50%.
Not possible to beat a






Spectral analysis used on various
U.S. indices including the S and
P composite over differeing periods
to 1961. Spectral analysis identi¬
fies underlying oscillations in
time series.
Some evidence of long-
term dependency but not




Serial correlation tests on weekly
price returns for 29 U.S. stocks
over the period 1951-1958.
Average serial correlation
coefficient with lag 1




(i) Serial correlation tests on
daily price returns for the
30 stocks comprising the Dow
Jones index 1957-1962
(i) Average seria 1
correlation coeffic-
ient with lag 1
reported as 0.03-
(ii) Runs test on the same data
for non-randomness in sign
changes.





Filter tests on the Dow Jones 30
companies 1957-1962. Filter range
from 0.5% to 50%.
Slight evidence that
very small filters produce
better profits than a bag






(i) Serial correlation tests on
monthly total returns for 253




(ii) Runs Test on the same data. (ii) No significant runs
noted.
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Based on reasonably simple models of market equilibrium the overall
conclusion on the U.S. weak form tests is that the efficient market hypo¬
thesis as it relates to the informational content of historic prices
cannot be rejected. Of particular interest is the result by Hagerman
and Richmond working with data from the OTC market rather than the more
widely tested NYSE. That the empirical results can be replicated on
other stock exchanges is an important and necessary contribution.
The two main test forms, serial correlation based on the assumption that
the underlying return distribution is normal and the distribution free
runs test provide useful alternative methodological approaches although
both do suffer from certain limitations. For example the serial
correlation test only tests a relatively simple linear relationship and the
runs test is perhaps too rigid in the sense that runs terminate on the first
sign change. However even with these restrictions the conclusion that
successive prices follow a random walk thus implying a high degree of
weak form market efficiency appears safe.
The practical implication of this result suggests that any attempts to
predict future prices from either a trading rule or the analysis of past
trends will not be rewarded.
Unlike the weak form tests where the information sub-set historical
prices is clearly defined semi-strong form and strong form tests cover
a wide range of information sub-sets within their respective areas of
publically available information and restricted information. Looking
first at semi-strong form tests Table 2 (i i i) summarises a selection
r. - , . 42,43,44,45of results using U.S. data.
Each of the authors use the market model of equilibrium prices
although Ball in addition presents his results using CAPM. The
adequacy of these models in reflecting the pricing process is
increasingly being questioned. However for the purposes of
assessing semi-strong form tests of the EMH they would appear
reasonably adequate at least to the extent that on received evidence
it is still difficult to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency.
Of the four results reported those by Ball and Brown, FFJR, and
Ball are typical of the vast bulk of semi-strong EMH tests. The
usefulness of Annual Income Statements as timely sources of
price sensitive information is clearly questioned by Ball and
Brown. Indeed as they defined the effective date of the Annual
Income Statement as an information source to be the earlier
date of the preliminary earnings announcement then the usefulness
of the formal Annual Income Statement to market participants is
further reduced in spite of the "wealth of information"
it contains. The FFJR test is generally considered the
most conclusive test of semi-strong efficiency. Not
42. R. Ball and P. Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting
Income Numbers", Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn, 1968,
pp. 159-178.
43. E. Fama, L. Fisher, M. Jensen and R. Roll, "The Adjustment of
Stock Prices to New Information", International Economic Review,
February 1969, pp. 1-21.
44. R. Ball, "Changes in Accounting Technique and Stock Prices",
Journal of Accounting Research - Supplement 1972, pp. I-38.
45. M. Scholes, "The Market for Securities: Substitution versus
Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices",
Journal of Business, April 1972, pp. 179-211.
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TABLE 2(i'i)
Semi-Stronq Form Tests of Market Efficiency
U.S. Evidence
Authors Information Sub-Set Test Approach and Data Resu1ts




The authors report that in excess of 80% of
the total information available about a
company's annual earnings is contained in
the Annual Income Account. They test the
speed with which the market reacts to
The market is reported to have anticipated
the Annual Income Accounts to the extent that
no abnormal performance can be observed even









Changes in Account incj
Policy that Resulted





between 1957 and 1965-
Dividend changes reflect management expect¬
ations as to future earnings. Therefore
stock prices will be sensitive to dividend
information. As dividend increases very
often follow stock splits - stock splits
are a source of dividend information. The
speed wi h which the market reacts to the
informational content of stock splits was
investigated for 9^0 splits on the NYSE
between 1926-60.
If the market anticipates the reported
earnings of a company (Ball and Brown
above) will it do the same for income-
sensitive changes in accounting policy?
237 policy changes (including inventory,
depreciation, expenses and revenue) from
197 companies between 19^7 and I960
provided the data base.
Scholes reports that the price falls
associated with 3^5 large secondary sales
of stock between 1961 and 1965 are small
thus implying an elastic demand curve for




a necessary inducement to
take up the stock;
investors to
(ii)The result of a revaluation of expect¬
ations about the stock based on the
information content of the secondary
sal e .
(i) Where the subsequent dividend increased - only
very small positive abnormal returns in the splits
to dividend period.
(ii) Where the subsequent dividend decreased - small
negative abnormal returns in the split to dividend
period.
(ii i) The market therefore reacts quickly and accurately
to the informational content of the split announce¬
ments and certainly before the change of dividend
announcement.
The reported results indicate little abnormal price
movement either in the month of the accounting change
or in the preceeding and succeeding months. The market
would appear to "see through" accounting conventions to
the underlying real values.
The reported results indicate that there were no
positive abnormal returns achieved in the post sale
period. In addition sales by Corporations and Officers
were followed by larger price falls than for other
investor groups suggesting that the market is very
efficient in recognising the signal from these reasonably
privileged investors..
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only does the market pre-empt the dividend announcement but does so
quickly and accurately. They note that this process is certainly
completed by the end of the split month but, "... most probably
almost immediately after the announcement". In the two remaining
results reported Ball extended the earlier contribution of Ball and
Brown and Scholes reported the speed with which the market reacted
to large sales by potentially well informed sellers.
In Table 2(iv) we detail a selection of reported test results on the
46 47 48 4q
strong form of the EMH that use U.S. data. ' ' '
Strong form tests of the EMH deal with the potential for profitable
trading that possession of either inside information or superior
information may lead to. Almost by definition we would expect insiders
to have access to information sources that if traded on would yield
substantial profits. This is indeed the case. The reported results
of Lorie and Niederhoffer and perhaps more dramatically the results of
Pratt and de Vere support this conclusion. Collins by examining an
information source that was initially restricted and subsequently became
public concentrates not so much on observed insider activity but on
the potential for profit that restricted information allows.
46. M. Jensen, "The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964"
May 1968, pp. 389-416.
47. J. Lorie and V. Niederhoffer, "Predictive and Statistical Properties
of Insider Trading", Journal of Law and Economics, 1968, pp. 35—53-
48. "SEC Product Line Reporting and Market Efficiency". Reported in
T. Dyckman, D. Downes and R. Magee, Efficient Capital Markets and
Accounting - A Critical Analysis (New Jersey), 1975, p.30.
49. S. Pratt and C. De Vere, "Relationship between Insider Trading and
Rates of Return for NYSE Common Stocks 1960-1966". Unpublished
Manuscript, University of Chicago (1968). Reprinted in J. Lorie and
R. Brealey, Modern Developments in Investment Management (New York),
1976, pp.268-279.
TABLE 2(iv)
























Test Approach and Data
Mutual fund managers can be expected to obtain
superior information about investment opportun¬
ities than other perhaps non-professional invest¬
ors. If the market is efficient then even
these privileged investors will not be able on
average to record consistently superior perform¬
ance over a buy and hold portfolio of the same
risk level.. This proposition was tested using
monthly total returns for 115 open ended mutual
funds 1955 " 1965.
Working with data from 100 companies between
1950 and i960 three questions were addressed.
(i) Are periods of intense insider trading
followed by large price changes?
(ii) Does insider trading affect price
vol ati1ity?
(iii) Do certain companies provide higher
insider trading profits than others?
The SEC requirement in 1970 for companies oper¬
ating in more than one business to submit seg¬
mented reports was accompanied by a first year
requirement that 1970 10-K statements should
contain comparative data for 1967-1969. This
segmented information was not previously available
to the public. Collins prepared two sets of
estimated earnings for the years 1968, 1969 and
1970 one based on the segmented reports and one
based on the publically available consolidated
earnings and tested whether a profitable trading
rule could be developed using the segmented
earnings information.
Starting at 1960 the rates of return achieved by
483 stocks on the NYSE from the date of a
recorded insider buy or insider sell to 1966 were
computed and divided into the two insider groups.
Of the ^83 stocks used 211 represented "buy
signals" and 272 "sell signals". The frequencie;
of occurrence of the two signals were evenly
distributed over the test period.
Resu1ts
Reported results indicate that superior performance
over a buy and hold portfolio was not on average
achieved. Indeed there is little evidence that
individual funds were able to return performance
levels better than could have been achieved by
chance. This result held even when management





Expanding the positive answer to (i) it was noted
that periods of intensive insider buying were
followed large positive abnormal returns.
Reported results show that the segmented reporting
information was a better predictor of future
earnings than the consolidated data. Profits could
be earned using this non-public information. This
result held for the years 1968 and 1969 but not
1970 the year when segmented reporting went public.
The market was therefore not efficient in dealing
with non-public information of 1968-1969-
The average return following "buy signals" was
approximately 17% p.a. greater than that following
the "sell signals". This difference in returns
between the two groups suggests profitable
trading opportunities for insiders.
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The popularity of many mutual funds (unit trusts) is based on the
belief that professional management with access to superior information
and analytical techniques can provide the "ordinary investor" with a *
greater return than he could have achieved on his own. In a sophisticated
study Jensen reported that there was no apparent evidence to suggest
that mutual funds consistently outperformed buy and hold strategies.
This result is interpretated in the sense that the efficiency of the
market is such that even the informational advantages held by professional
managers are insufficient to ensure consistently superior performance.
There are many reported results on the EMH in the U.S. context.
The balance of evidence is broadly represented in Table 2 (ii), (iii)
and (iv) above. On this basis it is difficult to reject the EMH.
While insider information can as we would expect lead to superior
trading opportunities it is unlikely that insider trading is quantit¬
atively important. Thus in the context of the efficiency of the market
mechanism we consider the results of strong-form tests based on insider
trading in the U.S. as expected and interesting but of rather less
importance than the other reported results.
The U.K. results on the EMH are not as conclusive as the U.S. results.
We follow the same format in reviewing this evidence dealing first of
50. E. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work", Journal of Finance, May 1970, pp. 383~^17-
51. T. Dyckman, D. Downes and R. Magee, Efficient Capital Markets and
Accounting - A Critical Analysis. (New Jersey), 1975.
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52 53 54
all with weak form results. These are described in Table 2(v). ' ' '
55, 56.
The results based on serial correlation tests (Brealey 1970, Dryden 1970)
report coefficients of the order 0.2 and 0.3. These are considerably
larger than the results of the equivalent U.S. tests (0.03,0.06, etc).
It is clear that on daily price relatives there is some time series
dependency at the first order level. However both authors conclude
that it is insufficient to reject the weak form EMH. On the other hand
Kemp and Reid using a range of non-parametric techniques in something
of a 'shotgun' approach are far less optimistic. Their conclusion,
"... that share price movements were conspicuously non-random over the
period ..." is not mirrored in any of the U.S. results. A particularly
interesting aspect of their work involved the effects of non-trading
which when removed from the data reduced the proportion of securities
showing evidence of non-randomness from 8Q% to 50%. Grimes and
Benjamin reached a broadly similar conclusion using a large sample of
individual companies. Their work included a brief comment on sector
differences in efficiency and it is revealing to note that, " ... a large
proportion of the non-random stocks were financial stocks, i.e.
investment trusts etc.".
52. R. Brealey, "The Distribution and Independence of Successive Rates of
Return from the British Equity Market", Journal of Business Finance,
1970, pp. 29-^0.
53. M. Dryden, "Filter Tests of U.K. Share Prices", Applied Economics,
1970, pp. 261-275.
54. M. Dryden, "A Statistical Study of U.K. Share Prices", Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, 1970, pp. 369"389 -
55. A. Kemp and G. Reid, "The Random Walk Hypothesis and the Recent
Behaviour of Equity Prices in Britain", Economica, 1971, pp. 28-51.
56. D. Grimes and A. Benjamin, "Random Walk Hypothesis for 543 Stocks and
Shares Registered on the London Stock Exchange", Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting, 1975, pp. 135-141.
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Test Approach and Data
Working with the daily price relatives between April 1962
and October 1968 Brealey investigated both the distributional
properties or returns on the FTA-A11 Share Index and their
time series dependency.
Dryden reported the results of filter tests, serial correlation
tests and a brief investigation into the distributional form
of three indices - FTA-500, FTA-Capital Goods and the Daily
Mail Ordinary. The period covered daily price relatives
between 1963 and 1967-
Dryden reported results of filter tests, runs tests serial
correlation tests and a brief investigation into the
distributional form of the returns on each of 15 securities.
The period covered daily price relatives 1963-1967•
Kemp and Refd were primarily concerned with developing a
methodology that did not rely on any underlying data
distributional characteristics. They suggested a series
of non-parametric tests and demonstrated their application
on 52 daily returns for 50 securities between October 1968
and January 1969-
The authors worked with daily, weekly and fortnightly prices
for 5^3 securities between October 1968 and April 1971. They
used two tests based on "fluctuation theory".
(ii)
Distributional Characteristics; Although the distribution of the FTA-A11 Sharereturns was symmetrical it differed from a normal distribution by having moreobservations in the tails, less in the middle ranges and more in the centre. Non-stationarity suggested as the likely explanation. These differences were notconsidered sufficient to reject return normalcy as a good working hypothesis.
Dependency; First order serial correlation coefficient - 0.219. After consider¬ation of several reasons including dividend payments, ex-dividend dates and non-simultaneous recording of prices the overall conclusion reported some non-randomnessbut not sufficient for profitable trading or grounds to reject weak form EMH.
Small filters consistently produced higher returns than either larger filters or a buyand hold strategy. (Work on individual companies confirmed this result). Transactioncosts were not taken into account. Serial correlation coefficients on the FTA-500 andthe FTA-Capital Goods were reported as .28 and .31 respectively. The Daily Mail indexresult was .16. The distributional properties of the indices were similar to thosereported by Brealey. The Dryden conclusion suggested considerable non-randomness in theindices examined.
Reported results indicate that the hypothesis of random price movements could not berejected with either filter, runs or serial correlation tests. The distributionalform of the returns was noted as slightly leptokurtic with a positive skew as comparedto the normal distribution.
Kemp and Reid reported that after adjusting for non-trading approximately 50% of theirsample showed evidence of non-randomness. These over-all results were accompanied by aconsiderable variation between the various individual companies. Their conclusion
suggests that the random walk hypothesis has been dangerously over-generalised.
Of the 5^3 stocks examined 30% were reported to behave like a genuine random walk while20% were noted as deviating significantly from a random walk. Of particular interestwas their result that a large proportion of the non-random stocks were financial stocksincluding investment trusts.
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We move on to describe four tests of semi-strong market efficiency
that while still broadly supporting the EMH do indicate that its
acceptance is perhaps not quite as complete as in the U.S.^^
The results are reported in Table 2(vi).
Until recently the scope of tests on semi-strong and strong form
efficiency in the U.K. was hampered by a lack of extensive data bases
that could provide full details of capital changes, dividends etc.
With the formation of the London Business School Share Price Data-base
this situation has to some extent been rectified. Indeed the majority
of the studies reported in Table 2(vi) on semi-strong form tests and in
Table 2(vii) on strong form tests use LBS data.
The earliest study cited (Morris) is unfortunately not rigorous. In
particular the "information release" dates for inflation adjusted
earnings are very probably not unique. The companies themselves or
indeed other stockbroking firms may well have pre-empted the dates used.
Firth's results are interesting in that his conclusion is considerably
stronger than that of Marsh. Unfortunately his data is restricted in
that it covers only two years 1973-1974. In addition it should be
noted that the period 1973-1974 covers the long bear market following
the late 1973 stock market "collapse". It would be useful to know
if the results held in more typical market conditions. More substantial
support for the EMH comes from Franks et al although again there are
57- R. Morris, "Evidence of the Impact of Inflation Accounting on Share
Prices", Accounting and Business Research, Spring 1975, pp. 82-90.
58. M. Firth, "An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Announcement
of Capitalisation Issues in Share Prices", Journal of Business
Accounting and Finance, Spring 1977, pp47~60.
59- J- Franks, J. Broyles, M. Hecht, "An Industry Study of the Profitability
of Mergers in the U.K.", Journal of Finance, December 1977, pp.1513"
1525.
60. "Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the U.K. Stock Market",
Journal of Finance, September 1979,
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Test Approach and Data Results




Morris noted that as a result of popular interest
in inflation accounting stockbroking firm occasion¬
ally produced lists of inflation adjusted earnings
for large samples of individual companies. He
identified three such periods in the 1970s -
December '71, March '73 and April '7^. Using the
FFJR approach he tested the reaction of share
prices to the informational context of the inflation
adjusted earnings. Data from 132, 13& and 53
companies were used for the 12/71, 3/73 and h/lh
periods respectively.
The results report that in the post-pub 1ication
period no abnormal returns of any significance
were recorded. One aspect of the results is
difficult to interpret. He notes that abnormal
returns were often in an opposite direction to
that which would be expected given the anticip¬





Scrip issues are usually accompanied by announce¬
ments of dividend increases. Abnormal returns
around the announcement date should if the market
is efficient relate solely to the dividend effect
and not to the purely "mechanical" scrip pricing
effect. Firth tested for this using 227
capitalisations in the period 1973-197^. An FFJR
methodology was employed.
Scrip issues Firth reported have no impact on
share prices thus the stock market is efficient
in accounting for the "mechanical" pricing effect




Mergers The authors were primarily concerned with assessing
whether or not abnormal returns accrued to share¬
holders of the companies involved in mergers. An
implication of their methodology and results would
be that if the market was efficient it would
anticipate any abnormal returns prior to the merger
announcement. The study was confined to 70 mergers
in the "Breweries and Distilleries" sector between
1955 and 1972. An FFJR methodology was employed.
In addition to reporting results on mergers and
shareholder returns the authors noted that the
market appeared to be efficient in anticipating






Marsh was interested both in the efficiency with
which the market reacted to rights issues announce¬
ments and in providing some U.K. evidence on the
demand elasticity for U.K. equities. He used
several different methodologies including CAPM and
FFJR on samples that ranged from 1000 rights issues
to 250 depending on the data requirements of the
particular methodology. The periods covered
ranged from 1955 to 1975.
His results on demand elasticity broadly supported
those of Scholes. (Demand elasticity was estimated
at -300). However the results on market efficiency
are ambiguous. While the overall conclusion fails
to reject market efficiency his results indicate
consistent and positive abnormal returns in the
post-announcement period. This result was invariate
to the model used. Interestingly Marsh notes that
the large abnormal returns were associated with
smaller companies. He suggests that as the rightsissue sample is equally weighted and the market
factor is value weighted the larger returns avail¬
able on small companies are "flowing through into
the abnormal returns measures.
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limitations. In particular only one sector was tested and within
this sector the sample size was 70.
Marsh's results represent the most comprehensive U.K. research into
the EMH. He employed large samples and obtained results using
several different methodologies. His suggestion on the importance
of size as a priced variable is extremely useful. We note in passing
that the large number of small to medium sized companies on the London
Market as compared to the NYSE may well support the existence of a
"size factor". Recent work on the NYSE strongly suggest a priced
variable related to size although interestingly its presence does not
appear to have biased U.S. results on the EMH in the way suggested by
61
March for the U.K. In some respects Marsh's conclusion not to
reject the EMH is surprising. As we noted in Table 2(vi) much of his
evidence strongly suggests significant inefficiency.
Strong-form tests of the EMH using U.K. data have effectively been
confined to replicating the U.S.., performance approach on unit trusts.
We report a typical test approach in this area together with similar
studies on the performance of pension funds and investment trusts
The results are shown in Table 2 (v i i).
61 . R. Banz, "The Relationship between Return and Market Value of
Common Stocks", Journal of Financial Economics, 1981, pp. 3~l8.
62. J. Holbrook, "Investment Performance of Pension Funds", Journal
of the Institute of Actuaries, 1977, pp. 15—91 -
63. M. Firth, "The Investment Performance of Unit Trusts in the Period
1965-1975", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking ,'1977, pp. 597 ~
604.
64. J. Guy, "The Performance of the British Investment Trust Industry",
Journal of Finance, May 1978, pp. 443-455.
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Using annual results based on "questionnaires"
from between 26 to 9& pension funds in the
1970-1975 period Holbrook attempted to identify
superior performance.
Firth using a CAPM methodology tested the
performance of 70 unit trusts. He covered
the period 1985-1976 and used annual total
return data.
Working with monthly returns from hi ITCs between
I960 and 1970 Guy used a selection of methodol¬
ogies including CAPM to test for superior
performance.
His conclusions based on non-risk adjusted
returns were very few funds consistently
achieved above or below average performance.
He could find no evidence of superior
performance even after adding back man¬
agement expenses.
No ITC had performance measures (Jensen's
alpha, Shape variability or Treynor
volatility) that were significantly different
I from zero. However some evidence of signif-
1 icant non-zero performance was obtained using
either an empirically estimated security
market line or the zero-beta form of CAPM.
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Holbrook's work while weak in the sense that it does not compare
returns on a risk adjusted basis is useful as it represents one of
the few published sources of comparative pension fund performance.
Firth found strong support for the EMH in his work with unit trusts.
The most comprehensive work on U.K. fund performance is that by Guy.
His results are of particular interest in that he deals with ITCs.
Although his study was limited to 49 ITCs he employed several method-
6 ^
ologies and over all his results support the EMH.
In reviewing both the U.K. and U.S. evidence on the EMH it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that reported U.K. results are far less
convincing than those for the U.S. This conclusion would appear to
hold at all three levels of the EMH. We stress that it has not been
our intention to present a full and detailed analysis of tests for
market efficiency. As our purpose was to assess the market environ¬
ment within which ITCs must operate a description of the main and
accepted conclusions was considered sufficient.
4. Foreign Investment : We noted in Chapter 1 the very substantial
international exposure that the ITC sector maintained during the
nineteen seventies. This level of exposure was significant both in
terms of absolute value and in relation to that maintained by other
financial intermediaries. Table 2(viii) describes the average U.K. -
non-U.K. portfolio split for several such intermediaries.
65. A reference list for most U.K. tests on the EMH can be found in
A. Henfrey, B. Albrecht and P. Richards, "The U.K. Stock Market




Average Non-U.K. Portfolio Investment Proportions




Insurance Companies - General Funds 8
Long Term Funds 4
Superannuation Funds 5
Notes : 1. Sources - Financial Stat i'st ics^
Business Monitor^
Table 1 (xiv)
While the historical justification for going overseas was primarily
in terms of exploiting interest arbitrage opportunities the more
recent justification is perhaps in terms of diversification.
Foreign investment by U.K. nationals and institutions has traditionally
been closely controlled by the U.K. authorities. Indeed as the
beginnings of exchange controls can be traced back to the 13th century
66. Financial Statistics (C.S.O.), Various Issues. 1971 -1980.
67. Business Monitor MQ5, Various Issues including summary data -
Quarter 1, 1976.
both the relatively liberal 19th century and the more recent period
without exchange controls could be considered as periods of exception
, 68rather than rule.
Modern exchange controls covered the period from 1947 until October
2k 1979- On this latter date all exchange controls on foreign currency
denominated portfolio investments were abolished. However while they
existed they did represent a major parameter within which ITC managers
had to operate. The authority for the post World War II exchange
controls was found in the Exchange Control Act 19^7 which was implemented
through the Bank of England.
Our objective in this section is two fold. Firstly we describe the
main methods of gaining foreign exposure open to ITCs. Secondly we
indicate the relevant considerations involved in choosing between
the premium and borrowing approaches.
(i) Methods of Gaining Foreign Exposure : There were five main
methods of gaining foreign exposure during the nineteen seventies
all of which were subject to exchange controls. The relative
importance of each to the ITC movement was noted in Table l(xvi)






(e) Supplement 35 Loans
68. M. Hughes, "The Consequences of the Removal of Exchange Controls on
Portfolios and the Flow of Funds in the U.K., de Zoete & Bevan, 1980.
HP;
(a) Investment Currency : The most significant route for ITCs to
gain foreign exposure was through the purchase of investment
currency. The development of an investment currency market can
be traced back to the financing requirements of World War II.
In 19^0 the holders of foreign currency securities were required
to register their holdings with the Treasury. From time to time
some of these securities had to be sold to the Treasury in return
for sterling. Following the war those securities that were
registered but unsold came under the "custodianship" requirements
of the 19^7 Act. They represented the only U.K. source of foreign
exchange available to U.K. residents or companies for the purchase
of foreign currency portfolio securities. During the early
post-war years although the securities comprising this "pool"
could be bought and sold for sterling direct trading between foreign
currency securities of different currencies was not allowed.
Gradually however this barrier was removed and by 195^ the only
effective transfer restriction was between North American securities
and those of other countries. The fund of North American securities
was known as "hard" dollars and that of other currencies as "soft"
69
dollars. J As convertibility between the various world
currencies increased the need for this remaining division decreased
and in May 1962 the two markets were amalgamated into one. The
resulting investment currency market still however represented
the only U.K. source of exchange for those investors seeking foreign
portfolio exposure without borrowing. The main developments in
the market after May 1962 that are relevant to our purpose are
described in Exhibit 2(v).
69. Several names were used to describe the pool of foreign currency





Principal post May 1962 Change with Implications for ITCs
Date Description
May 1962 Amalgamation of "hard" and "soft" dollar markets
April 1965 25% surrender rule introduced
June 1972 Exchange controls extended to cover the securities
denominated in the currencies of the former
Overseas Sterling Area.
March 197^ The sale of securities denominated in the currencies
of the former Overseas Sterling Area attracted the
25% surrender rule.
January 1978 25% surrender rule abolished.
July 1979 The purchase of portfolio investment in most countries
using official exchange was allowed.
October 1979 All exchange controls were abolished as from
October 2k.
Note: Source, Bank of England^
70. Bank of England Quarterly, 1976, pps. 314—322 .
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An ITC that decided to gain foreign exposure by purchasing the
required foreign currency through the premium market was faced
with the problems of the dollar premium and the premium surrender
rule. We look at each in turn.
The demand for investment currency was always such that it could
only be purchased at a premium over the official exchange rate.
While the premium was often calculated for convenience against
the last fixed sterling-dollar parity of $2.60 to £1 the true
premium at any point in time was calculated against the current
spot. Graph 2(i) traces the monthly true premium from
February 1971 - October 2k 1979.
Both the level and the variability of the premium are evident
from Graph 2.(0. Nine times it fell to below 15%. On the other
hand for the most part of 1975 the rate was in excess of 60%
peaking in Uune 1975 at over 85%. Unfortunately there is little
quantitative evidence on the precise determinants of the premium.
Indeed one author has suggested;
"... the behaviour of the investment premium defies
analysis". 71
In this respect attempts at analysing the premium share much in
common with attempts to analyse the discount at which ITC equities
usually stand to their underlying net asset values!
We do not attempt to identify the various determinants of the
premium or their relative importance. However we note that
71. J. P. Gurney; "A Comparison between Premium Currency and Loans for
Overseas Investment", Investment Analyst, No kk, 1976, pp. 17—22.
GRAPH 2(i)
Investment Dollar Premium Based on the Current U.S. Dollar Spot Rates
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Notes: 1. Source : Capital International
2. The premium is calculated from the following algorithm; P^. = (S^. - I ^) /1 ^ 2(i)
where ; P^ = Premium at the end of month
= Spot at the end of month
lt = Investment dollar spot at the end of month ^
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Wool ley has suggested that while many factors may underlie the
premium and its variability the expected performance of the
72
relevant foreign security markets will be crucial. He suggests
that as the available pool of investment dollars is more or less
fixed together with the fact that institutional investors allocate
relatively fixed market-weighted proportionsto the various world
markets then there will be an inverse relationship between foreign
market movements and the premium. Interestingly the correlation
coefficient between the premium and Capital International's U.S.
index is -0.69 which given the reasonable assumption that the U.S.
is the major foreign destination for U.K. funds would lend support
to Wool ley's hypothesis.
One aspect of the premium market that was of particular concern
to ITCs concerned the treatment of foreign dividends. As the
premium market related only to capital transactions foreign dividends
were translated at the higher spot rate of exchange. This resulted
in downward pressure on reported yields. Given the perceived
importance of yields noted in Chapter 1 many ITCs considered this
translation effect an important restriction on the funds that could
be allocated to non-U.K. markets.
The presence of the investment redemption or surrender rule between
April 1965 and January 1978 was a method whereby premium dollars
were transferred to the official market. The surrender rule
operated by requiring 25% of the sale proceeds of foreign currency
denominated securities originally purchased with premium dollars
to be redeemed not through the investment currency market but
72. P. K. Wooley, "Britain's Investment Currency Premium", Lloyds Bank
Review, 1975, pps. 33-^6.
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through the official exchange. The sellers of these securities
therefore lost the benefit of redeeming the full value of their
assets at the lower investment dollar rate of exchange. The
workings of the surrender rule and its implied "tax" cost are
demonstrated in Exhibit 2(vi). Graph 2(ii) plots the movement
of the implied tax rate on foreign security sales.
As the computation described in Exhibit 2(vi) implies the tax cost
was closely related to premium levels. The average cost over the
83 months was 6.46% dropping below 3% four times and rising to a
high of 11% in June 1975. There is no doubt that the presence
of the surrender rule represented a real cost on non-U.K. portfolio
transactions. The tax was particularly strongly criticised by
the ITC movement where it was felt that it restricted ITCs from
operating effectively in international markets - an area where they
perceived they held a competitive advantage. Just what the absolute
cost to the ITC movement was is extremely difficult to determine.
However an approximate idea can be gained albeit by some restrictive
assumptions through the following computation.
Let .8x^ = Dollar value of ITC foreign currency sales in year .
Approximately 80% of ITC foreign exposure was gained
via the currency market.
S = Average spot rate in year t.
P = Average investment dollar rate in year t.
T = Average surrender tax rate in year t
where Tt = .25 (S - P ) /S
Then





Assumptions : Sale Proceeds $50,000
US - UK Spot Rate $2.5
Effective Investment Premium b0%
(A) Premium Calculation :
Sale Proceeds $50,000
Translation c Spot 20,000
c Premium (2.5/1.4) 28,933
Premium £ 7,933
(B) Surrender :
1. Proceeds to be offered on the official
exchange 25% $50,000 : $ 12,500
2. Cost of the surrender; £
$12,500 c 1.79 6,983
$12,500 c 2.50 5,000
Cost {25% of £7,933) £1,983
3. Effective "tax"; 1983/27,933
= 7.IS


























































































Effective Surrender Tax Rate
Monthly Observations
February 1971 - December 1977
Notes : 1. Source : Capital International
2. The effective tax algorithm
is as follows:
Tt * -25(st " 't» /st 2 {i i j
where T = Effective tax rate at the end
of month .
S^_ = Spot rate at the end of month ^.












Description 1971 1972 1973 197 A 1975 > 1976 1977
ITC Foreign Security
Sales £m (a) 293.3 A65.0 726.2 627.3 385.2 A66.2 A73.1
Average of Spot 2.AA 2.50 2.A6 2.35 2.23 1 .82 1 .61
Average of Investment 1.98 2.03 2.06 1 .69 1 .32 1 .22 1 .26
Average of Tax Rate A. 70 A.70 A.00 7.00 10.20 8.20 5.AO
Cost of Tax (£m) :
To ITCs £m 28 A6 62 80 58 51 3A
Total Cost £m (b) 128 138 158 265 180 177 177
73Notes: 1. Sources (a) Bank of England
(b) Bank of England ^
73. Bank of England Quarterly, 1976, pp. 31A-322.
lb. Bank of England Quarterly, Various Issues, 1971-1980.
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To the extent that our estimates are reasonably accurate and we
have no way of independently verifying this the cost to the
movement over the decade was considerable.''"' In total some £359m
was surrendered by the movement as the result of the redemption
rule.
On the basis that the surrender rule acted as an intermediation cost
one would expect a relationship to exist between the discount and
the premium. Saunders and Woodward working with data for the four
year period to 1975 hypothesised that the higher the expected
premium then the lower will be the price an investor will offer for
an ITC share and therefore, ceteris paribus, the higher the discount.^
However their results reported a negative relationship between premium
and discount. In Graph 2 (iii) we plot the monthly relationship between
the premium and the average monthly discount on 64 ITCs for the 84
months to October 1979.
Clearly the relationship between the discount and the premium is
extremely weak. Indeed the correlation coefficient over the 84 months
covered by Graph 2(i ii) was -0.0687. A further insight into the
relationship between the premium and the discount can be gained by
noting from Graph 2 (i i) that the 105 month period covered by the
graph can be divided fairly easily into a period of increasing
premiums to June 1975 and thereafter a period of decreasing premiums.
The correlation coefficient between the discount and the premium for
the 32 months to June 1975 was -0.095 and for the remaining 52 months
75. The Bank of England were asked first of all if such figures were avail¬
able. They were not. Secondly they were asked to comment on our
estimates. They considered that the estimates were very probably on
the high side rather than the low side. Their reasons for suggesting
this were principally concerned with data weaknesses in the reported
total premium figures.
76. A. Saunders, R. S. Woodward, "The Effect of the Foreign Investment Sur¬
render Rule on Investment Trust Share Discounts", The Investment Analyst,
January 1975, pp. 42-43.
GRAPH 2(1 i i)
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to October 1979 was -0.383. Therefore while the relationship
between the premium and the discount is weakly negative over the whole
period the negativity is considerably stronger in the period of
declining premiums. These results would clearly support the findings
of Saunders and Woodward. In doing so they cast doubt on the
"practitioner" argument that the investment currency regulations had
a strong positive influence on the discount. If anything the
relationship was negative and unstable. Unfortunately any conclusion
involving either discounts or premiums hinges crucially on the ceteris
paribus assumption. In particular the discount captures the
relationship between the whole portfolio and the equity price while the
premium and the related surrender rule cover an average 30% of the
portfolios. Thus there are many other influences that could affect
discount levels. In view of this we do not wish our conclusion to
do more than suggest a weakness in the "practitioner" position.
We now turn to consider the other methods by which ITCs could gain
foreign exposure. However, we stress that during the 1970s by for
the most important route was through the investment currency market.
Indeed something in excess of 75% of foreign exposure was financed
this way. In view of this predominance our review of the other
methods is correspondingly brief.
(b) Mu1ti-currency Loans: In addition to the risks of exchange rate
volatility mu1ti-currency loans carried the risks associated with
gearing. Clearly there were two decisions involved here the first
to invest abroad and the second to sensitise the foreign exposure
through gearing.
Exchange risks can of course be minimised by ensuring that funds
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borrowed are in the same currency as the investments purchased.
Mu1ti-currency loans facilitate this by allowing managers to borrow
a "package" of currencies with the option of changing currency mix
at certain pre-determined dates. This option helps avoid either
mis-matching loans and investments or the necessity of raising
additional foreign currency to meet a new investment opportunity in
a different currency.
During the period of exchange controls each foreign currency loan was
subject to individual approval from the Bank of England and permission
to proceed was conditional on the following undertakings.
"1. To retain the investments purchased by loan currency in
a separate portfolio.
2. To maintain a separate cover of investment currency
investments. If the market value of the investments in
the laon portfolio falls, the investor must purchase
investment currency investments to maintain a cover
(which includes both the loan portfolio investments
and the investment currency investments at market value)
at a level above 115% of the loan.
3. To reply the loan at a specific date out of the proceeds
of sale of the loan portfolio investments. Any shortfall
between the proceeds of the investments and the cost of
repaying the loan must be accounted for by purchase of
investment currency. However any surplus remaining
after repaying the loan is treated as an investment
currency asset and the dollar premium can be realised when
that surplus is crystallised.
A. To pay interest on the loan out of dividends and other
income from the loan portfolio investments. If this
income (reduced by overseas witholding tax) is less than
the interest payable, the difference must be settled
either by proceeds of sale of part of the overseas
portfolio or by purchase of investment currency."
From the above regulations it can be seen that there was a considerable
inter-relationship between foreign currency borrowings and the premium
77- G.M.A. Crawford, "Financing Overseas Portfolio Investment",
Investment Trust Handbook (AITC) 1978.
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markets. Not only had foreign borrowings to be covered by
additional assets purchased through the investment market but
dividend and capital "shortfalls" and "surpluses" also involved
investment currency transactions. Interestingly these latter
transactions had an effect broadly equivalent to an additional
element of gearing. For example a surplus on a portfolio realisation
after repaying the currency loan was redeemed at the premium rate.
Similarly a net loss on realisation had to be made good through the
premium market. This additional "profit" or "loss" through having
to use premium dollars clearly exposes equity holders to a further
gearing element in addition to that initially involved in the foreign
currency loan.
Back-to-back Loans : Back-to-back loans are both an interesting
variation of mu1ti-currency loans and an attempt to allow "borrowing
without" gearing. They usually involve an international bank
bringing together an ITC which deposits sterling at a fixed rate of
interest as security for a foreign loan and an overseas company which
wants to borrow sterling and deposits its domestic currency as security.
The ITC then has access to the foreign currency deposit and the
overseas company to the sterling deposit. While both recipients
receive a fixed return from their own domestic currency deposit the
capital value and the interest payable on the overseas loan will vary
considerably depending on exchange rate movements. During most of
the 1970s sterling decreased in value against most of the major currencies
which effectively increased both the cost of interest payments and the
amount of the capital liabilities. Although it is often maintained
that back-to-backs involve no gearing they clearly do if the value of
the investments change while the debt component in foreign currency
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terms does not. In addition as with mu1ti-currency loans back-to-backs
were subject to the "shortfalls and surpluses" requirement of the
exchange controls. As we noted above this in itself led to a gearing
effect.
(d) Currency Swaps : In 1976 the Bank of England gave approval for a
variation to the established back-to-back schemes. This involved
permission for the direct swap of sterling for an equivalent amount of
a foreign currency. It is suggested that their introduction made
it slightly easier for overseas companies to meet interest payments
to foreign principals given that swaps were not strictly loans. (The
liabilities are correctly shown on balance sheets as contingent
rather than established.) However it should be noted that as far
as the U.K. was concerned they were liable to the same exchange control
provisions as back-to-backs and mu1ti-currency loans.
(e) Supplement 35 Loans : These loans were a specialised form of borrowing
whereby an ITC could build up a portfolio of bonds from E.E.C. countries
exempt from the usual exchange control regulations. Their introduction
in 1977 was the first significant easing of exchange controls and
reflected E.E.C. policy to gradually reduce barriers to European
international capital movements. As we noted in Exhibit 2(v) all
exchange controls were eventually removed in October 1979 therefore the
usefulness of Supplement 35 loans was both limited and short-lived.
(ii) The Premium and Loan Approach to Foreign Investment : Having completed
out review of the various methods of gaining foreign exposure that were
open to ITCs it is clear that they fall into two broad groups involving
either borrowing foreign currency or transactions in the investment
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currency market. ITCs in general preferred to purchase investment
currency rather than borrow. Indeed as we noted above the percentage
of foreign securities funded this way rarely fell below 75 to 80% for
most of the decade. It is perhaps slightly unfair to directly compare
the two methods as one involved a gearing decision in addition to the
decision to purchase foreign securities. However given the dominance
of the premium market in spite of its volatility and the surrender rule
some comments on the choice are required. Table 2(x) details return
characteristics on various foreign currencies including the investment
dol1 a r.
In Table 2(x) we treat foreign currencies as investments in their own
right although it should be noted that at this stage the returns do not
take account of interest rate differences in the various countries.
The exchange rate observations that provide the basis for the monthly
returns are the foreign currency equivalents of £1 sterling. Therefore
a negative return sign implies an average monthly gain in sterling for
a U.K. investor. The opposite is the case for a positive sign. Thus
for example a U.K. investor would on average expect a gain in sterling
terms from holding U.S. dollars. Indeed he could have expected a gain
in sterling terms from holding any national currency apart from those
of Spain and Italy. This merely reflects sterlings continued weakness
against the world's currencies throughout most of the 1970s.
Interestingly it would not on average have been to a U.K. investor's
advantage to hold premium dollars during this period. In addition to
the extent that standard deviation is an adequate measure of investment
risk then such an investment was almost twice as risky as a similar position
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U.S. -0.000216 0.0262 -0.0707 0.0579
1nvestment Dol1ar 0 .00143^ 0.0525 -0.1084 0.1615
Sweden -Q.001501 0.0259 —0.0744 0.1026
Germany -0.005356 0.0329 -0.1083 0.1003
Japan -0.004207 0.0342 —0.1144 0.1133
Austra1 ia -0.000279 0.0273 -0.1055 0.1866
Hoi 1 and -0.004578 0.0315 -0.1173 0.1056
1 ta 1 y 0.003983 0.0382 -0.1335 0.1670
Switzer1 and -0.007653 0.0374 --0.1419 0.1540
Spa i n 0.000939 0.0281 -0.0854 0.2006
Denmark -0.001987 0.0304 —0.1115 0.1072
Austria -0.005291 0.0321 -0.1124 0.1094
Norway -0.002939 0.0261 -0.0999 0.0917
France -0.001785 0.0293 -0.1044 0.0979
7O
Notes : 1. Source : Capital International
2. R. . Log (X,t/X.t.,)
where R. = return on currency i.
X.^_ = spot exchange rate at month end t.
78. Capital International (Geneva) Inc.
It is of course unwise on the basis of the above analysis to conclude
that ITCs in general chose the wrong method of gaining foreign exposure.
Many other factors influenced the choice of investment route. For
example the administrative difficulties involved in the setting up
and monitoring foreign currency loans for the purpose of exchange
controls, the costs of foreign currency borrowing, the penalities noted
earlier that could result under exchange controls from asset shortfalls
and of course the perhaps unwanted gearing could all act against
choosing the foreign currency loan route. On the other hand exchange
risks could be hedged and the surrender rule avoided. However the
premium route was very much the accepted route. It has been pointed
out to the author by a senior member of the investment community that
administrative difficulties together with a "feeling" that the Bank of
England very much favoured the premium route were the critical factors.
Interestingly we can show in slightly more qualitative terms the broad
effect of choosing the premium route over the foreign currency route.
Table 2(xi) reports the results of such a comparison between U.K.
borrowing, investment dollar purchase and U.S. investment and U.S.
borrowing and U.S. investment.
Clearly this is an extremely rough and ready investment scenario.
However it does suggest that over the period as a whole U.S. exposure
might have been more profitable gained by foreign borrowing rather than
through a combination of U.K. borrowing and investment dollars. As
we might expect the strength of the premium during the first half of
the seventies suggests that the latter approach to U.S. exposure would
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U.K. Borrowing + Premium $
Mean Std. Dev.
1971 -
1975 53 -0.00072 0.05637 0.00312 0.06586
1976 -
1979 52 0.00179 0.04704 -0.01227 0.06558
1971 -
1979 105 0.C0052 0.05172 -0.00450 0.06586
Notes : 1. The cost of borrowing is taken as the three month
T.B. rate in both the U.K. and the U.S.
2. The returns are the continuously compounded returns
including the dividend component on Capital International's
U.S. index.
3. The index values were translated to sterling at the month-
end premium exchange rate. The 25% surrender rule was
applied on returns up to the end of 1979-
4. Dividends were translated back to sterling at the
official month end exchange rate and re-invested at the
ruling premium exchange rate.
5. Both transaction costs and the foreign security and
dividend cover rules that applied when portfolio investment
was undertaken with foreign borrowings were ignored.
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To conclude this section we look briefly at the post-October 1979
period. It is however an area we return to in Chapter 7. Undoubtedly
the speed with which exchange controls were abolished took many
institutions including ITCs by surprise. The immediate effect was
a loss on portfolio valuations due to the removal of the premium
element. The longer term effects are more difficult to assess. The
removal of controls may persuade some non-ITC institutions to allocate
a larger proportion of their portfolios overseas which with increasing
expertise in this area would tend to undermine a traditional ITC
intermediation function. Indeed Hughes working with survey data
sourced from twenty institutions suggests that foreign holdings by
79institutions may well double following the removal of exchange controls.
Summary : In this chapter we have concentrated on the institutional
parameters within which ITC managers must operate. These parameters
very much determine the characteristics ofthe intermediation service
produced. The four broad categories we considered, namely legal,
tax, market and foreign represent the most important aspects of the
business environment ITC managers must deal successfully with.
79. M. Hughes, "The Consequences of the Removal of Exchange Controls on

















INTRODUCT1 ON : Our objective in this chapter is to examine the
returns achieved by a selection of ITCs during the 1970s.
In selecting ITCs to be included in the main empirical work the
predominant concerns were coverage and representativeness. The
objective was to identify the core of the ITC sector. To achieve
this the main sample was made up of 97 of the largest ITCs at
December 1980 that had been in existence throughout the 118 month
period to December 31, 1980.
Size for this purpose was defined as assets under management although
it was noted that the largest 100 ITCs accounted for more than 80%
of the sector's total capitalisation. The choice of 118 months
rather than the full ten years was the result of a data constraint. The
bulk of the price data on individual ITCs came from the London Business
School and a considerably larger sample of companies was available for
the post-decimalisation period (February 1971).
The data was accumulated from the following sources :
(i) London Business School
(ii) Extel Cards
(iii) Grieveson Grant & Co.
(iv) Wood Mackenzie & Co.
(v) Association of Investment
Trusts
Share prices, dividend and
capital information
Dividend and capital information
Capital information and gross
assets under management
U.K. index information and
certain accounting data for
individual ITCs.
Net asset data-base. This was
made available by the AITC through
Wood Mackenzie & Co.
(vi) Ivory & Sime Rates of exchange and international
market indices.
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In order to control the very substantial amounts of data involved a
data-base was assembled in a standard format that allowed easy access
to specific data on any ITC or index. The question of data accuracy
is extremely important. The main elements of the data-base those
from the London Business School and the AITC are widely used and both
are extensively checked for accuracy and reasonableness. However a
critical eye was still kept on these data sources and indeed an
occasional error was identified and corrected. Extel cards and the
Stock Exchange Daily Official Lists were the principal verification
sources.^ The accuracy of the data collected from the other sources
was rigorously reviewed and where necessary verified with other sources.
All the data was card punched for an ICL 2972 machine one of the several
large computers operated by the Edinburgh Regional Computing Centre.
The usual verification procedures for card punch data were followed.
A considerable amount of computing was required. The necessary
programming was sourced where possible from standard packages namely
2
TSP, ESP and SPSS. However there were many areas where additional
programming specific to a problem at hand was required. Where such
programming was required this was undertaken by various members of the
Business Studies Department, including Mr. Robin Day and Dr. Jan
Kwia t kowski.
1, The Computation of Investment Returns : An investment return
consists of two parts one capital and one income. Taken together they
comprise the following measure of the total return on an equity investment
1. J. Smithers, "London Business School Share Price Data-Base", London
(1977). This publication includes details of the various data
checks undertaken by the London Business School.
2. TSP : Time Series Software Package - University of Chicago.
ESP : Econometric Software Package - University of Chicago.
SSPS: Statistical Package for Social Sciences - McGraw-Hill.
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R. Total return over period t-1 to t..
P.
Price of security i at t-1t-
P<4. = Price of security i at t11 1
D. = Dividend distribution on security iit '
It is important to include both components of return in any investment
return measure. Failure to do so will result in returns not reflecting
the full return attributable to security ownership. The relative importance
of the two components changes over time. In general this is due to
positive attempts by companies to maintain a considerable degree of
stability in their distribution policies. As a result of this the dividend
component in total return generally increases during periods of market
decline and decreases when the market is rising.
Returning to equation 3(i) it is necessary to give more adequate
definitions for the various component parts of return in order to
establish an empirical content. In particular we examine the
fol1owing :
(i) Security prices
(i i) Capital changes
(i i i) Dividends
(iv) Taxation.
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Security Prices : There are three prices available for each security
on the stock exchange. The first two represent the jobbers' purchase
and sale quotes while the third represents an ultimate bargain or
transaction price. Clearly the transaction price is the one with the
most economic significance. However U.K. stock exchange analysts
have traditionally been content to use an easily available surrogate
for transaction prices namely the average mid-point of the bid-ask
ranges quoted by each jobber. The spreads are entered by each
jobber on prepared boards which are collected at the close of business
and then updated for any after hours trading. This data provides an
input for the various FT information services. An alternative mid-
market price is available from the Stock Exchange Daily Official List.
The FT data is usually preferred by analysts principally because the
Stock Exchange Daily Official List is drawn up at 2.30 p.m. which is
prior to the close of business and therefore does not cover the full
day's trading.
While great care is obviously taken with the preparation of the FT mid-
market prices there is no way round the problem of relevance. They do
not reflect true transaction prices and in addition there is no obvious
connection between mid-market prices and ultimate transaction prices.
Recognising these problems the ITC prices we use in this study are
actual transaction prices. There are however two difficulties
associated with the use of transaction prices. First of all they
are only recorded for public use on a voluntary basis. The
available population of recorded prices known as marks is therefore
not the same and indeed is considerably less than the total number of
transactions for a given security. There is no obvious way round
this difficulty and it is quite possible than an element of bias
weights a jobber's decision on whether or not to record a mark.
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For example it is sometimes suggested that in busy market conditions
jobbers are unwilling to take time to record marks. As the
percentage of bargains recorded as marks has declined by 20% to
approximately 30% over the decade the possibility of bias being
present in the population of marks may well have increased.^
The second difficulty which would be present even if all bargains
were recorded concerns infrequent trading. It may well be that in
any given period a particular security has not been traded. To use
the price of the prior period or some other surrogate would obviously
be imprecise. This problem which has long been recognised is of
particular relevance to the London Stock Exchange where there is a
disproportionately large number of small companies than compared
to say the New York Stock Exchange. A characteristic of many
small companies is that their equity tends to be infrequently
traded."' In the U.K. context Marsh has recently suggested that
"
... for the 10% least actively traded companies,
the recorded prices are on average some two months
out of date."6
Franks, Broyles and Hecht note a similar effect in the sample of
companies they used in their recent study of U.K. mergers.'' We
reproduce their Table 4 below :
3. Stock Exchange Fact Book, December 1980.
4. L. Fisher, "Some New Stock Market Indices", Journal of Business
(January), 1966.
5- We examine the relationships between size, marketability and
infrequent trading in chapter 9.
6. P. Marsh, "Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the U.K. Stock
Market", Journal of Finance (34), September 1979-
7. J. Franks, J. Broyles, M. Hecht, "An Industry Study for the Profit¬






No. of days before the







5 - 10 1559
11-15 631
16-20 352
21 - 25 312
26 - 30 180
+ 30 2253
16026
The most obvious way round this difficulty is to allow the period
over which the returns are measured to vary and to calculate the
returns on a transaction to transaction basis rather than over a
given time period such as a week or a month. This method requires
both a knowledge of transaction price dates and a method of
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weighting returns calculated over intervals of differing lengths
in order ot make them comparable.
Fortunatley the last recorded marks in each month together with
their associated transaction dates have been collected by the
London Business School. As a result of their efforts transaction
based returns for a large number of ITCs can be calculated.
The problem of weighting the returns is slightly more complex.
As each individual return is calculated over a unique period any
comparison between either returns on different ITCs or successive
returns on one 1TC is difficult. Our approach to this problem
varies depending on the use for which we are calculating the return.
Justifications for the various approaches appear before the relevant
section of our empirical work.
Although we have dealt in this section with the non-trading problem
in relation to the returns on individual ITCs similar problems will
arise with the constituent companies in any index. There is really
no way round this problem. However we suggest that as market-
weighted indices are dominated by larger companies which in turn
tend to be the more actively and continuously traded companies the
problem of non-trading is substantially reduced.
(ii) Capital Changes : in calculating returns over any length of time
capital changes will occur. Bonus issues and the bonus elements of
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rights issues will directly affect the level of a mark and thus
give an erroneous return for the period opening cum capital change
and closing ex capital change. Here again the London Business
School kindly provided details and dates of the various capital
changes. Where there was obviously some doubt as to the exact
date of a change these were checked against Extel cards. The
method of adjustment we adopted was to alter the opening mark and
make it comparable to the closing one.
(iii) Dividends : Although we have established from equation 3(i) that
dividends must be included in the computation of investment returns
it remains to decide which return period should include the dividend
component. There are three dates which are potential contenders
- the dividend announcement date, the XD date or the date of the
dividend distribution. Our choice, to add the dividend back to
the return period when the security was declared XD, is based on
the following argument.
The distribution of a dividend represents a reduction in a company's
fund of earnings available for equity holders. As the price of a
security is to a large extent determined by the dividend flows
shareholders can expect it is clear that any reduction in this fund
of earnings will have a direct effect on the market valuation
investors are willing to place on the company. Thus any dividend
distribution would be expected to have a downward effect on the
price of the security concerned. It is important to note that we
are concerned here with the timing of a purely mechanical price
adjustment and not with the price sensitivity of any additional
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information the dividend announcement itself may contain. It
is clear from the above that the correct period during which to
add back the dividend is the period in which the market price
of the security is adjusted downwards to account for the impending
distribution. To use another date would result in under-estimating
the return during the period of price adjustment and over-estimating
it in a subsequent period. The fact that the investor has not
actually received the dividend is really irrelevant. His right
to the dividend is unchanged by the price adjustment and represents
a receivable due to him from the company. The data at which the
price adjustments occur will be close to the date of the company's
dividend announcement and will have no necessary connection with
the date the company intends to make the distribution which in
practice may be several weeks after the announcement.
The stock exchange has a well established practice for dealing with
dividend declarations. On the opening Monday of the account period
following the announcement the price of the security is adjusted
downwards by the amount of the dividend and trading in the security
goes XD. While certain XD bargains are allowed in the days prior
to the XD date the Monday adjustment is widely accepted as the cut-off
point. In order to reflect this returns over XD dates were
adjusted by adding back the gross dividend declared. The XD dates
were obtained from the London Business School and where necessary
were checked against Extel cards.
Having fixed the relevant period for the dividend add back it should
be noted that an assumption implicit in equation 3(i) is that all
dividend components are added back at the end of the relevant return
period. Although this is obviously an unrealistic assumption
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the alternative, to adjust closing marks by an amount equivalent
to any return earned on the dividend during the return interval
was considered impractical.
(iv) Taxation : The value of a return to an investor is reduced by
any taxation that is payable on receipt of the component parts of
the return. Consideration was given as to whether or not returns
should be calculated net of some assumed shareholder marginal tax
rate. We noted that several stockbrokers roughly followed this
practice by adjusting returns with a factor equivalent to the
basic rate for income tax. Similarly we heard from several sources
that the XD adjustment described in the previous section was
generally assumed to be a net of tax one although Brealey for one
has suggested that in the U.K. context this would be difficult to
g
empirically validate. Interestingly Elton and Gruber working
with U.S. data assumed a net of tax XD adjustment and used it as
9
the basis of calculating implied shareholder marginal tax rates.
We rejected the temptation to adjust returns for taxation on two
grounds. First of all the broad tax adjustment favoured by some
stockbrokers surely leads to a false sense of accuracy. In previous
chapters we noted the different tax status of several major ITC
shareholders ranging from the non-taxable pension funds to the
perhaps highly taxed personal investors. Similarly within groups
of tax paying shareholders there will most certainly be differences
in marginal tax rates. Secondly we considered whether or not to
imply various tax groupings to individual ITCs based on their share-
8. R. Brealey, "Marginal Investor Tax Rates - A Note", Investment Analyst,
No. A3, December 1975-
9. E. Elton, M. Gruber, "Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele
Effect", Review of Economics and Statistics, pps. 68-7A, 1970.
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holder mix. However this approach would still suffer from intra-
group differences and in addition there are the difficulties
involved in establishing accurate ownership patterns for ITCs which
we noted in Chapter 1.
As well as the taxation of returns actually received by ITC
shareholders there is a further taxation effect peculiar to the
investment returns of iTCs and unit trusts. This concerns the
credit available to ITC shareholders for use against their realized
ITC gains.
As we noted in the previous section the share price of an ITC
security will reflect the current valuation of the earnings potentially
available for distribution. However in addition to these earnings
shareholders during the nineteen seventies would also have had the
benefit of the gains tax credit. The return on the ITC investment
would of course reflect the gains tax on the portfolio transaction
but not this statutory relief available to tax paying shareholders.
The possibility of adjusting for this effect was considered but
rejected principally because it was impossible to accurately define
those shareholders who would benefit from the relief at any point
in time. The benefit received would be a function of both tax
status and the ITC equity trading patterns adopted by investors.
The omission of tax from the computation of returns is of course a
weakness. However on balance we felt it was adviseable to reject
making perhaps inaccurate adjustments in favour of calculating returns
on as objective a basis as possible. (We note in passing that the
overstatement inherent in returns calculated gross of a shareholder
tax effect will to some extent be offset by failure to account for
the gains tax credit.)
We have now completed the main definitional points required to give
equation 3(i) empirical substance. However one further comment is
required. A slight adjustment to the equation is required when
calculating returns on stock market indices. The dividend component
on an index is invariably published in terms of dividend yield.
Effectively the most recent annual dividends are weighted by current
market prices thus making it impractical to isolate the dividends
allocable to a particular return period. We used the following
approximation as an estimate of the monthly dividend component.
D;t = (Dyit X I11)/1200 3 (i i)
where;
D.t = Dividend component during period 1
Dy. = Yield at timet11
I.. r Index value at time t.
11
As we noted above the investment returns on individual ITCs were
calculated on a transaction to transaction basis. In order to
observe index returns over the same number of elapsed days as ITC
returns index values were matched with individual ITC transaction
dates.It was possible to complete this matching process for
both the FTA-A11 Share Index and the FTA-ITC index.''
10. The programming required
(a) to calculate the number of elapsed trading days, and
(b) to align up the index values with the differing ITC equity
transaction dates was completed by Dr. Jan Kwiatkowski.
11. The FTA-AS and ITC indices are market-weighted indices of the form
N P /N P
t t o o /continued
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2. Some Initial Observations : We detail the average and individual
annual portfolio and equity returns for the full data base of ITCs
in Tables 3(ii) and 3(iii), pages 1/3 to 2/3. The returns on the
FTA-AS index are shown for comparative purposes.










Log (R. + 1)
t-1
-1 100
= Simple return equivalent for the year
= Return per equation 3(0 in the case of equity returns.
The index returns are calculated as per equations
3 (i) and 3(i 0 •
In addition to the annual simple return equivalent of the cumulative
monthly returns similar returns are also reported for the full 118 month
period. The 118 month returns were calculated as follows :
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Simple return equivalent for the 118 months
As before.
/ where;
N = Number of shares currently in issue
P z Current price per share
N = Number of shares at base date
o
P = Price per share at base date
o r
Linking procedures to account for scrip issues, bonus issues and rights
issues allow the indices to be used as a measure of capital performance
relative to the base date of April 10 1962. The coverage of these two
indices is substantial. Indeed each covers more than 60% by market
value and 30% by number of their respective parent populations.
TABLE 3 (ii)
Investment Trust Companies
Average (Total) Equity Returns
Annual %
Period
ITC Equity FTA -
A11 ShareAverage Mini mum Maximum
10 mths to 12/71 34.384 15.235 75.587 48.502
Year : 1972 14.813 "3-965 44.851 17.312
1973 -36.171 -49.047 -13-403 -30.385
1974 -44.391 -84.441 -10.061 -49.363
1965 131.829 74.452 189.746 150.262
1976 -3.064 -23.904 42.520 1 .432
1977 44.949 14.278 82.129 50.082
1978 4.781 -7.192 38.428 9.135
1979 0.622 -14.324 43.554 8.931
1980 58.309 21.643 93.929 33.982
118 mths to 12/80 182.872 39.900 377.759 260.342
We would draw attention to the following points of interest from
Tab]es 3 (i i) and 3 (i I I) .
(i) As we might expect the average ITC returns closely mirror
those of the market.
(ii) The cumulative return on the index over the full period was
considerably greater than the average achieved by ITCs
although nine ITCs did achieve higher returns than the index.
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1972 1973 197 A 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Tota 1
Aberdeen Trust ^49-379 15 322 -3A. 827 -AO.936 151 .175 -8 Aqo AO .670 -0.67A 2 .189 63 .355 260 .680
Alliance Investment 22.12A 15. A2A -A9 0A7 -A7.1A2 1A7 . 1A1 -5. 508 A3 .213 16.629 3 .930 71 .083 163 .305
A]1iance Trust 33 - 848 6 733 -33. 255 -AO.211 123 .200 -1 681 31 .112 -1 .556 -5 .A7A A5 .981 120 .A65
American Trust 29.279 17 367 -A3 189 -5A.292 126 .597 -2 397 A3 .51A -A.A2A 0 .287 66 .551 99 . 6 A A
Anglo-American 30.1A9 18 888 -33 5A6 -AO.297 12A .351 -3 701 22 .119 1 .921 -6 . A12 51 .836 113 .563
Anglo-Scott i sh AO.019 -3 965 -A 1 667 -58.852 129 .988 -12 21A 55 .816 6.A08 2 .032 63 .A29 123 .037
Ashdown 32.A83 72 059 -3A 999 -AA.175 130 .786 -12 206 57 .053 -A.236 1 .805 7A .002 1A9 .022
Atlantic Assets 29.58A 6 785 -Al 129 -8A.AA1 136 .558 A2 520 7A .032 8.AA8 37 .869 93 .929 2A7 .986
Atlas Elec £ Gen. 36.967 12 .2A7 -3A 263 -50.876 186 .9A2 -3 .A3A 60 .198 3.726 -2 8A2 5A .586 227 .198
Bankers 37.792 AO 290 -36 820 -29.A92 10A .168 -7 .063 52 .671 17.910 -3 .552 56 .692 255 .659
Berry 19.888 11 991 -A5 022 -62.A73 111 • 17A 11 . 1A2 51 .359 27.566 1 .A09 98 .A8A 216 .520
Bishopgate 21.329 8 929 -35 .2A3 -53.991 151 .676 -18 395 80 .181 9.116 3 .869 60 .162 171 .9A3
Border £ Southern 22.585 11 .689 -39 15A -Al .960 1 12 • 9A5 -3 .287 50 .202 0.232 -0 .357 53 .803 12A .163
Brit. Amer £ Gen 41.117 6 700 -Al 856 -27.321 9A . A1A -3 .277 A5 .982 -1 .19A 2 • A35 AO .538 160 .067
British Assets 28.977 8 392 -37 577 -65.378 155 • 9A5 18 .265 3A .A36 O.A59 1 1 818 AA .272 96 . 1 AA
Brit Investment 31.A80 -2 1A5 -33 652 -A9.658 113 .688 -A .03A 31 .888 A.780 -0 .808 39 7AA 70 .018
B roadstore 25.572 17 .709 -27 19A -A3.68A 139 .Al 3 -6 1 18 52 .229 0.077 -2 .952 62 162 171 .502
B runne r 49.753 13 .619 -A5 .518 -A0.69A 127 • 17A -2 797 6A .3A3 A.636 0 526 60 511 255 .A52
Capita1 £ National 39.997 23 .29A -A7 16A -30.980 119 .259 3 8A8 A5 .0A5 1.868 17 20A 52 583 199 .333
Ca rdinal 25.6AA 18 AA5 -35 .326 -51.173 130 .766 --9 .611 53 .827 A.197 A 998 7A 25A 23A .025
Ceda r 25.245 13 .375 -39 A 76 -35.65A 11A .822 -A .713 Al .703 3.0A9 -1 0A7 A5 077 181 .608
Charter Trust AO.930 13 .116 -AA 656 -A5.AA8 13A .333 0 CO 39 .399 A. A65 1A 307 52 099 1A9 .981
C1ave rhouse A2.592 30 .2A7 -35 .939 -A7.6oo 109 OO 3 650 77 .065 A. A19 -1 212 5A 362 28A .280
CLRP 28.206 -3 .05A -22 .080 -A2.998 111 .133 -20 .563 51 .309 11.718 2 2A9 5A 856 221 .669













































































































































































































































































































1972 1973 197A 1975
1nvestors 1 Cap i ta1 59.A 87 A.357 -Al 929 -50. 3A0 183. 312
Keystone 33.A16 17.153 -A5 010 -A3. 7 A 2 172. 133
Lakeview 25.8A7 2.A7A -3A 969 -A6. 06A 12A. 688
London £ Holy rood 36.262 23.788 -A3 61A -30. 253 117. 359
London £ Lomond 25.5A8 9.5A8 -36 A73 -61 . 309 18A. 931
London £ Montrose 30.AO 1 27.231 -36 .226 -A3- 135 1A2. 376
London Provincial 33.639 22.910 -29 .982 -37. 592 119. 581
London Trust 3A.259 11.811 -31 .779 -52. 57A 159. 977
Mercanti1e 32.765 6.809 -26 .576 -53 885 65. 2A2
Me rchants A5.156 IO.8A7 -36 .809 -32 571 117. 392
Monks 33.A18 2.680 -39 .258 -AO 121 128. 790
Murray Caledonian 29.605 18.A26 -36 .976 -56 081 129. 631
Murray Clydesdale 30.930 16.110 -33 .728 -51 9A3 122. 301
Murray Northern 31 .363 22.187 -A2 .01A -52 763 12A. 771
Murray Western 31-861 20.329 -AA • 9A7 -56 A2A 1A2. 372
1928 2A.OA8 17.711 -35 .732 -3A 030 125. 595
North Atlantic Sees. 35.313 2.256 -3A .793 -36 635 111. 6A7
Northern American A7.836 13.A57 -36 .327 -52 291 163 922
Outwich 51.382 39.202 -22 .711 -52 111 136 A07
Pent land A2.3 7 7 18.A70 -39 .971 -A6 939 152. 36A
Raebu rn 37.85A 8.379 -39 .AAA -38 705 138. 589
Romney 31.61A 8.961 -37 .339 -A2 A68 128 61A
RIT 51.368 27.150 -Al .302 -10 .061 13 583
St. Andrew 28.A60 1A.893 -33 .793 -A3 .90A 133 973
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(iii) There is considerable uniformity in the direction of the
year to year returns between the individual ITCs. In
particular note the decline from 1971 to the end of 197^,
recovery in 1975, 1977 and 1980 with no obvious trend
identifiable during the remaining intervening years.
3. Distributional Characteristics : As a pre-requisite to any
empirical work it is useful to know the ditributiona1 characteristics
of the data being used. This is particularly so if the empirical
conclusions are to be supported by statistical inference. Ideally
we would like any distribution to closely resemble a stationary
normal. In practice we would not expect an empirical distribution
to exactly mirror the theoretical model. On the other hand we
would be unwise to assume a particular distributional form in the
face of strong evidence to the contrary. Our objective then
must be to establish the reasonableness of assumptions.
The distributional characteristics of equity returns have been the
subject of considerable debate. There are very broadly three
strands to the controversy.
(i) Return Stationariy
(ii) The Normality Assumption
(iii) The Stable non-Normal Assumption.
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We deal with each of these in turn.
(i) Return Stationarity : The question is whether the return
generating process is relatively stationary through time or
whether it leads to changing distributional parameters. The
danger inherent in the latter position is that it implies we are
dealing with several populations each with its own parameter set
rather than with a single population. Any results based on
sampling procedures applied across these different populations
would require to be interpreted with care.
In the U.K. context various authors have suggested that long term
trends in variability can be detected and they have implied that
these are primarily related to the increasing institutionalisation
12 13of the stock exchange. ' The argument runs that the increased
concentration of trading power leads to large block trading which
is reflected in increased return volatility. Given the established
informational efficiency of the stock market such arguments would
appear to require very substantial empirical verification. Indeed
Brealey et al working with a long time series of U.K. monthly
data (1925-1977) have suggested that periods of increased
volatility are more closely related to periods of economic uncertainty
than to any underlying trend through time. We note in particular
their cone 1 us ion :
"The principal peaks of volatility occurred in the
periods 1931-32, 1939-^0 and 1974-75- We conclude
with a "question. If you were asked to think of any
events in those periods that might have caused unusual
market perturbations, would the first thing to come
into your head be an increase in institutional
ownership?"
12. R. Dobbins, M. Greenwood, "Institutional Shareholdings and Equity Market
Stability", Journal of Business Finance S Accounting, 1975, pp. 257-261.
13. C. Ward, A. Saunders, "Some Disturbing Developments in the U.K. Stock
Market", Investment Analyst, 49, 1977, pp. 5-8.
14. R. Brealey, J. Byrne, E. Dimson, "The Variability of Market Returns"
Investment Analyst, 52, 1978, pp. 19"23•
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A similar conclusion relating periods of economic uncertainty to
periods of increased return volatility has been noted in the U.S.
context.^
In order to provide some insight into the stationarity of ITC
returns the following test was undertaken. Daily observations on
the FTA-AS and FTA-ITC indices were collected for the period of
February 2 1971 to December 31 1980. In total 2407 observations
16
were recorded for each index. Daily log returns were calculated
as per equations 3(0 and 3(ii).^
When the daily returns on the two indices were plotted out in
time series format it was visually apparent that the series
included periods of differing return variance. In order to determine
the extent of non-stationarity the returns were divided on a "moving
window" principle into groups of 100 observations each - group 1
comprising observations 1 - 100, group 2 comprising observations
2 - 101 and so on. The variance of each group was then calculated
and the time series of variances plotted out.
The observed result was that the ten year period could easily be
divided on a visual basis into three separate periods of different
but reasonably stable variance. As the graphs cover several yards
of computer print out we do not reproduce them here. However the key
distinguishing characteristics of the three periods are shown in
Table 3 (iv) .
15. R. Officer, "A Time Series Examination of the Market Factor of the New
York Stock Exchange". PhD dissertation, University of Chicago. (Quoted
in E. Fama, "Foundation of Finance, Oxford, 1977).
16. The data was collected from the daily client service sheets of Wood
Mackenzie S Co.




Sub-Periods of Stable Variance
FTA-AS and FTA-1TC 1 ndices
Da i 1 y Returns
1971 - 1980 U)
FTA - A11 Share FTA - ITC
Desc ription
Ful 1 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Ful 1 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Mean {%) 0.053 0.0*48 -0.380 0.081 0.0*: 1 0.022 -0.027 0.068
Standard Deviation (%) 1 .468 0.840 2.053 1 .*416 1 .257 0. 9*+1 1 .686 1 .084
Period Covered
From 2/ 2/71 2/ 2/71 3/ 1/7*4 17/ 3/75 2/ 2/71 2/ 2/71 3/ 1/7*4 17/ 3/75
To 31/12/80 16/11/73 3/12/7*t 31/12/80 31/12/80 16/11/73 3/12/7*4 31/12/80
No. of Observations 2*4 06 670 201 1*42 2*406 670 201 1*4*42
Note 1. The means and standard deviations are shown in terms of
average daily simple returns.
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The main characteristics of the sub-periods are as follows :
(i) The three sub-periods cover the same time span for both
i ndices.
(ii) The trend of means through the three periods - a negative
period 2 surrounded by an intermediate period 1 and a high
period 3 - was the same for both indices.
(iii) The trend of standard deviation through the three periods -
an initial low followed by a middle high and an intermediate
final - was the same for both indices.
(iv) The inter-period differences in standard deviation were
substantial ranging from a minimum of 17% (FTA-ITC period 1
to period 3) to a maximum of 175% (FTA-A11 Share period 1
to period 2).
(v) Only 93 observations were lost in isolating the three sub-
periods 26 - between period 1 and period 2 and 67 between
period 2 and period 3-
The first transition period between 17/11/73 and 2/\/~Jb covers the
steepest monthly decline in share prices of the decade and led into
the bear market of 197^ which we noted in chapter 1 did not bottom
out until 13/12/74. The duration of this stock market decline is
effectively covered by our period 2. We record negative returns
and the highest standard deviations in this period.
The second transition period running from h/]2/~]k to 16/3/75 covers
the market turn-around and the largest monthly rise of the decade.
Thereafter the return generating process is relatively stable although
at a significantly higher level of standard deviation than we
recorded in period 1 before the gyrations of the 1973-1975 period.
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These results suggest that periods of different return variance
can be triggered off by substantial market movements. To this
extent there appears to be elements of non-stationarity in the
return process that may well be slightly more serious than the
occasional "shock" of increased volatility reported by Brealey et
al. However as relatively long periods of stationarity can be
identified the assumption is perhaps not completely redundant.
Nevertheless our reported results do suggest that care should be
taken in applying the assumption.
(ii) The Normality Assumption : The usefulness of the normality assumption
lies in the relative ease with which the assumption allows both
statistical inference to be established and the investment decision
process to be proxied. There is little conclusive evidence in
either the U.K. or the U.S. context that equity returns precisely
follow a normal distribution.^' ^ However it is maintained by
most authors that the distributions are either adequately close to
the normal or in fact belong to the same family of distributions as
the normal namely the stable Pareto-Levy group. Unfortunately the
normal distribution is the only member of this family to have a finite
20
variance. If a finite variance cannot be assumed for the under¬
lying distribution the Central Limit Theorem will not hold and the use
21
of traditional methods of statistical inference must be questioned.
18. E. Fama, "The Behaviour of Stock Market Prices", Journal of Business,
1965, pp. 34 - 105.
19. R. Brealey, "The Distribution and Independence of Successive Rates of
Return from the British Equity Market". Journal of Business Finance,
1970.
20. R. Brealey, "The Distribution and Independence of Successive Rates of
Return from the British Equity Market". Journal of Business Finance,
1970, p.30.
21. T. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott, "Introductory Statistics", Wiley, 1972,
p. 125.
In order to test the normality assumption the following work was
undertaken. The daily returns used in the stationarity test were
recoded into groups of half standard deviations from their
respective means. In addition to using the full sample range the
sub-periods of relatively stationary variance were similarly
recoded. This had the useful effect of both removing the unstable
transition periods and allowing an assessment of the normality
assumption at different levels of variance. The results are
documented in Tables 3(v) and 3 (v i) .
The main conclusions from Tables 3(v) and 3(vi) can be summarised
as follows :
(i) There is a strong similarity between the return distributions
on the full samples and on each of the sub-periods. This
result holds for both indices.
(ii) While there is evidence of slight positive skewness all
22
the distributions are on the whole reasonably symmetrical.
2
(iii) The computed X value suggests non-normality for all samples
bar those of period 2.
(iv) In comparison with the theoretical normal distribution the
actual distributions exhibit higher peaks, lower middle
ranges and fatter tails.
This last conclusion suggesting that the returns are leptokurtic
relative to the normal would be in line with those authors noted
above who have identified return distributions as belonging to the
stable Pareto-Levy group.
22. Note that the returns are in log form while it itself will tend




Actual Distributions Compared with Normal
i















3 + + + + + + + +
3-0 - 2.5 - + + +' -
2.5 - 2.0 - - + -
2.0 - 1.5 - _ _ -
1.5 - 1 .0 - _ - -
1 .0 - 0.5 + + - -
0.5 - 0.0 + + + + + + + +
0.0 - 0.5 + + + + + + + +
0.5 - 1 .0 + + + _ -
1.0 - 1.5 - + + + -
1.5 - 2.0 - - - -
2.0 - 2.5 - _ - - +
2.5 " 3.0 - + - - -
1
3 + + - + + + + + 1
Notes : 1. + More observations than expected under the normal
Less observations than expected under the normal
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TABLE 3 (v i),
Actual Distribution of Observations Comoared with the Expected Normal Distributions
FTA-A11 Share, FTA- ITC
























3 0.13 0. 47 0.92 1 .00 0.21 0.75 0.89 0.50 0.35
3-0 49-87 48.81 47-72 44.77 48.89 49.40 47.47 44.78 50.41
2.5 ^9-38 48.19 46.72 44.77 48.68 48.77 46.42 44.28 49.99
2.0 47.72 47.57 45.38 44.27 48.06 48.11 44.78 41 .79 49.02
1 .5 43-32 45.61 43.44 43.27 45.77 45.61 42.54 40.30 46.18
1.0 34.13 40.46 35.08 35.82 40.22 39.33 36.27 34.33 38.14
0.5 19.15 25.28 20.45 21 .89 23.72 25.57 22.99 22.39 24.41
0.5 19.15 26.69 22.24 27.35 25.45 26.36 25-07 27.86 23.51
1 .0 34.13 42.95 36.56 43.77 42.65 39-33 38.88 42.29 37.59
1.5 43 - 32 47.53 46.42 50.74 47.99 45.23 45.37 53.24 44.87
2.0 47 - 72 49.11 49.41 53-73 49.86 47.65 49.25 53.34 47.85
2.5 49-38 49-56 50.60 54.23 50.48 48.36 51 .19 53-84 48.89
3-0 49-87 49-97 51 .20 54.23 50.48 49.06 51 .19 54.30 49.24
3 0.13 0.75 0.16 0.00 0.42 0.79 0.46 0.42 0.90
X2 Value - 412.65 21 .62 17.50 152.52 384.62 59.67 21 .85 79.85
Number of
Observations - 2406 670 201 1442 2406 670 201 1442
Notes : 1. X values were computed using the observations that fell in the half standard
deviation groupings shown in Table 3(v). (X^ ^ 11 df = 19.67).
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(i i i) The Stable Non-Normal Assumption : If the return distributions follow
the more general stable Pareto-Levy model rather than the more specific
normal distribution as was suggested above we would expect to observe
a considerable measure of stability in the distributions. By stability
we imply that the distributional form (i.e. leptokurtic relative to
the normal) will be broadly the same whether we use daily, weekly or
monthly observations. Effectively the distribution will be stable
even although we use sums of the daily continuously compounded returns.
There is little U.K. evidence on this additive property of the
return distributions. In the U.S. Fama notes several studies indicating
23
that this property is not present in U.S. returns. This would be
extremely unfortunate but for the observation that monthly returns in
fact appear to be more normal than daily ones. Thus there is support
for rejecting the stable Pareto-Levy position and returning to the
normality assumption.
The 2406 observations were reduced to 118 by selecting approximately
every twentieth return. This reduction in sample size effectively
rules out the possibility of sub-dividing the total period into periods
of stationary variance. To this extent our results will be less secure.
The characteristics of the monthly distributions are shown in Tables
3 (vii) and 3 (viii). Those Tables correspond to Tables 3(v) and
3 (vi) for the daily returns.
Looking first at Table 3(vii) the form of the monthly distribution is
broadly similar to that of the daily observations. However from the
more detailed Table 3(viii) it is clear that for both indices the
monthly returns are slightly closer to the normal when taken over the
two central groups together and comprising one standard deviation on
23. E. Fama, "Foundations of Finance", Oxford 1977, p.38.
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TABLE 3 (v i i)
Investment Returns
Actual Distributions Compared with Normal





FTA - All Share FTA - ITC
3 - -
3 - 2 - +
2 - 1 - -
1 - 0 + -
0 - 1 + +
1 - 2 - -
2 - 3 - -
3 + -
Notes : 1. + More observations than expected under the
norma 1
Less observations than expected under the
normal.
either side of the mean. However if anything the reduced height of the
central position is compensated by increased positive skewness. At the
extremes of the range the monthly distributions are closer to the normal
than the daily. There is then slight evidence that the monthly distributions
are in fact marginally more normal than the daily but that like the
daily they suffer from an element of positive skewness. To the extent
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TABLE 3(vT i i)
1nvestment Returns
Actual Distributions of Observations Compared with the Expected
Normal Distributions : FTA-All Share and FTA-ITC Indices
Monthly Returns
1971-1980 (%)
Standard Deviation Normal FTA - A11 Share FTA - ITC
from the Mean
3 0.13 - (0.47) - (0.75)
3 49.87 48.20 (48.81) 45.66 (49.40)
2 47.72 46.12 (47.57) 42.37 (48.11)
1 34.13 34.85 (40.46) 29.67 (39.33)
1 34.13 44.17 (42.95) 44.92 (39.33)
2 47.72 51.70 (49.11) 53.38 (47.65)
3 49.87 51.70 (49.97) 54.24 (49.06)
3 0.13 0.10 (0.75) 0.10 (0.79)
X^ Value - 14.8 14.03
No. of observations - 118 118
Notes : 1. The X values were computed on the number of observations
that fell within the„standard deviation groupings shown
in Table 3(viii). (X 5df= 11.1)
0.05
2. To facilitate comparisons the equivalent daily full sample
data are shown in parenthesis.
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that this conclusion is valid we would be rejecting the stable
Pareto-Levy assumption and supporting the normality assumption for
2
monthly observed returns. Finally we note that the X statistics
indicate non-normality.
Whether or not the normality assumption is valid is at the end a
question of judgement. Certainly the distributions reviewed above
indicate broad similarities with the normal. However there are
undoubtedly elements of 1eptokurtosis and skewness which would tend
to weaken the normality conclusion. As with stationarity the cost
of rejection is high both in terms of statitistica1 inference and
financial theory. In view of this we suggest that complete
rejection on the basis of the above results is not justified.
k. Time Series Dependence : Knowledge of the time series behaviour
of returns is of particular importance in finance. We noted in Chapter
2 that a large section of theoretical and empirical work is concerned
with the efficiency of stock markets and that a substantial proportion
of this work is centred on testing weak form efficiency through
analysing the time series dependence of returns. Indeed the adequacy
of any performance measure depends to a large extent on at least weak
form efficiency. It is therefore necessary to establish some minimum
level of market efficiency upon which to base the results of succeeding
chapters. We do this by examining the time series dependence of
returns on the FTA-AS and FTA-ITC indices and a sample of ITCs.
We start by considering the conditions that will lead to a meaningful
test for time series dependency. Our task is made considerably easier
given that returns can be assumed to follow normal distributions. if
this were not the case then either more complex distributional forms
or the weaker non-parametric approach would have to support any
statistical inference. However an assumption of normality alone is
insufficient. It is possible for example that an underlying trend
in the mean of successive normal distributions would induce an observabl
time series dependency. We make an assumption that successive
distributions are both normal and stationary. In the light of the
results in the previous section some care is required with these
assumptions thus the presentation of our results is in terms of both
full and sub-period samples.
The assumption of stationarity has a direct financial implication.
We noted in Chapter 2 that any test of the EMH requires an assumption
as to how the market sets equilibrium or market clearing prices. As
we are assuming that the expected means of successive distributions
are identical we are implying a market mechanism that sets prices
such that the expected returns are constant. If this model is accurate
then weak form market efficiency implies that it is not possible to
use the information contained in past returns to estimate expected
returns that are both different from those constant returns achieved
when the market is in equilibrium and are consistently and accurately
realized. The use of the word "consistently" is important. We are
dealing with a distribution of possible return values any one of
which could be actually realized. Our limitation is that on average
the realized return will be constant.
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More formally our model is as follows :
R.
t = E (Rj) + e ^ 3 (• i i)
where;
R. = Realized return on index i during period t.
"V .
E(R.) = Expected return on index i
"e- = Residual error term,
t
If our model of equilibrium pricing is accurate then ;
E(%) = 0
Similarly if there is no time series dependency then;
Cou V Vn' "" °
A violation of this second condition could take many forms. We
are concerned with testing only for linear dependency.
!-e- \ z e Vn +a 3(iv)
In this model first order dependency would be identified by a
significantly non-zero rho. It is of course possible that the
linear dependency is of a more complex form than the relatively
simple first order process.
To assess whether or not the extent of any dependency justifies
further work in terms of determining the nature of the underlying
dependency a first step is to calculate serial correlation coefficients
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for a variety of lags. We present our results dealing first of all
with the two market indices and then with the individual ITCs.
(i) FTA-AS and FTA-ITCs : The samples used in this test are the
same as those used to examine the distributional characteristics
of the returns. it was however necessary to make one adjustment
to the index returns described in equations 3(i) and 3 (i i) - As
the dividend component of the total index returns were derived
from the reported daily yields we would expect some time series
dependency between the yields reported on successive periods
of less than twelve months. This dependency would take the
form of a moving average. As our return periods are daily
it seemed prudent to use log price relatives rather than total
2k
returns.
Table 3(ix) describes the serial correlation coefficients on
the two indices for lags of 1 to 30 days. The results are shown
for both the full samples and the sub-periods identified above
as periods of reasonably stable variance.
The main results from Table 3(ix) can be summarised as follows:
2k. It is interesting to note the possible effects that this would have
on the distributional form of the returns. As corporate dividend
levels tend to be relatively stable the removal of a positive
"constant" from each total return would have the effect of shifting
the distribution to the left rather than altering its shape. In
fact the distributional results of the previous section were




1 nvestment Retu rns
First Order Serial Correlation Coefficients for Daily Log. Price Relatives
FTA-A11 Share and FTA-ITC Indices
Lags
FTA - All Share FTA - ITC
Ful 1 Pe riod Period Period Ful 1 Pe riod Period Period
Days 1 - 30 Samp 1e 1 2 3 Samp 1e 1 2 3
1 0.06 0.27 0.11 -0.06 0.27 0.33 0.15 0.26
2 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.12
3 0.02 -O.OA -0.08 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.1 1
A 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.07 O.OA 0.07
5 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.09 0.05 O.OA
6 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -O.OA 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01
7 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.00
8 0.02 O.OA 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.99 -O.OA 0.05
9 0.09 0.0A 0.07 O.OA 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.02
10 0.06 O.OA 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.08 O.OA
11 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.02
12 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -O.OA -0.07 -0.01
13 0.0A 0.09 -0.09 0.01 0.06 O.OA -0.03 0.03
lA 0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.08 -0.00
15 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.03
16 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02
17 0. OA 0.07 0.06 O.OA 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.01
/ 18 0.03 0.08 -0.09 0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.02
19 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 -0.03
20 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 O.OA -0.1 1 -0.02
21 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.15 0.01
22 0.02 -0.0A -0. 1A 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01
23 0.02 -O.OA -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -O.OA -O.OA
2A -0.02 -O.OA -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -O.OA
25 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.03
26 0.00 0.03 0.10 -O.OA -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02
27 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 O.OA -0.02
28 0.02 0.06 0. 1 1 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
29 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.02
30 0. OA -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.12 0.00 O.OA
Number of
Observations 2A05 670 201 1AA2 2A05 670 201 1AA2
i. The FTA-ITC results suggest slightly more dependence
than those of the FTA-AS.
ii. The absolute size of the largest serial correlation
coefficient is in fact fairly small (.33) and is usually
although not always confined to the lag 1 cases,
ill. The average coefficients of the sub-periods with the
exception of period 3 for the FTA-AS are slightly higher
than those for the full sample period. The highest
average (.08) is for period 1 on the FTA-ITC index.
In general our results confirm the work of other authors in this
area described in Chapter 2. Note particularly that it is
extremely doubtful whether the absolute size of the coefficient
would be sufficient to base a profitable trading strategy on.
For example a first order model with the largest coefficient
2
would still only account for (.33) of the return variation.
Transaction costs would further reduce any possibility of profitab
trading. In view of this further work in fitting either
moving average or auto-regressive type models would serve no
financial purpose.
While concluding that returns on the two indices are sufficiently
independent to support the weak form EMH two further concluding
comments are required. First of all the higher sub-period
averages particularly for the coefficient on the FTA-ITC index
indicate the extent to which ignoring non-stationarity can
potentially influence the results. Secondly Working has shown
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that serial correlation can be induced by using the first
25
differences of averages in a random chain. Undoubedly
there will be elements of the "Working Effect" present in our
results. To the extent that these effects are present our
results will over-state possible serial correlation.
(ii) Individual ITCs : The returns on the two indices used in the
previous section were of course based on market value weighted
portfolios. In order to establish that the resul ts he^ld at the
individual ITC level serial correlation coefficients were
calculated for the returns from individual ITCs. The returns
used were the log transforms of those described in equation
3(i) with one additional correction. Average daily returns
were calculated by weighting the log returns by the number of
26
elapsed days between trades.
i .e. R.
iD Log (R.t + 1)/T 3 (v)
where;
R. Average daily return on ITC..
R.
i t
Return as per equation 3(0-
T Number of elapsed days between t and t-1.
The results are shown in Table 3(x).
25. H. Working. "Note on the Correlation of First Differences of
Averages in a Random Chain", Econometrica, I960, pp. 916-918.




ge Serial Correlation Coefficient
Average Daily Returns
97 ITCs - 1971 - 1980
Description Lag 1 Lag 2
Mean 0.06 -0.12
Range
Mini mum -0.01 -0.32
Maximum 0.30 0.15
Perhaps the most interesting point to note is the change from a
predominantly positive lag 1 range to a predominantly negative
lag 2 range. Indeed some lb% of the lag 1 coefficients had
positive signs and 87% of the lag 2 coefficient had negative signs.
However given the very small size of even the largest coefficients
the sign changes while suggesting some very slight evidence of
negative dependency are really too small to have any financial effect.
We can safely conclude that the degree of dependence is sufficiently
small not to undermine the weak form EMH.
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5. Return Components : The final aspect of ITC equity returns
we examine are the relationships that exist between the returns on
different ITCs. It is clear that if the returns on different ITCs
exhibit some elements of communality the task of performance assessment
is made considerably easier. Without such communa1ities there can
be no certainty in either equilibrium pricing models or in the
choice of performance benchmarks that are applicable to all ITCs.
The identification of communaIities essentially centres on the
correlation matrix of returns. This indicates the degree of linear
association between the returns from different ITCs. Reasonably
high correlation coefficients may suggest the presence of underlying
factors common to all ITCs. Principal component techniques can
then be used to identify the presence of one or more common factors.
Later in this section we present results based on this methodology.
While there is a considerable literature in this area our review is
confined to four articles which provide a reasonable perspective
of the received results. We deal with these in chronological order.
27(i) King : Using monthly price relatives from 63 N.Y.S.E. securities
over the k03 month period June 1927 to December I960 King was
concerned with the identification of communa1ities and with
assessing their stationar i ty . In particular he investigated
whether three effects namely market, industry and individual
27. B. King, "Market and Industry Factors in Stock Price Behaviour",
Journal of Business, 39, 1966.
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firm would be sufficient to " ... account for the complex
interrelationships of the ensemble of security price changes."
A subsidiary objective of his study was to determine whether
the industry effect was sufficient to support a security
classification scheme. Using factor and cluster analytic
techniques he reported that approximately 50% and 11% of a
security's return variance could be accounted for by market
and industry effects. He did however note that these
percentages were not entirely stationary through time. In
particular the importance of the market factor appeared to
be less in later periods.
28
(ii) Myers : Myers suggested that there is danger in overemphasising
the generality of King's results. Firstly King's sample selection
was based on relatively well defined and homogeneous security
groupings such as tobacco, railroads and petroleum etc. The
industry effect may be considerably less with more heterogenous
security groups. Secondly Myers suggested that King's choice
of factor technique would tend to over-emphasise the importance
of his results.
By constructing two samples of 60 securities each the first being
broadly similar to King's sample selection while the second
included six additional industry groups Myers attempted to
correct for the above weaknesses in King's work. His reported
results cover both the period of King's work and the succeeding
seven years.
28. S. Myers, "A Re-examination of Market and Industry Factors in Stock
Price Behaviour", Journal of Finance, 28, 1973, PP- 695~705-
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The relative importance of the market factor and its downward
trend were both confirmed by Myers. However while the presence
of a second factor underlying return variances was identified
it was not strongly related to an established industrial
c1 ass ification.
29(iii) Draper : Working with quarterly data from 520 U.K. companies
for the period 1965 - 1970 Draper utilised the decomposition
attributes of ANOVA techniques to identify a sector effect in
returns. In addition he reported industry effects broadly comparable
to those of King. Interestingly though he noted that several groups
including ITCs that could be considered relatively homogeneous
were not in fact significantly distinguishable from other groups.
(iv) Rol 1 and Ross^: As part of their work on testing the APT Roll
and Ross performed a detailed and sophisticated factor analysis
on the daily returns from 1260 U.S. securities for the period
July 3 1962 to December 31 1972. Their results suggest that
at least five explanatory factors can be identified of which at
least three appear to attract significant elements of pricing.
Interestingly they don't attempt to identify the factors with
economic variables. We deal in more detail with theoretical
results of APT in Chapter 5.
It is clear from the above results that we would expect elements of
communality to be present in the returns of ITCs. Two such elements
may well be related to market-wide and industry wide effects.
29. P. Draper, "Industry Influences on Share Price Variability", Journal
of Business Finance S Accounting, Summer 1975, pp. I69-I85.
30. R. Roll, S. Ross, "An Empirical Investigation of Arbitrage Pricing
Theory", Journal of Finance, 35, December 1980, pp. 1073-1103.
210
As a first stage to investigating this possibility a correlation
matrix of the average daily returns as per equation 3(v) for 97 ITCs
between 1971 and 1980 was obtained.^ The full matrix is substantial
and not reproduced. On review it was visually apparent that very
substantial correlations were present between the returns. Indeed the
majority of coefficients were in excess of 0.7- This result strongly
suggests the presence of at least one element of communality.
In order to examine the extent of any such communalities a series
of tests were carried out. The methodology adopted was based on
principal components and ordinary least squares regression.
Principal components analysis is a multivariate statistical technique
which along with other factor analytic methods offers a useful approach
to investigating correlation matrices. The technique involves the
generating of a series of factors to account for the total variance of
all the variables under consideration. Each factor extracted is indep¬
endent of all the others and therefore successively drawn factors will account
for less and less of the total variance. The attraction of the technique
is that a relatively small number of factors out of a maximum number equiv¬
alent to n-1 variables in our case 97-1 ITCs may account for a relatively
large proportion of the total variance. Clearly if this is the case then
operating definitions can be hypothesised for these factors. We stress
the term hypothesised as the factors themselves have no direct
economic interpretation. They merely serve to indicate that an under¬
lying economic variable may be present in the data. We adopt an
extremely conservative approach to applying principal components analysis.
31. Mote that although we use average daily returns the number of days
between trades on which this average is based does vary. Therefore
the correlation matrix of returns is a slightly inaccurate estimate
of the 'true' correlation matrix. However as the purpose of this section
is investigative rather than conclusive we suggest acceptance of this
weakness.
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Indeed in each of the principal component runs performed we are
only concerned with gaining an approximate estimate of the variance
accounted for by the first factor which tends to be a general factor.
Our conservative application of the technique seeks to by-pass
problems associated with either the selection of a rotational method
to improve the initial estimates of factor loadings or the statistical
32
significance of the results. Our results are summarised in Tables
3(xi) and 3(xii) which appear at the end of this section.
In column 2 of Table 3(xi) the percentage of variance explained by
the first factor extracted by principal components from the returns
on 97 ITCs is reported as approximately 12%,. All the factor loadings
were noted as positive. This strongly suggests the presence of an
underlying element of communality. Following MPT and the results
reported by the authors reviewed above this factor was hypothesised
as representing a general market-wide factor. Using the returns
on the FTA-A11 Share index as a surrogate for this factor the
following market model regressions were carried out for each ITC.
/V A --V
R. = . +3. R . + e. 3(vi)
it i / im mt it
where;
/v
R. = The return on ITC. as per equation 3(vi)
it i
mt
= The return on the FTA-AS index as per equations
3( i) and 3 ( i i) -
The regression results are reported in Table 3(xii). The results
2
are reported as averages for the sample as a whole. The high R suggests
32. Principal components and other similar techniques are not without
their critics. See for example:
B. Rosenberg, "An Application of a Three Factor Performance Index
to Measure Stockholder Gains from Mergers", Journal of Finance and
Quantitative Analysis", March 1976, pp. 265-266.
Perhaps the most persistent practical problem is the danger of
confusing ex poste explanatory factors with ex ante variables.
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as we would expect that the market component is a particularly important
element of communality amongst ITCs.
Having extracted the market component it remained to be seen whether
any further elements of communality could be identified. In column 3
of Table 3(xi) we report the results of a principal components run on
the residual, e.t, from the market model regressions. Some 35% of the
remaining variance is accounted for by the first factor. Again all the
factor loadings were noted as positive. While considerably less than
the results on the raw return data 35% is still large enough to warrant
investigation. Unfortunately while there is a substantial body of
theoretical and empirical work suggesting the presence of a market
component in returns there is no comparable status ascribed to other
economic variables. The work by Roll and Ross reviewed above allows
for the possibility of other factors but does not attempt to define
them in any economic sense. In view of this it is only with the greatest
caution that we suggest the presence of a second industry related
communality effect.
To obtain an industry effect the following regressions were run;
"r . = + B .R . + E 3 (v i i)Fit Fi'Fimit Fit
where;
R,.. = The return on the FTA-ITC index as per equationsF,t
3(0 and 3 (i i) .
R . = The return on the FTA-AS index as per equationsmit 3(0 and 3 (i i) .
The residuals, Ep. , from the regressions represent an estimate of
the return components of the FTA-ITC index not accounted for by the
return on the market. As the FTA-ITC index is made up of approximately
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100 ITCs it can be considered as a reasonably well diversified
portfolio of ITCs. This assumption implies that the individual
ITC return components are diversified away in the portfolio leaving
the regression residuals to represent an estimate of the ITC
"industry effect".
These residuals together with the returns on the FTA-AS index were
33
treated as independent variables in the expanded regression,
A A. A* A ~
R. = <*. + B..R
„ + B . ~EC + 3 (v i i i)it i ri1 mt / i2 Ft it
where;
/v A/
R. ,R ,E_ are as defined before,
it mt Ft
As the individual observations on the two indices and the ITC marks
were data aligned the expanded regression equation 3(viii) represents
a set of unique return observations for each ITC. The results are
reported in column 3 of Table 3(xii).
Equation 3(viii) is clearly a better fit than equation 3(vi). The
average R2 increases to .77 and the sum of the squared residuals
drops by approximately 25%. In addition the new coefficient term
that represents in industry effect was noted as statistically significant
at the 95% level for all ITCs. It would appear then that our hypothesised
industry effect is a significant ex post explanatory variable.
To complete our tests a principal components analysis was run on the
^
/ \
residuals, $*jt> from equation 3 (v i i i) . The results are shown in
column A of Table 3(xi). We now have a relatively small amount of
33. The use of the residuals from the index regression equation 3(vii)
was preferred to the use of the returns on the FTA-ITC index as
inserting the latter as an independent variable in equation 3(v i i i)
would have resulted in the introduction of mu11i-colinear i ty into
the model. As we were concerned with among other points assessing





Results of Principal Components Run
Average Results 97 ITCs
Cumulative Percentage of Variance Explained
Factor
Rit Residuals - 3 (v ) Residuals - 3 (viii)
1 71.89 35.29 10.01
2 75.73 42.14 17.32
3 77.34 46.69 22.48
4 78.80 50.12 26.52
5 80.15 53.12 o oo
6 81.31 55.74 33.59
7 82.37 57-94 35-72
8 83.37 59.99 39.85




Results of Regression Runs
Average Results 97 ITCs








variance accounted for by the first factor. We suggest that 10%
is too small to warrant further consideration.
It is clear both from the above results and literature review that on
an ex post basis returns contain elements of communality associated
with both market and industry effects. There may well be other
elements "hidden" in the 10% factor noted above although their
explanatory power is going to be considerably less than either of the
effects already identified. To the extent that much of MPT relies
entirely on the market related component the ommission of an industry
effect may we 11 be a weakness. The alternative approach to equilibrium
pricing suggested Roll and Ross offers a possible role for an industry
effect although it has not been specifically defined or tested.
Clearly the possibility of there being more than one priced element
underlying the returns of ITC has important implications for performance
assessment and indeed it is an area we return to in later chapters.
Summary : In this chapter we have defined the conceptofan investment
return. In addition we have examined the distributional and
time series characteristics of ITC returns as well as providing some
evidence of underlying communa1ities. It is clear that assumptions
suggesting that return distributions are both independent and
stationary-norma1 are in fact violated in practice. This we reported
as being more so in the case of the latter assumption. To the extent
of these violations financial models based on either of the two
assumptions are weakened. We do not however suggest that such
financial models be rejected. The usefulness of models lies after
all in their predictive powers. It may well be that the predictions
are fairly robust even in spite of weaknesses in the underlying
assumptions.
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The presence of more than one element of return communality questions
the relevance of pricing models such as CAPM which only allows one
element of returns to be priced. Unfortunately as we noted above
there is little theoretical justification to define other non-market
related variables. At best we can intuitively suggest that
the homogeneity of the 1TC sector gives rise to what we have termed




Section 1 : The
Section 2 : Esti
Section 3 : The







INTRODUCTI ON : In this chapter we are concerned with establishing
empirical estimates of the investment risk associated with ITC equity
ownership. We do this by first of all defining the relevant risk
measures (Section 1). Secondly we describe the estimation procedures
adopted (Section 2). In Section 3 we provide the empirical estimates.
Finally in Section k we discuss the management of risk.
1. The Relevant Measures : What constitutes risk in the mind of a
fund manager or an investor is particularly difficult to establish.
Inflation risk, political risk, geographic risk, the list is unfortunately
endless. We can do no more than attempt to establish an observable
surrogate for this population of risks. However what can be assumed
is that investors' perceptions of the risks associated with a particular
security or portfolio of securities will be closely related to the returns
expected from these holdings. The establishment of financial models
relating expected return to risk occupies perhaps the most crucial
cornerstone of modern investment theory. Ultimately these models lead
to conclusions about equilibrium asset pricing under conditions of
uncertainty.
In this chapter we are mainly concerned with deriving risk measures from
one such equilibrium model namely the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
Indeed underlying not only our risk measures but also many of our
performance results is a belief in the general usefulness of this model.
1 2
CAPM is usually credited to the work of Sharpe and Lintner. ' Like
all equilibrium models it suffers from the twin problems of ex ante
estimation and unrealistic assumptions. It is arguable that later
developments to the original CAPM, in particular the work by Black,
1. W. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices : A Theory of Capital Market
Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk", Journal of Finance, 19,
September 197^, pp. 425-^2.
2. J. Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky/
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remove many of the latter criticisms although costs in terms of
345
more complex estimation procedures are often involved. ' ' We
assess the validity of CAPM together with its usefulness for
performance measurement in Chapter 5- However from the results of
Chapter 3 where we identified an element in the correlation matrix
of ITC returns additional to that associated with the market it is
clear that the unique role assigned to the market portfolio by CAPM
is not above criticism. In Chapter 5 we describe an alternative
equilibrium model the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) which specifically
allows tests for performance differences that arise for reasons other
than differing market risk levels.
There are three quite distinct aspects to CAPM. Firstly there is a
hypothesised model of individual investor behaviour. Secondly given
this model there is the establishment of an optimum individual investor
strategy. Thirdly there is the extension of the individual investor
case to the world of many investors and thus the derivation of an
equilibrium risk-return relationship at the market level.
(i) Individual Investor Behaviour : We can establish a model
of investor behaviour fairly easily by assuming that having
decided on the level of resources to allocate to investment an
investor in constructing a portfolio of risky assets will for
any given level of return prefer less risk to more and for any
given level of risk will prefer more return to less. Investors
/ Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets", Review of Economics
and Statistics, hi, February 1965, pp. 13~37-
3. F. Black, "Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing",
Journal of Business, , July 1972, pp. kkk-kS^.
k. M. Brennan, "Capital Market Equilibrium with Diverging Borrowing and
Lending Rates", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 6,
December 1971, pp. 1197-1205-
5. S. Ross, "The Current Status of the Capital Asset Pricing Model", Journal
of Finance, 33, June 1978, pp. 885-901. The article provides- a very good/
221
therefore are assumed to be risk averse. In addition investors
are assumed to be primarily concerned with risk and return at
the portfolio level. The importance of individual securities is
limited to their contribution to investors' total portfolios.
While such a marginal approach has considerable intuitive appeal
its real practical importance stems from the principles of diver¬
sification. Interestingly the relevance at least to some ITC
equity holders of this marginal approach may be doubtful. For
example as we noted in Chapter 1 some investors may consider gaining
access to a diversified portfolio preferable to constructing one
themselves. If this is the case then it may well be that total
measures of risk and return are more relevant than marginal ones.
In other words ITC equities are being treated as "complete portfolios"
rather than as contributory elements.
(ii) The Optimal Policy for an Individual Investor : The assumption of
risk aversity together with the additional assumption that expected
portfolio returns are normally destributed allows the construction
of the well known Markowitz efficient frontier and a unique series
678of indifference curves for each investor. ' '
Perhaps the most useful result of assuming that portfolio returns
are distributed normally lies in the fact that normal distributions
are completely described once their means and variances have been
established. This allows the investment decision process to be
/ survey of various generalisations made to the original Sharpe-Lintner
model. These include adaptations to cover inflation, international
portfolios, human capital and taxation.
6. J. Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behaviour Towards Risk", Review of
Economic Studies, 35, February 1958, pp. 65-85.
7. H. Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection", Journal of Finance, 7 March 1952,
pp. 77-91.
8. H. Markowitz, "The Utility of Wealth", Journal of Political Economy,
April 1952, pp. 151-158.
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proxied in terms of two parameters namely expected return, and
the variance from expected return. The financial relevance of
the mean-variance approach depends upon a willingness to accept
that it adequately reflects the risk return expectations that
investors hold about portfolios. On this point there may be
some question as to the relevance of using a total measure of
dispersion especially if investors' true risk perceptions are in
terms of downside exposure rather than total variability. Several
authors have explored the possibilities of using measures such
9
as semi-variance to highlight downside risk. The general
conclusion is that they are considerably more difficult to work
with than total measures of variability. ^ In addition as long
as we can assume ex ante return distributions that are reasonably
symmetrical the use of total measures will not result in any
changes to risk rankings. As normal distributions are both
symmetrical and from Chapter 3 appear to be a reasonable although
not wholly accurate result for the expost distributional form of
ITC returns we retain variance as our primary measure of portfolio
risk. U.S. evidence on the symmetry of equity returns is reported
h pi 11by Blume.
So far we have only considered an investment set consisting of risky
assets. The presence of a risk-free asset together with opportunities
to borrow and lend at that rate provides a vital extension to the
optimum strategy available to the individual investor. We describe
this in Diagram A(i).
9. W. Hogan, J. Warren, "Towards the Development of an Equilibrium Model
based on Semi-Variance", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
9 January 197A, pp. 1-11.
10. F. Modigliani, G. Pogue, "An Introduction to Risk and Return - Concepts
and Evidence," Financial Analysts Journal, March/April 197A, p.71.
11. M. Blume, "Portfolio Theory. A Step Towards its Practical Application"














Indifference curves for investor I
Expected return and risk on portfolio P
Utility maximising portfolio for
Investor I
The efficient frontier of portfolio investment
opportunities
Risk-free rate
Efficient frontier with a risk-free asset
and lending and borrowing at that rate.
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Given an investor's set of indifference curves the presence of
a risk-free asset together with lending and borrowing at the risk-
free rate allows the investor to move to a higher indifference curve.
For example portfolio P represents the optimum investment strategy
for investor 1. This portfolio dominates portfolio S that which
investor 1 would have favoured had the risk-free opportunities not
been present. At point P investor I's portfolio would consist of
an investment R^P in the risk-free asset and an investment PQ. in
the efficient portfolio of risky assets Q.
(i i j) Capital Market Equilibrium : We now consider the implications of
all investors acting in the manner hypothesised in (i) and (ii)
above. Effectively each investor is now a price-taker in the sense
that his actions and influence are small relative to that exercised
by the market participants as a whole. When the capital market
is in equilibrium the resulting market clearing set of asset prices
fixes the efficient frontier and allows each investor to complete
his optimum portfolio strategy. However to consider a risk-return
relationship at the market level that is in any way general and
useful we cannot allow each individual investor the luxury of his own
unique efficient frontier. There must in fact be complete agreement
amongst all investors as to their expectations for all securities.
An implication of this assumption of homogeneous investor expectation is
that securities markets are strong form efficient. Clearly investor
expectations will be conditioned by the length of the time period to
elapse before they are realised. Therefore in addition to the assumption
of homogeneous expectations we require a further assumption equating
investors' investment horizons.
When these assumptions are in force our efficient portfolio Q
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takes on very considerable significance. Indeed all investors
will now attempt to hold Q, either on its own, in combination
with the risk-free asset or by levering their resources allocated
to investment through borrowing at the risk-free rate and
investing the total in Q.. If Q. represents the only portfolio
of risky assets investors attempt to hold then the prices of
risky assets will adjust until they are all marginally eligible
for inclusion. Thus in the disequilibrium situation where
a particular risky asset is not included in Q. its price will drop
until it becomes attractive for investors to sell some of their
existing holdings and using the proceeds purchase the additional
asset. The condition of marginal eligibility for all risky
assets will exist when portfolio Q, contains all risky assets in
proportion to their respective market valuations. When this
condition has been met a market clearing set of prices will
exist, a unique efficient frontier known as the capital market
line will have been established and the capital market will be
in equilibrium. In this equilibrium state the ex ante portfolio
Q. is known as the market portfolio.
There are two implciations that stem directly from the above
derivation of CAPM as a model of capital market equilibrium. We
12
state both without proof. The proofs can be found in Fama.
Firstly all portfolios lying on the capital market line are both
ex ante efficient and linearly related to the market portfolio
as follows :
12. E. Fama, "Foundations of Finance", Oxford 1976, Chapters 7 and 8.
E(Rp) = Rf + [E(Rj - Rf] /(Rp)/^(Rm) Mi)
where:
A*
R » The return on efficient portfolio P
R - The return on the market portfoiio M
m
R^. - The return on a risk-free asset
^"(R ) = The standard deviation of the returns on^ portfoiio P
£(R ) = The standard deviation of the returns on the
market portfoiio M.
Secondly in conditions of capital market equilibrium the expected
return on any individual security or portfolio irrespective of
its:-'" efficiency is :
e(R.) = R, + [e(R ) - Rj Cov (R. , RmW2(R ) 4(1 i)i f w m f* i m m
where:
Rr, R = As abovef m
R. = The return on security i
i
Cov (R.,R )= The covariance between the returns on security
and the market portfoiio m.
^ <Vm The variance of the market portfolio.
Equation 4Qi) is usually shown in its simpler form with,
Cov (R R )/^2(R ) = R
m m / m
Restating 4(ii):
E (R.) = Rf + B. [E(R) - Rf]i r s i m c m fJ 4 (i i i)
Strictly speaking the linear aspects of the relationships
between risk and return described by equations 4(i) and 4(ii)
can be derived from assumptions weaker than full capital market
equilibrium. They will of course be quantitatively different
for each investor without the key equi1ibriating assumption of
homogeneous expectations. However the linearity of equation 4(i)
is established for any efficient portfolio merely through the
possibility of lending and borrowing at the risk-free rate. When
capital market equilibrium is established the only relevant
efficient portfolio of risky assets is the market portfolio thus
leading to equation 4(i). Similarly the linear relationship
between the risk and return for an individual asset can be
derived from any minimum variance portfolio containing that risky
asset. A minimum variance portfolio is a portfolio constructed
in such a way that the weights attached to the constituent
securities minimise the variance for a given level of expected
return. The risk of portfolios constructed this way is determined
by both the variances of the individual securities and the
covariances between them. The condition of capital market
equilibrium restricts the choice of minimum variance portfolios
first of all to those that are efficient and secondly to one
portfolio in particular namely the market portfolio. While we
return to the role of the market portfolio in Chapter 5 we note
that its ex ante efficiency is perhaps the most fundamental and
controversial aspect of CAPM.
In deriving relevant risk measures we first of all re-emphasise
the difference between equations 4(i) and 4(ii). The former
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holds only for efficient portfolios while the latter holds
for all individual securities and portfolios irrespective of
their efficiency. Interestingly Sharpe has suggested
a useful extension to equation 4(i). In particular there could
exist multiple points of tangency between the efficient frontier





The Efficient Frontier and the Capital Market Line
where; R^, A,M,BC = Capital Market Line
13- W. Sharpe. "Reply" Journal of Finance, 20,March 1965, pp. 9^~95-
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The implication of Sharpe's analysis is that there may well be
risky assets or portfolios of risky assets whose composition is
not that of a market portfolio but whose returns are perfectly
correlated with the market portfolio. As these portfolios
would offer investors alternatives to the market portfolio
without violating any of the assumptions of equilibrium under
CAPM their appropriate measure of risk is clearly total risk.
Equation A(i) can now be interpreted as one of a series of
identical equations - one for each alternative to the market
portfolio. The relevant measure of risk for each of these
portfolios including the market portfolio is the standard
deviation of return.
Sharpe's argument has a particular significance for ITCs. As
we have noted several times investors may perceive ITC equity as
allowing access to a well diversified portfolio. If this is the
case then ITC equity may well be considered an alternative to the
construction of a market portfolio. In such circumstances total
risk is the approriate risk measure for ITCs. The investor
group most likely to consider ITC equities in this manner are
individuals who perhaps lack the resources or funds to construct
their own market portfolios.
However for those investors who feel uneasy about the existence of
an individual asset or portfolio whose returns are perfectly
correlated with those of the market the relevant portfolio of
risky assets is the market portfolio. In equilibrium each investor
will hold the market portfolio and if necessary will borrow or lend
at the risk free rate in order to reach a desired level of risk
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exposure. As the market portfolio is the appropriate portfolio
of risky assets to hold the relevant risk measure for an
individual asset (or portfolio) is the risk contribution made
by that asset to the market portfolio. Thus from equations
4(ii) and A(iii) the proportionate factor is;
B = Cov(R. ,R) /. ^2(RJ
'im i m m
In order to keep risk in the same units as returns the beta
factor is usually applied against the market risk defined not in
terms of variance but standard deviation.
i.e. B. R ) = The risk of asset i in the market portfolio.
* i m m
The equilibrium risk return relationship of equationsk(ii) and
A(iii) is usually summarised by the security market line which
plots expected return against the proportionate factor for
each member of the population of risky assets. This is
demonstrated in Diagram A(iii).
We now have two measures of risk. The first ^(Rj) is relevant
if we consider ITC equity as an alternative to the market and
the second 's relevant if we consider ITC equity in the
context of the market portfolio. The latter may well be the
case for such ITC equity holders as pension funds or indeed
other ITCs.





where; (R) , p, R^. = as defined above
R^., M, Q = Security Market Line
M = Market portfoliowithE(R)andB=l.
m /
It is important to note that these are the only two measures
of risk that flow directly from the equilibrium conditions implied
either by CAPM or by Sharpe's "extended" CAPM which includes points
of multiple tangency on the efficient frontier. In reality
however the validity of homogeneous expectations amongst
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investors is clearly questionable. Thus an investor may well
not hold the ex ante efficient market portfolio either through
an inability to identify it correctly or through the belief
that his alternative expectations are superior. To the extent
that selected portfolios differ from the market portfolio the
relevance of B. /(R ) as a measure of risk is weakened. Similarly
r im " m
in conditions of disequilibrium our measure of total risk loses
its theoretical justification. Both these measures however
retain considerable intuitive appeal. For example systematic
risk reflects the widely held belief that the returns on an
asset are related to market-wide movements while total risk
is useful in terms of describing the variability of expected
returns.
To the extent that individual securities and portfolios are not
efficient equation 4 (I i I) should be restated as ;
Whereas before we had two measures of relevant risk depending
upon which version of CAPM was preferred we can now identify the folbwing
additional element. For later convenience we also re-state the
model in excess return space.
Miv)
where:
E("e.) = The expected return of the non-market
component in E(R.) 15
15- For an efficient portfolio ; ^ (e ) z 0.
Rearranging 4(iv) ;
E<RI> " Rf = J»hn [E<Rm> " Rf] + E<eV




Var E(e.) = the variance of the non-market risk of asset i.
As ^E(e.)j is unpriced in equilibrium there is the strong implication
that in the construction of the market portfolio these unique or
unsystematic elements of risk cancel out.
If an investor rejects the perfectly diversified market portfolio
then elements of risk are being incurred for which there can be
no return. ITC managers although perhaps not their investors may
well believe that such rejection is justifiable in terms of their
skills at producing estimates of expected returns that are superior
to those of the market.





Total Risk £[e(Rj) " Rf]
Market Risk V]
Unique Risk ^[E(e.)j
2. Estimation Procedures : The usefulness of all three risk measures
described above depends upon the possibility of estimating the ex ante
variables E(R.) and E(R ). These could of course be estimated
i m
subjectively. However the process of establishing risk estimates is
made considerably more straightforward if the model of market equilibrium
can be translated into terms of ex post realisations. This can in fact
be achieved in two steps.
Flrstofalkas CAPM is formulated in terms of returns calculated over a
single period that is the same for all investors the resulting risk
measures are strictly only appropriate for that period. While such an
assumption eases the problem of deriving market equilibrium under CAPM
it severely restricts the applicability of the model. In particular
the usefulness of the model would be greatly increased if it was valid
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for both more than one investment period and for the possibility
of heterogeneous investment horizons among different investors.
Jensen has shown that in market conditions where continuous trading
can be assumed CAPM will hold for one or more time period; of
Jensen also indicates that the appropriate measure of return is that
calculated in continuous time. We note in passing, that the extension
of CAPM into a multiperiod model assumes that pirn is constant over the
various return periods. While this implication may well be applicable
for most industrial concerns there are clear doubts about its validity
as far as ITCs are concerned. In particular if one of the management
skills claimed by ITC managers is market timing, that is the accurate
prediction of bull and bear markets, they will be very much concerned
with adjusting levels of market exposure to reflect their market
expectations. We return to the area of non-stationary risk measures
be 1ow.
Secondly to complete the formulation of CAPM in terms of ex post
17 18
realizations we call on the statistically based market model (MM). '
The MM hypothesises a return generating process of individual assets
based on the assumption that portfolio returns are normally distributed.
As it is essentially a statistical model rather than a financial model
16. M. Jensen, "Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets and the Evaluation
of Investment Portfolios", Journal of Business, 42, 1969, pp. 167-247.
17- W. Sharpe, "A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis", Management
Science, January 1963, pp. 277-293-
18. E. Fama, "Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Some Clarifying Comments"
Journal of Finance, 33, March 1968, pp. 29-40.
arbitrary length.^ Thus equation 4 (i i i) becomes;
4 (v i)
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of market equilibrium its parameters can validly be estimated from
ex post observations. There are two steps involved in applying the
MM to CAPM. First we briefly describe the MM and secondly we
formally show its incorporation into CAPM.
Given that the return on any portfolio is;
R = 2. x r Mvii)
P A=1
where = weight attached to asset ^ in portfolio p
then to assume that portfolio returns follow a normal distribution
implies that drawings from any linear combination of return observations
will be normal. If this holds irrespective of the weights (x^)
applied then the assumption of normally distributed portfolio returns
implies that the joint distributions of returns on individual securities
are mu1ti-variate normal. Whether this assumption is valid or not
is of course an empirical matter. However we note that mu1ti-variate
normalcy requires the necessary but insufficient condition that
individual returns are normally distributed. In Chapter 3 we established
that although this assumption was not entirely validated it is a
reasonable assumption in the context of ITCs. Therefore our results
while not specifically testing for mu1ti-variate normalcy are at least
consistent with the assumption.
With portfolio returns assumed to be normal and security returns multi¬
variate normal then a distribution formed from drawings on the joint
distribution of two assets or portfolios will be bi-variate normal.
In particular as a single security can be thought of as a one security
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portfolio then the joint distribution of returns between the one
security portfolio and any other security or portfolio will be
bi-variate normal. An implication of bi-variate normalcy is that
1 9
the conditional distribution of the two variables is linear.
This allows the parameters of the conditional distribution to be
estimated by least squares regression techniques.
Broadly following Jensen the formal incorporation of the MM into
20
CAPM can be shown as follows.
Defining MM as;
R » E(Rit) + b.Qt +/|t Mviii)
where;
with;
Q = an element of return communality
1etting;
E(Q.t) z 0 Var ^Jt) = C1 {jj. t) Cov (yj. t ,Qt) = 0
Efit) = 0 Cov fit'P^t} = 0
*mt = E(Kmt)+^t 4(ix)
substituting 4(ix) into A(vi);
E (R. ) = R, + B. f(R . - Q,.)- R,Jit f r im L mt t fJ
A/
adding B. Q + u. to each side;3 I im t "it
E(R. J + B. + u.. s R. + B. (R ^.-L-RJ + P. CL + V.+it r im t "it f Tim mt t f Tim t ] it
- R_ + B. (R - R,) + u.f rim mt f r it
19. T. Wonnacott, R. Wannacott, "Introductory Statistics", Wiley, 1972,
pp. 342-343.
20. M. Jensen "The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 19^5-1964",
Journal of Finance, 23, May 1968, pp. 389-416.
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by allowing b. - p.m the LHS (from 4(viii)) becomes;
R. = Rc + B. (R ~ Rj.) + u.,it f ' im mt f / 11
by rearranging;
(Rit " Rf> *hn (Rmt " Rf» -At kM
Risk parameters can be estimated directly from equation 4(x) by
ordinary least squares regression techniques. However it is usual
to show Mx) without the constant suppressed. That is;
(R.. - R,) = o?. + B. (R - Rf) + £.. A(xi)it f i / im mt t it
where;
E(£.t) i 0 Var (£;t) =£2(£-t) Cov (€|t,e ) = 0
The relationship between the jj .^ of equation 4(x) and £.^ of equation
4(xi) is;
JU. = o<. +r it i ^it
Equation 4(xi) allows the direct estimation of the three risk measures
derived above from ex post return data. However before going on to
present'the empirical estimates some comments are required on the
application of equation 4(xi) in general and on the use of U.K. data
in particular.
As we noted above the slope coefficient of equation 4(xi) is clearly
assumed to be constant over the period under consideration. In
practice however this may not be so. In fact there is no particular
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reason to expect a company's beta to be constant. This may be
particularly so for ITCs where market timing is considered to be
one of the areas management possess skills in. Indeed in discussions
with managers the construction of high beta portfolios in anticipation
of bull markets and vice versa for bear markets is considered to
be extremely important. There are three alternatives to accepting
the stable beta assumption. The most complete is to formally model
expected betas. The second is to attempt to isolate the periods
over which beta can be considered to be relatively stable. The
third method is very much a development of the second in that adjusted
betas are calculated to overcome either or both expected elements
of non-stationarity or sampling errors in the estimation procedure.
Although several authors have been tempted to explore the first alter-
21 22 23
native their efforts have not been met with great success. ' '
In part this has been due to the statistical problems involved in
deriving estimation procedures for non-stationary coefficients and
partly to deciding precisely how to model beta. We cover this area
in more detail when we deal with the market timing aspects of ITC
performance. The second and third alternatives follow very much
2k 25
from the work of Blume. ' Working with U.S. data he reported
evidence that indicated both beta non-stationarity and a tendency
over time for betas to take on less extreme values. With regard to
21. A. Dotan, A. Ofer, "Variable versus Stationary Beta in the Market
Model". Paper presented to the European Finance Association", 1982.
22. G. Harpaz, "A Bayesian Estimator for Non-Stationary Betas" Paper
presented to the European Finance Association, 1982.
23- F. Fabozzi, J. Francis "Beta as a Random Coefficient" Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis. March 1978, pp. 101-116.
2b. M. Blume, "On the Assessment of Risk", Journal of Finance, March 1971,
pp. 1-11.
25. M. Blume, "Betas and their Regression Tendencies", Journal of Finance,
June 1975 (Reprinted in I. Friend £ J. Bicksler, "Risk and Return in
Finance" Vol.1, 1977)
240
the latter conclusion, based primarily on Blume's own work and
that of Gonedes, Fama notes that beta can be considered as reasonably
26 27
stable over periods of up to seven years. It must be noted
however that any decision as to the "correct" estimation period
over which betas are calculated does in itself imply a model of
beta variability. As yet there is no evidence in the literature
suggesting adequate financial justification for estimation periods
of up to seven years.
The observation by Blume and others that beta values tend to moderate
over time has led to the development of estimation procedures that
attempt to account for this. The most obvious way to correct this
tendency and indeed the one suggested by Blume is to regress the
estimated betas of period t on the estimated betas of t-1 and to use
this (estimated) relationship to adjust the beta estimates of period
t+1. The accuracy of this technique clearly depends on the one
period time series model utilised although it should be noted that
Blume's estimates of future beta values were considerably more stable
after adjustment. More sophisticated techniques have been developed
to overcome both the "regression tendencies" of betas and the problem
more acute at the individual security level of the standard errors
attached to beta estimates. The use of Bayesian estimators of
varying degrees of complexity provide estimates of individual security
betas that statistically would appear to have both greater accuracy
28 2S 30
and more stability. ' ' Indeed many commercial beta services
26. N. Gonedes, "Evidence on the Information Content of Accounting Numbers:
Accounting Based and Market Based Estimates of Systematic Risk", Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1973, pp-. 407-444.
27. E. Fama, "Foundations of Finance", Oxford, 1978, p. 131-
28. E. Dimson, P. Marsh, "The Stability of UK Risk Measures and the Problem
of Thin Trading" Presented to the European Finance Association, 1982.
29. 0. Vasicek, "A Note on Using Cross-Sectional Information in Bayesian
Estimation of Security Betas", Journal of Finance, December 1973,
pp. 1233-1239.
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31 32have in recent years adopted these techniques. ' However we
suggest that no matter the degree of statistical sophistication
these techniques undoubtedly possess they do imply that the so-called
"true betas" are in fact stable and that adjustments are necessary to
return inaccurate estimates to "true" values. In respect to general
cross-sectional Bayesian adjustments we note Sharpe's conclusion
that :
"Apparently betas not only vary over time but have a
tendency to move back toward average levels. This is
plausible enough, for extreme postures are likely to
be moderated over time. A firm whose operation or
financing make the risk of its equity considerably
different from that of other firms is more likely to
move back toward the average than away from it. Such
changes in beta values are due to real economic
phenomena, not simply an artifact of overly simple
statistical procedures. There is however no reason to
expect every stock's true beta to move in the same way,
to the same average and at the same speed. In this
regard a little fundamental security analysis may
prove more useful than the adoption of more sophisticated
statistical methods for processing past price changes." 33
Our approach to the problem of beta estimation is likewise conservative.
We examine whether or not beta estimates tend to be stable in successive
periods but recalling the point noted above that beta may well be a
variable that investment managers can actively change we do not make
any attempt to improve the estimated stability.
We now turn to a problem more specifically relevant to risk estimation
using U.K. data. As we noted in Chapter 3 a characteristic of the
London Stock Exchange is the presence of non-trading. This results
30. M. Theobald, "An Analysis of the Market Model and Beta Factors using UK
Equity Share Data", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Spring
1980, pp. 49-64.
31. London Business School, "Risk Measurement Service".
32. Merrill Lyndh Inc. "Security Risk Evaluation Service".
33- W. Sharpe, "Investments", New York, 1981, pp. 341-342.
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in the covariance between security and market returns being
based on observations that are not sourced from the same period.
In particular security returns where non-trading is present will
both start and finish in an earlier period to that covered by
the surrogate for the market return. As we would expect and indeed
as several authors have pointed out this leads to an under-estimation
34 35
of the slope coefficient. ' Several authors have suggested
ways round this problem.^5>.36 >37 y^e approaches adopted by
both Dimson and by Scholes and Williams involve attempts to correct
for bias by using either leading or lagged market returns. For
example Dimson estimates beta by running a multiple regression of
security returns on various market observations based on time periods
both before and after that of the security observation. By summing
the resulting slope coefficients he determines an estimate of the
beta relatively free of non-trading bias. Alternatively the approach
offered by Dimson and Marsh is to calculate returns on a trade to
trade basis for both individual securities and market returns. The
key to the latter approach is that security price observations and
market observations are recorded synchronously with the time between
observations being treated as a variable rather than as a fixed number
of elapsed days. Clearly the Dimson-Marsh method of risk estimation
deals with the problem of non-synchronous return observations in a
34. K. Cohen, S. Maier, R. Schwartz & D. Whitcomb, "On the Existence of
Serial Correlation in an Efficient Securities Market", TIMS Studies
in the Management Sciences, 1979, pp. 151-168.
35- E. Dimson, "Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent
Trading", Journal of Financial Economies, June 1979, pp. 197-226.
36. E. Dimson, P. Marsh, "The Stability of UK Risk Measures and the Problem
of Thin Trading" Presented to the European Finance Association, 1982.
37. M. Scholes, J. Williams, "Estimating Betas from Non-Synchronous Data"
Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 1977, pp. 309—327-
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more straightforward way than the previous authors. Unfortunately
it does involve additional costs both in terms of data collection
and a more complex estimating equation.
As we noted in Chapter 3 the construction of our data base allows
for the computation of synchronous trade to trade returns for
individual securities and FTA-AS market returns.
The effect on the estimating equation 4(xi) of allowing elapsed time
to act as a variable can be shown by first of all assuming the
following return distribution :
where;
A/
r. = continuously compounded daily excess total return
with successive distributions iid.







R. = continuously compounded excess total return per
lL
period t with successive distributions iid.
T number of elapsed days in period t.
As our ITC and market excess returns, where market is defined as the
FTA-A11 Share Index, are synchronous equation 4(xiii) applies to
both the independent and dependent variables in equation 4(xi). The
2kk
problem now is that as our basic model is in terms of daily returns
and our observations are over elapsed periods of various numbers
of days we require a distributional estimate of daily returns based
on trade to trade observations.
The estimated daily variance can be calculated by noting that the
variance of a constant times a random variable is the square of the
constant times the variance of the random variable, i.e.
Var (R ) = T Var (7.)
= Var Cr. ^T)
: Var (R^ATt) = Var (7.) 4(xiv)
In other words by weighting our trade to trade returns with the
square root of elapsed time the variance of the resulting transformed
variable will be an estimate of the variance,^2, in our original
"daily return" model. Our estimated daily distribution will
therefore take the form ;
N (nP^I, ^2)
Restating equation 4(xi) in terms of daily excess returns;
a A
r.t = <*. + B. r + e.. k(xv)it i f im mt it
where;
Ay ✓ Ay
r. = r. - r r
it it f
A, ~
r' = r - r
mt mt f
Summing over the number of elapsed days;
2^5
T T „ T T
(V/ r- c— /V/ ^
^ r.. : a. =*• + B. ^.r^+Z e.^
. , it . . i rim . . mt . , iti=l i=l 1= i=
b(xvi)
From equation 4(xiii) we can imply that the variance of the error
term in equation 4(xvi) will be proportional to the elapsed trade
to trade time periods. As a result of this the estimates we get
from the application of ordinary least squares will no longer be
BLUE.
Two solutions to this estimating problem are available. First of all
we could use weighted least squares procedures. In this case weighting
would be by the square root of the elapsed time. Secondly we could
transform the original variables and then run ordinary least squares
procedures. The results will be the same whichever method is
used. We chose the latter estimation procedure. From equation
A(xiv) the correct transformation to the trade to trade returns in
order to make the error terms in A(xvi) iid can be seen to be a
weighting by the square root of the elapsed number of days. Therefore
transforming equation A(xvi) gives;
2 r.y/r = Z«./JT + p. i 7'jJf11 . , i / im . . mtirl i=l + I e./JTi = 1 lc
T
which restated in trade to trade terms;
b(xvii)
where;
mt *mt " Rft
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Equation 4(xvii) now becomes our risk estimating equation which
specifically takes into account the effect of using trade to
trade returns. Note that we have also allowed the risk free rate
to vary over differing return periods.
3 ."^e Bnp irica1 Estimates : Before presenting our results it is
useful'at this stage to summarise the various estimating and
presentation procedures adopted.
(a) Estimating Equation
R.-t/JT = 5.JT + p,rc/Jf ♦ eit/Jr
where;
RTt = (Log (((MC - MO + XD) /MO) + 1)) - (Rf j
A-/
mt (Log (((FTC - FTO + D) /FTO) + 1)) - (R )
t
Rf = Log' (((TB )/12(l-TB. .)) + 1)
rt t-1
wi th;
MC = Last mark of month t
MO = Last mark of month t-1
XD = Gross dividend, added in at XD date
FTC = FTA-AS index at date of MC
FTO = FTA-AS index at date of MO
TB = Annual equivalent of the 3 month treasury bill rate
observed on the last Friday of each month. 38
D = Dividend component of total market return defined as;
(DY)(FTC)//1200
with DY = Observed yield on the FTA-AS index at FTC date
T = Total number of elapsed days between trades.
38. Financial Statistics, Various Issues, 1972-1980 (CSO)
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(b) Estimated Measures; The following risk measures were calculated
for 97 ITCs based on 118 trade to trade return observations between
February 1971 and December 1980.
Total Risk (t)
Market Risk (m) = b. Z(r' / /t)
*i m " mt
Unique Risk = yt2 - m*
(c) Presentation; In order to present the results in a more practical
format the risk measures were converted into estimates of annual
risk in terms of simple returns expressed in percentage form,
i.e. Total Risk (T) = ((Antilog (h(>5 .£2 (R[t//T))) - 1) 100
Market Risk (M) = b. ((Ant i 1 og (7365 . t2 (R' /^T))) - 1) 100/ i m J mt
Unique Risk = \j(T2 - M2)
(The variance of the weighted market returns was approximately the
same for all ITCs. Thus we have used an average. This was not
the case when the means of the weighted market returns were
considered. We discuss this point in detail in Chapter 5.)
Our results are summarised in Table 4(ii) and shown in greater
detail for individual ITCs in Table 4(i i i) pages 1/2 to 2/2.
Before looking at the results we note several statistical points in
relation to the estimating equations.
(i) The average coefficient of determination = .643




Equ ty Risk Measures - Summary
(%)
Description Average Minimum Maximum
Total Risk 38.483 30.406 70.711
Beta 0.945 0.686 1 .378
11^-11 14.807 9.270 22.102
"SE" 0.065 0.047 0.110
Market Risk 29.906 21 .714 43 .619
Unique Risk 24.220 15.475 55.654
The estimating equations are clearly reasonably good fits for the
data. There is some slight evidence of negative autocorrelation
with 1d12.00. To gain some idea of whether or not this level
of autocorrelation seriously effected the efficiency of our estimators
the equations were, following Theobald, re-estimated using the
39Cochrane-0rcutt procedure. The differences were not in fact
significant therefore our original methodology was retained.
39- M. Theobald, "An Analysis of the Market Model and Beta Factors
Using U.K. Equity Share Data", Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting, 7, 1980.
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TABLE A (ii'i) 1/2
Investment Trust Companies
Equity Risk Measures *
T rust








T -MT Pirn M Pirn M
Aberdeen Trust 36.523 .908. 28.7A1 22.536 Continental Union 36.263 9A7 29.976 20.A06
Alliance Investment A2.111 .988 31.27A 28.200 Drayton Commercial 35.226 .870 27.538 21.966
Aliiance Trust 36.784 .862 27.285 2A.669 Drayton Consolidated 3A.710 .880 27.855 20.709
American Trust 42.655 1 . OA 1 32.951 27.085 Drayton Premier 3A.A53 .880 27.855 20.275
Anglo-American Securities 37.308 .973 30.799 21.05^ Edinburgh Investment 35.7A3 .971 30.736 18.2AA
Anglo-Scottish 39.956 1 .0A8 33.173 22.271 Electric £ General 56.950 1 .187 37.573 A2.796
Ashdown 32.921 .802 25.386 20.960 English £ International Al .569 • 9A0 29.75A 29.212
Atlantic Assets 70.711 1.378 A3.619 55.65A English £ New York 39.956 .891 28.203 28.303
Atlas Electric £ General 42.832 1.017 32.192 27.566 Eng1ish £ Scottish 36.503 . 9A1 29.786 20.228
Bankers AO.223 .931 29.A69 27.376 Estate Duties 31 .156 .716 22.66A 21.378
Berry A5.A06 .952 30.13A 33.965 First Scottish American 39.956 .912 28.868 27.62A
Bishopgate 3A.197 .866 27.A12 20.AA5 Foreign £ Colonial 38.891 1 .012 32.033 22.05A
Border £ Southern 35.7A3 . 93 A 29.56A 20.088 General Consolidated 37.308 .925 29.279 23.186
British American £ General Al.8A0 .982 31.08A 28.006 General Funds 37.308 . 96A 30.51A 21 .A65
British Assets A5.A06 1.158 36.655 26.797 General Investors 36.78A .879 27.792 2A.097
British Investment 36.263 .929 29.A06 21 .220 General Scottish 3A.968 .831 26.30A 23.0A0
Broadstore 36.263 1 .036 32.793 1 5-479 Glasgow Stockholders 37.308 .9A3 29.8A9 22.381
Brunner 37.308 . 9A6 29.9AA 22.186 Globe 39.A22 .915 28.963 26.7A3
Capita1 £ Nationa1 37.308 . 91A 28.931 23.555 Great Northern Al.029 1 .001 31.685 26.06A
Ca rdina1 36.003 .929 29.A06 20.772 Guard ian Al .8A0 1 .028 32.5A0 26.300
Ceda r 38.097 .983 31.115 21 .982 Hamb ros 38.361 .881 27.887 26.3A1
Charter Trust 37.0A6 .871 27.570 2A .755 Phi 1ip Hill Al.029 1 .029 32.571 2A.950
C1 ave rhouse 36.003 .955 30.229 19.555 Industrial £ General 38.891 .979 30.989 23.A98
CLRP 35.A8A .789 2A.975 25.206 1 nternationaI 39.689 1 .100 3A.819 19.0A8
Continental £ Industrial 38.097 1.007 31 .875 20.865
/continued
TABLE b (ili) 2/2
investment Trust Companies












T -M/im M Tim M
1 nvestors 1 Capita1 38.1*22 .916 28.995 26.709 Scottish American 1*5.962 1.118 35.389 29.327
Keystone 32.921 .71*3 23.518 23.036 Scottish Eastern 38.361 .905 28.61+6 25.511*
Lakev iew 39.956 1.001* 31.780 21*.218 Scottish Investment 1*9.31*6 .911* 28.931 39.975
London £ Holyrood 33.9^1 .907 28.710 18.103 Scottish Mortgage 37.308 .852 26.969 26.969
London £ Lomond 1*1.299 1 .013 32.065 26.027 Scottish National 38.626 1.032 32.666 20.613
London £ Montrose 33.^30 .839 26.557 20.301* Scottish Northern 1*5.1*06 1 .185 37.509 25.588
London £ Provincial 39.689 .886 28.01*5 28.337 Scottish Ontario 37.308 .960 30.387 21 .61*5
London Trust 39.156 .91*3 29.91*9 25.31*2 Scottish United 33.685 .708 22.1*1 1 25.11*8
Mercanti1e A2.665 1 .006 31 .81+3 28.395 Second A11iance 49.061 .981* 31 .11*7 37.905
Merchants 36.523 .895 28.330 23.050 Securities 36.781* .893 28.267 23.538
Monks 1*0.1*91 1 .01*3 33.015 23.1*1*2 Sphere 39.1*22 1.047 33.11*1 21 .31*8
Murray Caledonian 1*1 .569 1 .098 31*.756 22.803 Ster1ing 32.162 .890 28.172 15.515
Murray Clydesdale 38.097 .897 28.393 25.1+01 Stockholders 41 .569 1 .063 33.61*8 21*.1*08
Murray Northern 1*3.201 1 .01*6 33.110 27.71*9 Th rogmorton 36.523 .813 25.731* 25.916
Murray Western 42.927 1 .009 31 .938 28.682 Trans Ocean 32.668 .842 26.652 18.886
1928 30.1*06 .791* 25.133 17.113 T ribune 33.685 .719 22.759 21* .833
North Atlantic Securities 33.1*30 .81*3 26.681* 20.137 Trust Union 31*.710 .959 30.356 16.831
Northern American 1*5.128 1 .028 32.51*0 31 .267 Trustees Corporation 37.01*6 1.029 32.571 17.650
Outwich 39.956 .871 27.570 28.920 UBS 31*.197 .858 27.159 20.780
Pent 1 and 38.626 1 .057 33.1*58 19.301 US £ General 37.0A6 1.057 33.1*58 15.901*
Raebu rn 1*0.1*91 .959 30.356 26.802 US Debenture 31*.710 .865 27.380 21 .333
Romney 38.361 1 .022 32.350 20.616 Wi nterbottom 33.175 .871 27.570 18.1*51
RIT 31*.453 .686 21.711* 26.71*9 Wi tan 40.760 .961* 30.511* 27.023
St. Andrew 31 .910 .786 21*. 880 19.980 Yeoman 37.308 1 .009 31.938 19.283
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Apart from the odd outlier the results for the individual ITCs
are remarkably similar. Indeed the majority of the estimated
risk parameters cluster fairly closely to their respective averages.
The beta coefficients are all statistically significant, have small
standard errors and average close to one with 31 greater than unity
and 66 less. This result is very much in line with those reported
in similar studies. In Table 4(iv) we report the market risk
coefficients found by a selection of other authors. In each case
the beta was computed against the return on the domestic market.
It does appear from both our reported results and those of the
other authors noted that lower market coefficients are experienced
by mutual funds and unit trusts as compared to those of closed end
funds or ITCs. We return to this area in Chapter 6.
With betas close to unity and R2s averaging .64 there is a clear
suggestion that ITC ownership implies holding asset claims which
result in investors taking on both the market risk and significant
amounts of diversifiable risk. We note in passing that the average
standard deviation of the weighted market returns is reported as 31.65%
p.a. whereas the average total risk of the ITC sample is greater at
38.48% p.a. Interestingly there is some evidence that this level of
total risk is in part the result of equally weighting small and large
ITCs in the presentation of our average results. Recall Table 3(iv)
where we reported that the market weighted FTA-ITC index had a
slightly lower level of total risk than that for the FTA-AS index.
This result has considerable appeal in that small ITCs are more likely








McDona1d 123 Mutual Funds 1960-69 0.87
1 k]Jensen 115 Mutual Funds 1955—6A 0.8A
A2
Ma i ns 70 Mutual Funds 1955-65 0.79
Thompson^ 23 Closed Funds 19A0—75 1 .00
AA
Smi th & T1 to 38 Mutual Funds 1958-67 0.85
2. FRANCE:
A5
McDonaId 8 Mutual Funds I96A-69 0.38
3. U.K.:
A6
Moles & Taylor 86 Unit Trusts 1965-75 0.67
A7
Corner £■ Matatko 92 ITCs 197A-79 0.9A
A8
Ward & Saunders A9 Unit Trusts I96A-7A 0.88
A9
Fi rth 72 Unit Trusts 1966-75 0.68
AO. J. McDonald, "Objectives and Performances of Mutual Funds 1960-69",
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 197A.
Al . M. Jensen, "Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets and Evaluation of Port¬
folios", Journal of Business, April 1969-
A2. N. Mains, "Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets and Evaluation of Port¬
folios - A Note", Journal of Business, July 1977.
A3. R. Thompson, "Closed End Funds Discount and Efficiency", Journal of
Financial Economics, 1978.
AA. K. Smith S D. Tito, "Risk, Return Measures of Ex Post Portfolio
Performance", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1969-
A5. J. McDonald, "French Mutual Fund Performance: Evaluation of Internat¬
ionally-Diversified Portfolios", Journal of Finance, December 1973•




Indeed the size of the funds under management by several of the
largest ITCs may well preclude significant specialisation.
4. The Management of Risk: The investment implications of CAPM allow
managers very little room in which to pursue active management policies.
Indeed with fully diversified portfolios and efficiently priced
securities the level of market risk is from a theoretical point of
view virtually the only operational variable fund managers should adjust.
Although we hasten to add that such adjustments would not under CAPM
result in profitable market timing activities. Rather they should
reflect changes in the desired level of risk exposure on the part of
fund investors. With this in mind what is of interest to investors
is whether or not management are in fact meeting the risk objectives
they advertise.
The performance differentials associated with actual and promoted risk
levels within the context of efficiently diversified CAPM benchmark
portfolios can be defined as follows;
Let B-j-^ = the investors target level of risk
B = the manager's achieved level of risk
Rn = the return associated with risk BnuA AM
Rt = the return associated with risk B^..,T TM
R = the return on the market portfolio
m K
R^ = the return on the risk free asset
47. D. Corner & J. Matatko, "Investment Trust Portfolio Performance -
Measurement and Determinants", Investment Analyst
48. C. Ward, & A. Saunders, "Unit Trust Performance 1964-74", Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting, 1976.
49. M. Firth, "The Investment Performance of Unit Trusts in the Period
1965-75", Journal of Money, Banking and Credit, 1977.
then the additional return required by the manager to compensate
his shareholders for the risk level he has in fact taken on will be;
RA " RT = Rf + Pam ^Rm " V Rf PtM ^Rm " "V
RA " RT = (PAM " PTM^ ^Rm " "V Mxv"
We should also note that by involving themselves in the equity market
investors are showing that they themselves are willing to take on
some risk. The return for this risk is;
RT " Rf = pTM (Rm - Rf) Mxix)
The above analysis turns on the assumed target levels of risk.
Unfortunately target levels of risk are unobservable and therefore
we must attempt to assess management ability to control risk with
a less direct methodology.
We noted in Chapter 1 that it is currently well accepted that ITC
managers should help investors differentiate between ITCs by publically
stating investment objectives. These objectives traditionally
turn on distinguishing those ITCs that provide their returns predominant
through dividend distributions from those whose investors can hopefully
expect capital gains. As an income stream can be secured with
relatively little risk the former strategies can be hypothesised as
relatively less risky than the latter strategies. Using this stated
income-capital distinction the question is whether or not these
objectives are reflected in the risk profiles actually adopted by
management. If management is successful at controlling risk we would
expect to see those ITCs with income objectives associated with low
risk levels and vice versa for ITCs with capital objectives.
Several authors have reported evidence showing that such a
relationship does in fact exist. We summarise the results from a
selection of authors in Table 4(v).
A common problem amongst all work of this kind is in the vagueness
with which many managers state their chosen objectives. This point
was noted in Chapter 1. In an attempt to avoid this difficulty and
to offer a more direct estimate of objectives annual average gross
yields were calculated on the portfolio assets of the data base ITCs.
These were then grouped into high, medium and low yield categories.
Staff at Grieveson Grant S Co. were then asked to confirm that
the constituent companies in the three groups were correctly allocated
in terms of managements known and accepted objectives.
Apart from eight ITCs the allocation was accurate. The average yields
together with the average equity betas and standard deviations are
shown in Table 4(vi).
The reported negative relationship between grouped portfolio yields
and grouped risk levels confirms the general conclusion of earlier
work that managers are in fact reasonably successful in meeting their
risk objectives. However looking at the standard deviations around
the risk estimates it is clear that there is substantial overlapping
between the yield groupings. Thus while yield grouping procedures
may be useful in highlighting a relationship between objectives and
risk the statistical significance of the relationship may be weak.
The results of the following regression runs are revealing.
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TABLE 4(v)
The Management of Risk
Reported Empirical Evidence
U.K. U.S.
Author Period 1ncome Ba1anced Capital Author Period 1ncome Ba1anced Capita1
1 Ward & Saunders"*^ 1976-1974 1 , 521 Jensen 1955-1964
Pirn CO OO OO VD OO .959 P-r im • 659 vOLACO • 955
^(Rj) .030 .037 .052 6(R.) N/A N/A N/A
(Log Annual) ( Log (Cum) )
2 Moles & Taylor ^ 1966-1975 2 McDonald"^ 1960-1969
Pirn .709 .716 .688 /im .615 .880 1.115
6(Rj) .185 .187 .184 6 (R;) 2.860 3.865 5.235
(Log i Annua 1) monthly)
Notes : 1. The results of the various authors have been summarised
and in the case of Jensen grouped.
50. C. Ward, A. Saunders, "U.K. Unit Trust Performance 1964-74" Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 3, 1976.
51. P. Moles, B. Taylor, "Unit Trust Risk-Return Performance - 1966-1975", The Investment Analyst, 1978.
52. M. Jensen, "Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios", Journal of Business, 1969, pp.587-615.






Yield Group Average Yield Average p.^ Average £(R.)
High Yield A. 083 .903 37.239
(.696) (.064) (2.801)
Mediurn Yield 3.096 • 956 38.521
(.146) (.082) (3.923)
Low Yield 2.303 . 966 40.721
(.485) (.147) (7.652)
Notes : 1. The December
for the fill 1
by Grieveson
portfolio market valuations
97 ITCs were made available
Grant S Co.
2. Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
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p. = 1.067 - 0.039 7. R2 = .104
; i m ✓ i
("t" = -3.26)
S. = 45.805 - 2.209 Y. R2 = .128
("t" = -3.69)
where; i = 1 ... 97
th
= Market risk component on the i security
/V th
Y. = Yield on the i security
S. = Standard deviation of the i^ security.
1 '
While confirming a statistically significant relationship between yield
and risk these results do however indicate the overall weakness of the
relationship. Portfolio yields would appear to be a significant
although small determinant of equity risk levels.
It may well be that it is unrealistic to expect managers to commit
themselves to stationary risk objectives. If this is the case then
it would go some way to explaining the weak relationships noted in
the above regressions. As we have noted several times varying risk
levels is in practice an important management tool. To see the
extent to which beta and total risk levels varied during the 1970s
the 118 month period was split into two equal halves and beta co¬
efficients were calculated for each ITC for the two periods. The
average betas and standard deviations together with the Spearman rank





The Consistency of Risk Measures
(p.a.%)(97 ITCs)
Description Total Risk Beta
Period 1 : 59 months to 1/76
Average 33-33 0.955
Period 2 : 59 months to 12/80
Average 19-20 0.920
Spearman Rho 0.470 0.149
While the general movement in risk levels between the two periods
is broad confirmation of our results on distributional stability
reported in Chapter 3 what is of particular interest is the
very small ranking relationship between the two periods for
market risk levels. It is clear that ITCs do not offer stable
levels of exposure to market risk although they do offer
considerably more stability in terms of total risk. These
results are very much in line with the results reported for unit
trusts and ITCs in the U.K. (Ellis and Moles and Taylor)
although they differ significantly from both the U.K. results
for equities as a whole reported by Dimson and Marsh and from
U.S. results. (Jensen, Blume, Pogue, Conway&Levy) .54,55,56,57,58,59-60
54./
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We suggest that the relative ease with which ITC managers can
alter gearing levels or portfolio holdings together with the
often heard comments about the importance of market timing strongly
imply that risk levels are in practice a key operating variable
and that to assume that they are stable over all but relatively
short periods of time is dangerous. In the context of the
results reported in Table 4(v) this would certainly appear to
be the case with different managers substantially altering their
market risk exposure during the second half of the decade.
Interestingly at the same time they showed rather less willingness
to change their relative levels of total risk. We return to the
question of market timing in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 1 and at several points in the subsequent chapters we
noted that a possible ITC intermediation product may well be the
provision of a diversified portfolio at a cost less than that
available to investors operating individually. If ITCs are to
provide this product then it is clearly important to assess the
success with which they repackage returns into income streams
that are highly correlated with the market. It is to this question
54. P. Ellis, "Beta Coefficients for Investment Trusts", Investment
Analyst, December 1974.
55- P. Moles, B. Taylor, "Unit Trust Risk-Return Performance 1966-75"
Investment Analyst. 1978.
56. E. Dimson, P. Marsh, "The Stability of U.K. Risk Measures and the
Problem of Thin Trading" Paper presented to the annual meeting of
the E.F.A. - Jerusalem, 1982.
57. M. Jensen, "Risk, The Pricing of Assets and the Evaluation of
Investment Portfolios", Journal of Business. April 1969-
58. M. Blume, "On the Assessment of Risk", Journal of Finance, March
1971 •
59. 0. Pogue, W. Conway, "On the Stability of Mutual Fund Betas",
unpublished MIT Working Paper. Quoted in W. Sharpe, "Investments"
Prentice-Hall, 1981, p.519-
60. R. Levy "On the Short Run Stationaritv of Beta Coefficients",
Financial Analysts Journal, December 1971, pp. 55-62.
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that we now turn.
We approach diversification under three sub-headings. First of all
we examine the importance of diversification within the context of
CAPM. Secondly we provide an empirical estimate of diversification
and thirdly we provide some empirical results.
(i) The Potential Gains from Diversification: Earlier in this
chapter we divided the risk of a security in the following
manner. (See equation 4(v))
Var (R. - Rf) = p2 Var (R^ - Rf) + Var (£.) see 4(v)
At the portfolio, rather than the individual security level
the market risk component can be obtained fairly easily by first
summing;
N
B = Z x. B. k(xx)
/pm ._j i / im
where;
x. = the weight of security i in portfolio p
P= the individual security betas,im '
Equation 4(xx) can be applied to the observed market risk to
give the estimated market risk component of the portfolio.
Unfortunately the non-market risk term can't be so easily
summed as it will contain both the non-market components of the
individual securities and any correlations between them;
N N
i.e. Var (6) = Z Z x.x P. £(fc.) 6(fcx) 4(xxi)p i = ] £ = i 1 J 0
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where;
x.x^ = the respective security weightings
*
p. = the correlation coefficient between securities$ i and ^
&(£.)£(£•$) = the non-market risk components of securities i and
Under CAPM the non-market elements in the returns of individual
securities are unique to those securities. In other words there
are no common elements left in the correlation matrix of returns
after the market component has been removed. Therefore assuming
independence in the non-market risk components equation 4(xxi)
reduces to;
N . „
Var (6 ) : I x. £ (€.)
p i = l 1
Further if we let the portfolio weights be equal then;
N
,
Var (€p) = £ (^)Z£Z(€.)
= 1 Z1 (£i) 4(xxii)
Clearly as the number of securities in the portfolio increases
the non-market risk contribution decreases. However it is
essentially an empirical question as to the number of securities
that must be included in a portfolio before the individual
elements of non-market risk, and therefore in terms of CAPM
unrewarded risk, can be diversified away.
The most widely quoted study in this, area is'.the work by Wagner and Lau.^
of. W. Wagner S S. Lau, "The Effect of Diversification on Risk", Financial
Analysts Journal, November 1971, pp. ^+8-53-
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Working with the monthly returns from 200 NYSE securities between
I960 and 1970 the authors grouped the securities by quality
ratings (A+, A, A-, B+, B-, B/C) and then formed randomly selected
portfolios of between 1 and 20 securities. Monthly portfolio
returns were calculated. This procedure was repeated ten times
and the risk and return results were averaged. We reproduce
/
their graph of portfolio total risk and number of securities below;
GRAPH 4(iv)
Wagner and Lau
Standard Deviation and Number of Securities
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What is apparent from Graph 4(iv) is that not only does the number of
securities s ign i f i cantiy .effect portfolio risk but that substantial
risk reduction can be achieved by a relatively modest number of
additions to the portfolio. Indeed with reference to sub-group A
they note the following.
TABLE 4(viii)
Wagner and Lau
Risk Return and Portfolio Size
No. of Securities Average Monthly Standard Deviation









While portfolio returns remain virtually the same the addition
of extra securities reduces total risk very considerably. The
reduction is approximately 34% by the time 5 securities have been
added and 44% by the time the portfolio size is 20. In the
context of ITCs while we noted in Chapter 1 that the number of
constituent securities in portfolios declined during the nineteen
seventies the average portfolio size in 1 980 was still
216 securities.
(ii) An Empirical Estimate of Diversification: In the context of CAPM
the vaiue-weighted ex ante market portfolio is by definition
perfectly diversified therefore the extent to which the returns
on a security mirror those of the market can be interpreted as
a measure of the degree of diversification obtained through holding
that security.
Recall that our basic risk estimating equation A(xvii) related
ITC returns to market returns. The closeness of this relationship
2
can be assessed by R , the coefficient of determination which
measures the proportion of the total variation in the dependent
variable explained by the regression model. We therefore adopt
this statistic as our measure of diversification.
Given the assumed importance of diversification to the ITC sector
we would expect to find reasonably high R s. In Table Mix) we
report a selection of received evidence in this area.
2
Unfortunately very few authors specifically report the R statistic
However the levels of diversification achieved by mutual funds
and unit trusts are generally considered to be in range noted in
Table Mix), It 's clear that the market component underlyin









1Jensen 115 Mutual Funds 1960-69 .865
Merrill Lynch^ 100 Mutual Funds 1970-7^ .841
2. U.K.:
r- ^64F1 rth 72 Unit Trusts 1966-75 OO OJ OO
Moles & Taylor^ 86 Unit Trusts 1965—75 .800
(iii) Empirical Results: Coefficients of determination were
calculated for the 97 data base ITCs based on the regression
equation described by equation 4(xvii). The results are
reported in Table 4(x).
62. M. Jensen, "Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets and Evaluation of Port¬
folios", Journal of Business, April, 1969-
63. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner S Smith, "Investment Performance Analysis"
in Sharpe, "Investments", Prentice-Hall, 1981, p.520 (adapted)
64. M. Firth, "The Investment Performance of Unit Trusts in the Period 1965-75"
Journal of Money, Banking and Credit, 1977-







(113 month period to 12/80)
Trust R2 Trust R2 Trust R2 Trust R2 Trust R2
Aberdeen Trust .638 Ceda r .702 General Scottish • 594 Murray Caledonian .766 Scottish United ■ k57
Alliance Investment .61A Charter Turst • 553 Glasgow Stockholders .674 Murray Clydesdale .620 Second A11iance .472
A1 1iance Trust .530 CIaverhouse .665 Globe .600 Murray Northern .649 Securities .616
American .659 CLRP • 505 Great Northern .694 Murray Western .593 Sphere • 756
Anglo-American Sec. .710 Continental £ Indus. • 732 Guardian .671 1928 .640 Ster1ing .695
Anglo-Scottish • 705 Continental Union .698 Hambros .616 North Atlantic Sec. .635 Stockho1ders .693
Ashdown .630 Drayton Commercial .656 Phi 1ip Hill • 714 Northern American .609 Throgmorton .546
Atlantic Assets .506 Drayton Consol. • 673 Industrial £ Gen. .668 Outwich .500 T rans-Ocean .629
Atlas Electric £ Gen. .646 Drayton Premier .649 1 nternationa1 KJ1 OO Pent 1 and .804 T ribune .428
Bankers .553 Edinburgh Investment .781 Investors' Capital .612 Raeburn .622 Trust Union .758
Berry .498 Electric £ General .495 Keystone .501 Romney .710 Trustees Corp. • 790
Bishopgate .650 English & 1 nternat. • 596 Lakeview .710 RIT .425 UBS .655
Border £ Southern .702 English £ New York .555 London £ Holyrood .678 St. Andrew .617 US £ General .717
Brit. American £ Gen. .608 Eng1ish & Scottish .654 London £ Lomond .647 Scottish American .676 US Debenture .672
British Assets .732 Estates Duties .549 London £ Montrose .690 Scottish Eastern .613 W1 bottom • 734
British Investment .676 First Scottish Am. .605 London Provincial • 532 Scottish Investment .427 Wi tan . 636
Broadstone .808 Foreign £ Colon. .719 London Trust .680 Scottish Mortgage .577 Yeoman CO
Brunner .671 General Consol. .637 Mercanti1e .638 Scottish National .740
Capital £ National .695 General Funds .666 Merchants .614 Scottish Northern .769
Cardina1 .650 General Investors .635 Monks • 732 Scottish Ontario .700
268
With approximately 64% of return variations being accounted for by
market wide movements there is still a considerable proportion unaccounted
for. We noted a similar finding in Chapter 3 where we loosely
ascribed much of the balance to an industry effect. Indeed after
2
including the industry effect an R of .77 was recorded. Just what
constitutes an industry effect is difficult to establish. Undoubtedly
foreign investments, domestic assets not reflected in the FTA-AS index
and portfolio weightings that are different from market value weights
will be among the main contenders under this general "industry effect"
heading. The question of foreign investment is one we dealt with in
Chapter 2. However it does have particular relevance to the concept of
diversification. Indeed to the extent that returns on different
domestic markets are not perfectly correlated then an internationally
diversified portfolio has the potential of diversifying away
domestic market risk. The extent to which this may be possible is in
fact surprisingly large. Lessard has shown that only 17% of the variance
66
on his U.K. security index can be accounted for by a world index.
ITCs very often make a significant play on the fact that they can
capitalise on these potential gains. However in spite of an average
some 30% of the sector's assets being non-U.K. we noted earlier that the
average total risk of the sector was greater than that for the U.K.
market. When this is considered in relation to an average sector beta
of slightly less than unity it is not clear that ITCs were benefitting
from the risk reducinq effects of international diversification.
Followinq Lessard it may well be that a far larqer international component
is required to exploit the risk reducinq potential of international
diversification. Alternatively it may have been that the beneficial
effects were being lost through security selection and portfolio weighting
strategies.
66. D. Lessard, "World, Country and Industry Relationships in Equity Returns:
Implications for Risk Reduction Through Diversification". Financial
Analysts Journal, 32, 1976.
A further insight into the levels of diversification achieved by ITCs
2
during the 1970s can be noted from a comparison of the R s recorded
in the first and second halves of the decade. The average in the
first half is reported as .721 while that of the last five years was
.531. In addition the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient
between the two periods was .126. These results reflect both a
substantial reduction in levels of diversification and a considerable
change in the levels of diversification achieved by individual ITCs.
Interestingly by relating these results to points noted in Chapter 1
we can hypothesise underlying explanations.
The 1970s was a period of intense pressure for the sector culminating
as it did in various take-overs during the mid years of the decade.
The pressure resulted from the combination of high interest rates
which precluded ITCs from their post-war strategies of market timing
through levering large "market" type portfolios in anticipation of
bull markets and the severity of the bear markets which reduced the
attractiveness of equity participat ion in portfolios primarily consisti
of equities.
The alternative strategy increasingly adopted in the latter part of the
decade involved specialisation and security selection and can be
interpreted as the results of strong feelings on the part of many ITC
managers to be "seen to be managing". The removal of exchange control
in late 1979 allowed an international perspective to be added to this
strategy. Such changes together with varying rates of adoption by
different ITCs would clearly lead to falling levels of diversification
and ranking changes.
270
Summary: In this chapter we have rather uncritiquely adopted CAPM
as the basis for our analysis of the risks involved in owning ITC
equities. However the CAPM approach is not without criticism and
indeed we discuss these criticisms and their effects in Chapter 5.
To the extent that these criticisms are valid our results are somewhat
weakened.
With these points in mind we reported estimates of total market and
residual risk measures based on a methodology specifically devised to
account for the problems of non-trading discussed in Chapter 3. In
particular we noted an average level of total risk greater than that
on the market as a whole, a level of market risk characterised by an
average beta of slightly less than unity and a level of diversification
perhaps slightly less than we might have expected given the received
results on U.S. Mutual Funds and U.K. Unit Trusts.
Finally we examined the consistency with which ITCs maintained risk
levels in terms of reflecting management objectives and inter-period
stability. We reported a weak but significant negative relationship
between yield and equity risk levels. However while the average market
risk coefficients were similar in both periods the coefficients at the
individual ITC level were notably non-stationary perhaps indicating
the importance of market timing to ITC managers. Levels of diversification
were neither on average nor individually stationary between the first
and second halves of the decade. We suggested that this could be
explained in terms of the changes in investment philosophy fhat_were filtering
through the sector during the second half of the decade.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PERFORMANCE OF INVESTMENT TRUST COMPANIES
1971 - 1980
Introduction
Section 1 Measures of Investment Performance
Section 2 Empirical Results
Section 3 Market Timing
Section b Investment Performance - A critique




INTRQDUCT1 ON : Our objective in this chapter is to review the
performance of ITCs during the 1971~1980 period. We do this within
/the CAPM framework established in Chapter 4. However we do recognise
that this approach has over the past three or four years come under
increasing scrutiny. Unfortunately there is as yet no real alternative
theoretical model of equilibrium pricing that is as useful as CAPM.
The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) which we noted briefly in Chapter 3
and which many authors consider an alternative and less restrictive
model is because of its very generality only of limited usefulness.
It would however be incomplete not to describe this alternative model
in more detail and indeed in our Section 4 critique of performance
measures we cover this topic. in Section 5 we present an application
of APT to performance measurement when we report empirical work on the
relationship between size and performance.
Investment performance is concerned with identifying levels of
performance either in relation to a peer group or in relation to some
exogenous and objective standard of assessment. It is clearly
insufficient to state that a particular ITC achieved a certain level
of return without at the same time relating this achieved performance
to some measurement criteria. To be useful such criteria must be
equally applicable to all ITCs. In addition they must be receptive
to the intermediation services actually being provided.
We noted in Chapter 1 that ITC managements could adopt several investment
strategies in attempting to provide services based on the production ofsuperior
price sensitive information and the exploitation of the possibility that
different market participants were faced with different transaction
cost functions. In regard to this latter service the strategy of
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providing diversified portfolios is perhaps the most applicable.
We covered diversification in Chapter 4 and noted that although ITC
equity ownership gave access to return flows closely related to those
of the market the relationship was by no means complete.
Two other strategies were noted in Chapter 1. These involved
security selection and market timing and both are perhaps best
considered as strategies based on attempts to produce superior price sensitive
information although clearly the production process must be cost com¬
petitive. In Chapter h the reported lack of stationarity in risk
levels suggested that ITCs were actively attempting to time the market
while the rising levels of specific risk suggested increasing attempts
at security selection. There is of course nothing inconsistent in ITCs
attempting to follow a hybrid strategy of both timing and selection.
Indeed from discussions with managers it is apparent that such a
hybrid approach is common place. In practice this involves a
continuous search for new investment opportunities combined with
timing decisions based not strictly on leverage given the cost of
borrowing but on the degree to which portfolios should be fully funded
or otherwise in equities.
Where possible then we wish to develop and use performance measures
that will; allow the comparison of performance against an objective
benchmark, facilitate relative rankings to be made between different
ITCs and be receptive to the intermediation services being provided.
We note at the outset that such a task is difficult and indeed the
results are not above controversy.
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1. Measures of Investment Performance : Given the risk return
framework we developed in Chapter 4 it is clear that risk averse
investors will require premiums over and above the return on the risk
free asset as compensation for holding risky assets. Translated into
terms of performance assessment then both the return premiums achieved
for particular levels of risk or the return premiums earned per unit
of risk provide assessment statistics. The latter measure is clearly
more restrictive in terms of inter-firm comparisons as it fails to
take account of different levels of risk exposure.
Three measures of performance two concerned with reward
_ratios and one with the absolute measure of performance
used and we deal with each in turn.
(a) Treynor Index of Volatility^
2 3(b) Sharpe Index of Variability '
4
(c) Jensen Performance Statistic ('J)
(a) Treynor Index of Volatility :
T - (R - R-) / P
pt f -rpm
where;
1. J. Treynor, "How to Rate Managements of Investment Funds", Harvard
Business Review, 43, 1965, pp. 63_75-
2. W. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
Under Conditions of Risk", Journal of Finance, 19, 1964, pp.425-444.
3. W. Sharpe, "Mutual Fund Performance", Journal of Finance, 39, 1966,
pp. 119-138.
4. M. Jensen, "Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets and the Evaluation








R = Average return on portfolio p
R^. = Return on the risk free asset
B_ = Market risk coefficient for portfolio p.Pm
By weighting the ex post returns with the market risk coefficient
the Treynor index is strictly only relevant to the world of well
diversified portfolios. However as we noted in Chapter 1 a considerable
proportion of the ITC equity ownership group is made up of institutional
investors who may well consider the marginal risk attached to an
ITC stake more important than the total risk. To these investors
weighting excess returns by the market risk will be relevant. However
the usefulness of this measure to those investors who don't hold
well diversified portfolios is reduced by the extent of any elements
of diversifiab1e risk underlying achieved returns. A further weakness
in the measure is that there is an implicit assumption that over an
assessment period a unique level of risk is relevant to each ITC.
Thus to the extent that manaqers attempt to alter levels of market risk
exposure it may be.difficult to identify a unique weighting factor.
(b) Sharpe Index of Variability; This is defined as;




Total risk (standard deviation) of portfolio p.
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The Sharpe index replaces the market risk coefficient of the Treynor
Index with the total risk of the security or portfolio. Such a
measure would be relevant to those ITC equity holders who do not
already hold diversified portfolios. For example the individual
investor whose holdings of risky assets are confined to a very small
number of investments. However like the Treynor index it also suffers
from the risk stationarity assumption.
Whether or not we consider performance in relation to diversified or
non-diversified portfolios is unfortunately a non-trivial matter.
Indeed it is clear that only under certain strict conditions will the
two measures give the same rankings. These conditions can be shown
as fol1ows;
Defining;
B = Cov (R R )/£2 (R )fpm pt, mt ^ mt
Multiply through by <^(Rm1_)/
Ppm - 1
•• fkm * e VV-^'V'^V 5(ii!)
In other words if we define both performance measures in the units
applicable to the Treynor index, effected by multiplying the Sharpe
index by<£(R ), then from 5(iii) we can see that the ranking measures
will only give the same results when the funds in question share the
5. K. Smith, D. Tito, "Risk-Return Measures of Ex Post Portfolio
Performance", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
1969, pp. 449-^70.
6. R. Bower, R. Wippern, "Risk-Return Measurement in Portfolio
Selection and Performance Appraisal Models", Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 1969, pp. 417~447-
same correlation coefficient between their respective returns and
those of the market. From equation 5(iii) we also note that a
correlation coefficient of unity implies an efficient portfolio
a result of which is that total and market risk are equated.
Correlation coefficients of less than unity imply as we would expect
that market risk is less than total risk. Given this restricted
equality between the two measures it is clearly important that their
usage is related to the importance investor groups assign to either
total or market risk.
Finally we should note that both ratios do allow benchmark comparisons
in the sense that the Treynor index can be compared to the excess
market return and the Sharpe index compared to the excess market
return weighted by the standard deviation of the market.
(c) Jensen Performance Statistic ; As we noted in Chapter k a1 key
result of CAPM is the linear relationship that exists in equilibrium
between risk and return. This relationship is usually summarised
in terms of the security market line the slope of which describes
the return available for taking on different levels of the only priced
element of risk namely market risk. While we would expect in
ex ante equilibrium all securities to plot along this line clearly when
ex post results are reviewed some securities will plot on the line,
some above and some below it. In view of this it would seem reasonabl
to suggest that the various combinations of risk and return represented
by the security market line can be thought of as objective criteria
against which overall investment performance can be assessed. The
principle difficulty with this approach is of course the point that
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ex ante relationships can't be directly observed and indeed must be
estimated from ex post data. However it will be recalled from
Chapter k that the statistically based market model can be utilised
to provide ex post estimates of risk return relationships. Working




V = Performance statistic
R. = Achieved return on the it*"1 security
E (R. 1 R ,8 . ) = Rr + B . [ R -R ]
i * m / i m f / i m m f
We show this result graphically in Graph 5(i).
GRAPH 5 (i)
Ex Post Performance Assessment : Jensen ^
Returns
(ex post)




/in, / = ' Risk (p)
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a
From Graph 5(i) it can be seen that the distance;Nrepresents the
reported level of return less the level of return that could have
been expected given a market level of risk equivalent to
Interestingly an alternative interpretation of the security market
line allows it to be considered not just as a standard but as a series
of alternative investment strategies,
i.e. E(R.) = Rf + B. [R - Rf]i t / i m m f
= R. + B. R - B. R
f T i m m Tim f
=B.R + R. (1 - B. )
/ im m f / im
In other words the expected return on security i is made up of an
investment in a portfolio consisting of the risk free asset and the
market portfolio. The portfolio weightings attached to these assets
are anc'^im respectively. More generally we can note that
for each achieved return there is a corresponding benchmark return based
on the relevant combination of risk free asset and market portfolio.
In the context of assessing ITC performance these alternative or
benchmark portfolios have considerable appeal as they represent the
results of a series of investment strategies that could have been
achieved without active intermediation on the part of managers.
There are several important points that should be noted with regard
to the use of the Jensen performance statistic. First of all it
can be relatively easily computed. Recall our theoretical estimating
equation k(xi) .
(R.. - R,) = <5. + B. (R - R,) + Z.
it f i r i m mt f it
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In equilibrium the expected value of the intercept term O^. is zero
but to the extent that it is in practice non-zero then we can interpret
its value as the unexpected return (positive or negative) on the i^lTC.
Unexpected in the sense that the security's actual return is different
from that which we would have expected given theJB.^ risk level. As
a useful by-product standard errors and "t" statistics can be fairly
easily produced from this regression procedure.
The second point to note with regard to the Jensen statistic is
that while it gives a useful measure of unexpected return for
individual ITCs it can lead to ambiguous results when used to compare
different ITCs. This problem is known as the leverage bias of alpha
and its effect is demonstrated in Graph 5(ii).
GRAPH 5(ii)
Alpha Leverage Bias'7
7. From now on we follow the usual practice of referring to the Jensen
statistic as the Jensen alpha (oi ) .
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Portfolio A and B report equal levels of alpha but they have been
obtained at different levels of risk. Just as the security market
line can be thought of as representing alternative investment
strategies so too can the higher radical RpAQ. indeed when
is levered up to the same risk level as c/g it is easily seen that it
significantly dominates o'g by an amount equivalent in our example to
the distance QB. The most obvious way round this problem is to
weight estimated alphas by their related levels of market risk. In
our examplec*^ would be weighted by J3^ andoi'g by ^g^* The resulting
ratio, very much in the spirit of Treynor's volatility ratio allows
unambiguous performance rankings.
Thirdly as with the Treynor and Sharpe indices the relevant risk
parameter in the Jensen approach namely beta is assumed to be
stationary. Indeed unless it is assumed to be stationary then we
really have no way of knowing the appropriate benchmark portfolio
against which to assess performance. Jensen recognised this problem
and suggested that short run timing operations were consistent with
g
a policy of maintaining a long run or target risk level. If a
manager was successful at timing in the short run then eventually this
would be reflected in a positive alpha when related to the long run
risk level. Whether or not target or long-run models of risk exposure
have any financial relevance is of course an interesting point and
one on which there is unfortunately little evidence.
Finally, as the only element of risk that is priced under the conditions
of CAPM equilibrium is market risk the Jensen statistic takes no account
of varying levels of diversification between different funds. It
8. M. Jensen, "The Performance of Mutual Funds 19^5-64", Journal of
Finance, 23, 1968, pp. 389-417-
solely measures the return to security selection for a given level of
market risk and is therefore only relevant to those investors holding
well diversified portfolios. To those investors not holding well
diversified portfolios management policies of security selection
will clearly have a cost in terms of lost diversification. We can
obtain some idea of the effects of less than perfect diversification
from Graph 5(iii) below.
GRAPH 5(i i i)
Security Selection and Diversification






/am /- 1 f-cv^
Measuring both total and market risk in proportionate terms along
the x axis we recall from equation 5(i) that the two measures will
only equate when we are dealing with an efficient portfolio. For
other portfolios ^(R^)/ ^(Rm) will always plot to the right of the
market risk coefficient.
We can interpret the reported performance of portfolio A a poorly
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diversified portfolio in the following way. In relation to its
market risk the portfolio has clearly outperformed the alternative
benchmark portfolio. The achieved alpha is equivalent to the
/
distance AA. Unfortunately in terms of total risk which takes
account both of security selection and diversification the fund
underperformed the alternative efficient benchmark portfolio by an
#
amount equivalent to aa. Thus even although there is considerable
evidence of ability to select outperforming securities it is not
sufficient to cover the extra risk taken on through lost diversification.




R. = R, + B. [R - R ]
i f i i m m f
and
B. - P. C( R./^(R ))
r i m t im i m
then the additional risk taken on through less than perfect diversification
will equa1;
irr/Cim " P im]
Therefore following Jensen it can be shown that incorporating this
additional element of risk leads to the following measure of efficiency.
Y* " Ri " [Rf +/im [VRf" + /im [E(RJ " Rfl[l/eim " 111 5(y)
where
Y* = measure of efficiency.
9. M. Jensen, "Risk the Pricing of Capital Assets and the Evaluation
of Investment Portfolio", Journal of Business, 42, 1969, pp. 116-247.
284
Note that in this context when we are dealing with efficient
portfolios the last term equals zero (i.e. when = 1) the equation
reduces to its traditional ex post CAPM form. However when £< 1
then the last term represents the return premium required to
compensate for lost diversification.
We note that Jensen's result cannot be entirely formulated in ex post
terms. In fact the crucial efficeincy element in equation 5(v)
requires knowledge of the ex ante market line. Interestingly the
effect of ignoring the implication of this ex ante term can lead to
an inconsistent performance conclusion. Following Fama we show
in Graph 5(iv) a possible ex post security market line covering an
observation period when the market return was less than that
available on the risk free asset.^
GRAPH 5(iv)
R
Security Selection and Diversification











10. Bank Administration Institute, "Measuring the Investment Performance of
Pension Funds", Illinois 1968, (Authors, E. Fama, et al).
285
In this situation portfolio A underperformed the market (AA7 ) in
terms of market risk but outperformed the market in terms of total
risk (aa'). However to say that portfolio A outperformed the
market at all is clearly dangerous when there exists a benchmark
portfolio (A ) with the same beta, a lower level of total risk and
a higher return.
Clearly care must be taken in relating the cost of lost diversification
to the gains of successful security selection when the ex post
security market line is downward sloping. Indeed given the likelihood
of a negatively sloping security market line during at least part
of the 1970s we do not attempt to split performance in this manner.
However we do re-emphasise that such a split is only relevant to
those investors who are not able to diversify away the additional
unique risk presented to them by ITC managers who follow policies of
security selection.
2. Empirical Results : We report various performance results for
the 97 ITCs in our data base between 1971 - 1980 based on the Jensen
statistic, the Jensen statistic weighted by beta, the Sharpe index
of variability and the Treynor index of volatility. We therefore
cover both those investors who consider total risk relevant and those
who consider market risk relevant. However while we note the values
attached to all these statistics we consider that in terms of these
alternative investment risk requirements the two most relevant are
the Jensen weighted statistic and the Sharpe index.
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We also report on both the consistency of performance measures
in ranking ITCs and in their predictability between the first and
second halves of the decade. Finally following our results in
Chapter 4 where we suggested an increasing tendency for policies
related to security selection we examine the weighted Jensen
statistics derived from the two halves of the decade.
Before presenting our results we describe the estimating procedures
adopted.
(i) Jensen Statistic: We argued in Chapter 3 that a relevant variable
in computing returns and risk parameters was the elapsed time
between successive trades. Very much in the spirit of this we
retain our risk estimating equation as the source of our estimate
of the Jensen performance statistic.
i.e. Kft/Vr-£,fF^jrt/jT+fclt/,fr 5(vl)
where;
_ > T ar"e as defined for equation 4(xvii).it' mt M
Given that our model is in terms of estimated daily returns the
A
correct interpretation of the coefficient 0<. attached to the
regression variable >|Tis that it represents the average unexpected
daily continuously compounded return on security i. However in
order to present the results in a more useful form we transform
them into ten year simple return equivalents expressed in percentage
format.
A
i.e. Jensen Statistic = [[Antilog[[o<.] 365.10]] -1] 100
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The weighted Jensen statistic (ci./p.^) was similarly transformed.
it should be noted that our model does not allow the computation of
a unique security market line. This rather interesting point arises because
of the weightings attached to the market returns. Recall that these
weightings are unique in the sense that they take account of the number
of elapsed days in each return period. The length of each return period
being in turn determined by the dates of the recorded marks for each
individual ITC. The result of this weighting is that the estimated
excess market return for each ITC will be a function of both the return
on the market and the number of elapsed days covered by the return period.
We illustrate this by a simple example shown in Exhibit 5(i).
EXHIBIT 5(i)
The Non-Uniqueness of Weighted Market Returns












Market Return (R) 15% 25% 10% - 50% -
Days (T) V-O O O O 90 - 9.12%
Company 2
Market Return (R) 15% 18% 17% - 50% -
Days (T) 20 15 55 90 - 10.33%
Clearly then it would within the context of CAPM be inconsistent given the
importance we have attached to trading periods in the computation of returns
to utilise some unique or average market return as a performance benchmark.
To do so would result in different performance measures and perhaps more
importantly in different performance rankings.
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This result however does not cause a major problem as individual ITC
performance can be assessed against their own ind iv idual security market
1 i nes."
(ii) Sharpe Index of Variability : The Sharpe index estimator was
def ined as fol1ows :
deviation estimated over the full period. Note that the standard
deviation is calculated on the weighted returns in order that
as a risk estimate it excludes variability due to differing
trade to trade periods. For presentation purposes the index
is transformed into simple return equivalents,
i.e. Sharpe index = [[Antilog [S]] -1] 100
(iii) Treynor Index of Volatility : The Treynor index estimator used
was estimated as follows
For presentation purposes;
Treynor index = [[Antilog [T]] -1] 100
Again the definitions are as before.
Where the various performance measures are presented for sub
periods the estimators used were calculated in a similar manner
using the data of the particular sub period.
5(v i i)
5(vi i i)
We report estimates of the Jensen statistic, the Jensen weighted
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statistic, the Sharpe variability index and the Treynor volatility
index for the 118 month period to 12/80 in summary form in Table
5(i) and in more detail in Tables 5(ii) and 5(iii). In presenting
these results we also show in Table 5(i) the number of positive
performance statistics and comparisons with the appropriate bench¬
marks. We discussed the Jenson benchmarks above. Those




Cumulative (118 month) ordinary
returns on the market
118
y R „ 1 .2818 260.3^2*- mt
Less; Cumulative (118 month) return
cn the risk free asset
118
Rf <1 .053 8> 186.853
Excess market return 0.2280 = 25.608
(Note that the average annual return on the risk free asset
defined in Chapter 4 as a 3 month Treasury Bill was in simple
return form 11.113% p.a.)
The appropriate Treynor benchmark given a market portfolio beta
of 1 is clearly the excess market return. The Sharpe measure
requires the excess market return to be weighted by the total




deviation of the weighted trade
to trade market returns taken
over the full period. For
convenience this was taken as
10 years.
(Note that the justification for using an average standard
deviation was discussed in Chapter 4, page 247 and that the need
to base this standard deviation on weighted returns was discussed
above when we dealt with the estimating procedure for the Sharpe
index).-
The appropriate benchmark for the Sharpe index is in log form








1nvestment Performance Statistics - Summary
118 months to 12/80 (%)





Jensen -20.52 -55.20 56.09 24.61 12 12
Jenson Weighted -21.69 -50.69 66.73 25-86 12 12
Sharpe -3.18 -44.33 62.36 20.67 39 6





(118 mths to 12/80)
Trust S T T rust o<. d/p S T
Aberdeen 2.31 2.55 23-95 26.02 Continental Union -19.69 -20.67 2.12 2.24
A1 1 i ance -24.82 -25.08 -8.99 -9-89 Drayton Commercial -30.14 -33.78 -11.14 -12.07
A11iance Trust -40.01 -44.72 -24.84 -27.81 Drayton Consolidated -24.55 -27.39 -15-08 -15.95
American -41 .52 -40.27 -28.92 -30.64 Drayton Premier -29.76 -33.06 -7.05 -7.43
Ang1o-American -39.34 -40.18 -26.96 -27.50 Edinburgh Investment 14.62 15.09 42.20 41 .63
Ang1o-Scottish -40.01 -38.59 -22.56 -22.71 Election £ General -55.20 -49-16 -28.39 -32.84
Ashdown -23.97 -28.94 -16.29 -17.98 English £ International -11.89 -12.60 -0.09 -0.18
Atlantic Assets 0.77 0.56 10.91 13-45 Eng1ish £ New York -21.29 -23.56 -10.48 -12.30
Atlas Elec & Gen. -7-74 -7.61 10.61 11 .64 Eng1ish £ Scottish -3.96 -4.21 16.54 16.60
Bankers -6.76 -7.24 20.27 23.43 Estates Duties -12.14 -16.54 6.54 7-83
Berry -7-41 -7.76 6.95 8.65 1st Scottish American -31-33 -33-77 -17-64 -20.13
Bishopgate -21.99 -24.93 -7.49 -7.97 Foreign £ Colonial -3.33 -3.31 -13.69 -13.94
Border £ Southern -34.99 -36.94 -24.12 -24.70 General Consol. -4.62 -4.99 19.68 21 .35
British Am £ Gen. -28.93 -29.38 -10.02 -11.14 General Funds 1 1 .52 1 1 .98 38.16 39.65
British Assets -49.04 -40.36 -28.71 -29.08 General Investors -7.90 -8.94 11 .03 12.43
British Investment -48.15 -50.69 -42.68 -44.14 General Scottish -11.14 -13.25 6.80 7.74
Broadstone -31.33 -30.43 -7.23 -6.80 Glasgos Stockholders -13.13 -13.86 6.53 6.90
Brunner 7.60 8.05 21 .62 22.89 G1 obe -11.44 -12.43 9-73 11.18
Capital £ National -13-39 -14.55 2.33 2.54 Great Northern -23.63 -23.61 -2.59 -1.15
Cardinal -4.20 -4.52 14.28 15-39 Guard ian -25.37 -24.77 -3.13 -3-34
Cedar -17-61 -17.89 -3.58 -3.69 Hambros -21.51 -24.04 -7.45 -8.57
Charter Trust -21.91 -24.72 -14.57 -16.39 Philip Hill -13.39 -13-04 18.90 19.92
Claverhouse 14.57 15-31 32.65 33.09 Invest. £ General -8.11 -8.27 17.80 19.45
CLRP -15-48 -19.19 10.47 12.79 1nternationa1 -26.80 -24.69 0.28 0.27










2. All values are shown for
presentation purposes only





oi S T Trust o< c*/p S T
Keystone 4.27 4.80 28.76 35.55 Scottish Investment -40.01 -42.82 -26.15 -34.16
Lakeview -31.33 -31.23 -18.18 -19.03 Scottish Mortgage -36.16 -40.95 -28.49 -32.43
London & Holyrood -13.45 -14.72 7-33 7.43 Scottish National -10.13 -9.84 7.79 7.74
London & Lomond -34.51 -34.61 -20.63 -21.94 Scottish Northern -32.32 -28.07 -17.06 -16.94
London & Montrose -17-31 -20.27 3.48 3.76 Scottish Ontario -26.05 -26.97 -5.45 -5-76
London Provincial -12.66 -14.71 7.91 9.45 Scottish United -4.02 -5.89 -2.91 -3.74
London Trust 5.73 6.09 30.96 34.57 Second A11iance -7.71 -7.83 -44.33 -52.66
Mercanti1e -41 .31 -41 .12 -20.92 -22.92 Securities -18.83 -20.84 -6.20 -6.81
Merchants -0.08 -0.08 15-74 17.32 Sphere -20.67 -19.93 -5.58 -5.57
Monks -26.88 -25-93 -13.75 -13.97 Ster1ing -3.75 -4.21 -20.04 -19.76
Murray Caledonian -45.44 -42.41 -32.05 -31.91 Stockholders -35.93 -34.23 -21.90 -22.43
Murray Clydesdale -44.83 -48.48 -30.98 -34.24 Throgmorton 47.77 61 .65 62.36 79.14
Murray Northern -47.58 -46.07 -33.07 -35.14 T rans-Ocean -24.91 -28.84 -15.82 -16.61
Murray Western -43.20 -42.96 -33.04 -35.98 T r ibune -13.07 -17.70 -3.65 -4.61
1928 -12.85 -15-91 -5-70 6.36 Trust Union -11.67 -12.15 2.81 2.75
North Atlantic Sees. -34.75 -39-74 -29-52 -31 .34 Trustees Corp. -1 .77 -1 .72 18.25 17.52
Northern American -30.82 -30.13 -11.65 -13.15 UBS O.63 0.73 18.77 20.36
Outwich 56.09 66.73 59.19 75.72 US 6 General -22.99 -21.90 6.03 5.64
Pent 1 and -24.05 -22.92 -1 .83 -1.78 US Debenture -23.07 -26.16 -+3-89 -*4.94
Raeburn -35.22 -36.41 -18.38 -20.25 W1 bottom -27.36 -30.72 -9.41 -9.71
Romney -36.16 -35-54 -19.95 -19.91 Wi tan -37-78 -38.87 122.51 -24.74
RIT 3.59 5.28 21 .87 30.76 Yeoman -3.65 -3.61 23.47 23.31
St. Andrew -21.43 -26.42 -12.48 -13.72
Scottish American -20.74 -18.77 0.44 0.44
Scottish Eastern -36.40 -39.35 -21 .35 -23.71
Notes :
1 . = Jensen a 1pha
/B = Jensen alpha weighted
S - Sharpe variabi1ity
T = Treynor volatility
2.All values are shown for
presentation purposes only
in terms of simple return
equiva1ents.
TABLE 5( i ' i)
Investment Trust Companies
Performance Statistics - Ranking Consistency
Performance Statistics Spearman Rho
Jensen with Jensen Weighted
Jensen with Sharpe






We note the following points with regard to Tables 5(i), 5 (i i) and
5 (i i i) .
1. None of the average performance statistics is positive.
2. Very few ITCs succeeded in achieving returns greater than
the appropriate market return.
3. Less than half the ITCs achieved positive risk premiums.
A. The ranking consistency between the various measures is both
high and in the direction we would expect.
5. The importance of adopting the appropriate performance measure
is highlighted by the lower ranking relationships between
the market and total risk determined measures.
*
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These results indicate that the performance levels achieved by
ITCs during the 1970s were not particularly impressive. Indeed even
attempts to obtain positive risk premiums over the decade were not
guaranteed to be successful with only thirty nine ITCs achieving
positive risk premiums. From the ITCs that "beat" the market it
is interesting to note that slightly fewer achieved it in terms of
total risk than market risk. To the poorly diversified investor
this result provides little comfort.
In comparing these results to those reported by other authors working
with U.K. ITCs we note that Guy found eleven out of forty seven ITCs had
negative Jensen, Sharpe and Treynor statistics for the 1960-1970
period with the highest" Jensen for each of the two halves of the
decade being 0.921% per month (Broadstone) and 0.583% per month (Continental
and Industrial).'' The lowest Jensen statistics for each of the two
halves of the decade reported by Guy were -.232% per month (Philip
Hill) and -.222% per month (Jersey General). For the sector as a
whole our results suggest rather poorer performance in the 1970s as
compared to the earlier period. Working with 92 ITCs between 197^ and
1979 Corner reports an average Jensen statistic of -.002% per month
which when converted to a ten year simple return is approximately -21%
1 2
a figure slightly greater than our own.
In interpretating the Jensen performance statistics we noted earlier
that a useful by-product of the regression procedure is the production
of standard errors and "t" statistics. We report these in average
form in Table 5(iv).
11. J. Guy, "The Performance of the British Investment Trust Industry",
Journal of Finance, 33, May 1978, pp. kk3~k55-
12. D. Corner, J. Matatko, "Investment Trust Portfolio Performance -




Jensen Statistic (<*) : Standard Errors
"t" statistics
(97 ITCs 1/71 - 12/80) (%)
Statistic Mean Mini mum Maximum Standard Dev.
SE 85-98 57.81 177.87 12.38
t 0.39 -1.15 0.29 0.34
Notes : 1. The standard error of the Jensen statistic (ot)
is in the same simple return form as the Jensen
statistics reported earlier.
The "t" statistics reported in Table 5(iv) indicate that none of the
Jensen statistics are statistically significant at the 95% level.
This substantially weakens the statistical validity of our reported
results. However this very much begs the question of just what level
of performance would be required to yield statistically significant
results. Following Murphy we note that to be significantly different
from zero at the 95% level the reported Jensen statistic would have to
be at least two standard deviations from zero. From Table 5(iv)
this would imply an achieved alpha in simple return form of 245.89%
over the ten year period equivalent to 13.21% per annum. We note
that no ITC came anywhere near this level of alpha achievement and
indeed to set managers a target return of 1-3.21% per annum over and
above that required for the risk taken on would seem inappropriate. We
237
are tempted to Murphy's conclusion that, "the statistical techniques
in common use are so weak they simply cannot detect good or bad
13
performance in any realistic amounts."
We noted in Chapter 4 some evidence that ITCs were adopting policies that
favoured security selection. In spite of the statistical points noted
above the Jensen statistic does provide at least a tentative performance
measure with which to assess security selection strategies given that
it assumes the ITC in question will be considered by investors not as
a security on its own but as one holding in a fully diversified portfolio.
To investigate whether or not the second half of the decade provides any
evidence on the success or otherwise of security selection based
strategies Jensen weighted statistics were calculated for both halves of
the decade. The results are reported in Table 5(v).
TABLE 5(v)
Investment Trust Companies







Mean -20.13 1 \J1 CO
Minimum -59.95 -41.45
Maximum 53.55 171.41
Standard Deviation 22.99 28.40
No. of Positive Statistics 9 39
No. of ITCs with Positive
Statistics in Two Periods
13- J- Murphy, "Why No-One Can Tell Who's Winning", Financial Analysts
Journal, June 1980, pp. 49-57•
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The differences between the first and second halves of the decade
are substantial not only in terms of the average weighted alphas but also in
relation to both the number of ITCs reporting positive alphas during
the 1976-1980 period and the small number of ITCs with positive
alphas in both periods. It would appear that the change in strategy
away from the provision of diversified portfolios towards security
selection operations was indeed reasonably successful. In one case
Atlantic Assets the reported alpha was particularly large at 171.41%
although again the result was not statistically significant.
In reviewing ex post performance an aspect that is clearly of interest
to investors is the consistency of performance reported by different
ITCs. We noted above that only three ITCs had positive Jensen
statistics in both halves of the decade. However given the reasonable
efficiency of the stock exchange we would not expect to find much
evidence of consistently superior or inferior performance. We
present evidence of ranking consistency in Table 5(vi).
TABLE 5(vi)
Investment Trust Companies
Performance Statistics - Inter-Period Consistency
Period 1 : 2/71 - 12/75
to
Period 2 : 1/76 - 12/80






The Spearman rank correlation coefficients reported above are
interesting both because of their negative signs and their relatively
large sizes compared to those reported by Guy for the earlier
1960-1970 period. We note that Guy reported rank correlation
coefficients of .035, .119 and .022 for the Jensen, Treynor and
Sharpe statistics respectively. Our negative signs suggests that
consistently superior or inferior performance was not achieved while
the absolute size of the coefficients suggest only weak relationships
between successive periods. The size difference between the results
reported by Guy and our own are more difficult to rationalise although
neither suggest an inter-period relationship strong enough to undermine
received evidence on the efficiency of the stock market. Without
suggesting a detailed explanation a possible source of the difference
may lie in the rather more extreme economic conditions characterised
by our two periods. For example it could well be that the
experiences of the bear market of the first few years of the 1970s
acted as a catalyst for the adoption of different investment strategies
which proved rather more successful during later years. If this
scenario is valid and we have noted above some evidence of both a
change in investment strategies and the relative success of this change
then this may account for at least some of the reported differences
between our results and those of Guy. However we do not go as far
as to suggest that the weakness of the absolute size of the Spearman
coefficients is conclusive evidence of the sector's unresponsiveness
to pressure for change!
We now move on to consider a further aspect of performance assessment
namely market timing.
14. J. Guy, "The Performance of the British Investment Trust Industry",
Journal of Finance, 33, May 1978.
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3. Market Tinning : We have mentioned the importance of market timing
at several stages. In particular when we considered alternative
investment strategies and also when we reviewed the inter-period
stability of risk coefficients. In addition we have noted the
importance attached to the strategy by many investment managers
particularly during the twenty to twenty five years following the end of
Wo r1d Wa r II.
By market timing we imply that investment managers attempt either through
gearing or security weighting to anticipate future market movements.
Thus managers will attempt to hold high beta portfolios in anticipation
of bull markets and low beta portfolios in anticipation of bear markets.
Recognition of the point that managers may actively attempt to alter
the levels of risk exposure they adopt clearly raises questions as to
the adequacy of estimating risk levels under the assumption that they
are stationary. Unfortunately as soon as this assumption is dropped
then particularly awkward problems arise as to how this new variable
risk exposure should be estimated. Some authors have attempted to
estimate betas based on models that assume observed betas vary around
some fixed long term meanJ^''^ Others have used econometric
techniques such switching and partitioned regression procedures which
in general attempt to distinguish between periodsof differing beta
levels.Overall the results are difficult to generalise.
15. J. Francis, and F. Fabozzi, "Stability of Mutual Fund Systematic Risk
Statistics", Journal of Business Research, Vol. 8, June 1980,
pp. 263-275.
16. G. Alexander, P. Benson, C. Eger, "Timing Decisions and the Behaviour
of Mutual Fund Systematic Risk", Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis. November 1982, pp. 579-602.
17. S. Kon, F. Jen, "Estimation of Time-Varying Systematic Risk and
Performance for Mutual Fund Portfolios : An application of Switching
Regression". Journal of Finance, 33, 1978, pp. 457-^75.
18. /
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Miller and Gressis for example found strong evidence suggesting the
non-stationarity of beta and therefore support for market timing
activities while the results of others are less conclusive. A
particularly interesting approach was adopted by both Francis and
20 21
Fabozzi and Alexander and Storer. ' Both these authors used a
dummy variable applied in the former work to the market model and in the
latter to CAPM in order to distinguish between bear and bull markets.
They then attempted to distinguish differences in beta levels between
the two types of market condition. Both papers worked with U.S.
mutual fund data Francis and Fabozzi selecting a sample of 85 funds
between 1965 and 1971 while Alexander and Stover used 49 funds between
1966 and 1971- We note their conclusions below :
i. Francis and Fabozzi, "... mutual fund managers did not shift
their fund's beta to take advantage of
market movements"
ii. Alexander and Stover, "... mutual funds were unable to
significantly increase their beta when
market conditions changed from bearish
to bullish, whether coincidenta11y
leading or lagging the change in market
condit ions" .
While it is not our purpose to build a sophisticated model to assess
performance under conditions of non-stationary risk coefficients we
are interested in more general approaches to the assessment of market
18. S. Kon, F. Jen, "The Investment Performance of Mutual Funds : An
Empirical Investigation of Timing, Selectivity and Market Efficiency"
Journal of Business, 52, April, 1979, pp. 263-289.
19. T. Miller, N. Gressis, "Non-Stationarity and the Evaluation of Mutual
Fund Performance", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
15, September 1980, pp. 639~654.
20. J. Francis and F. Fabozzi, "Mutual Fund Systematic Risk for Bull and
Bear Markets : An Empirical Investigation", Journal of Finance, 34,
December 1979, pp. 1243 - 1250.
21. G. Alexander, R. Storer, "Consistency of Mutual Fund Performance
During Varying Market Conditions", Journal of Economics and Business,
32, Spring 1980, pp. 219-226.
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timing strategies. Two such approaches are available the first
following the work of Treynor and Mazuy and the second the work of
22 23Main. ' We deal with each in turn.
Treynor and Mazuy noted that if a manager is consistently successful
in matching risk levels to market conditions then we would expect to
observe a characteristic line that reflects a strong relationship
between the two return variables during different market conditions.
For example if we assume only two market states corresponding to bull and
bear conditions the characteristic line of the successful market timer




22. J. Treynor, K. Mazuy, "Can Mutual Funds Outguess the Market", Harvard
Business Review, 44, 1966, pp. 131-136.
23. N. Main, "Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets and the Evaluation of
Investment Portfolios : Comment. Journal of Business. July 1977-
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During bear markets our hypothetical manager has successfully adopted
which is less than the unitary market beta while in bull markets he
is equally successful in that his portfolio has a beta level greater
than unity at B^. A less extreme and perhaps more realistic relation¬
ship between the market and fund returns for the successful market timer
would be that of a positively sloping curve. Thus a test of market
timing would be to determine whether the addition of a quadratic
term to the equation of the characteristic line results in both a
positive and statistically significant slope coefficient. Adopting
this technique we note that Treynor and Mazuy reported only one mutual
fund out of 59 that evidenced any superior ability at market timing.
In order to assess the market timing achievements of ITCs we ran the
following regression for each of the 97 ITCs over the full 118 month
period.




R. ,R = As before (see equation 4(xvii))11 mt M
AAA
o(. , B. Q. » Regression coefficients,
i f im im 3
The results are summarised in Table 5 (v i i) .
It would appear from Table 5(vii) that a substantial number of ITC
slope coefficients are negative although only 3 are significantly so.
24
However some 13 have "t" statistic values greater than 1. The
identification of a negative slope coefficient suggests that some ITCs
24. As a rough rule of thumb an absolute "t" statistic of greater than
1 will result in a higher coefficient of determination for the equation.
See D. Aigner, "Basic Econometrics" (Prentice Hall), 19/1, pp 91-92.
TABLE 5(vii)
Investment Trust Companies








("t" test at 35%) 7






("t" test at 35%) 3
"t" values > 1 13
managed to hold high beta portfolios in bear markets and low beta
portfolios in bull markets! On the other hand 60 ITCs had positive
slope coefficients although again only a relatively small number
were statistically significant. To gain some idea of the effect
on the fit of the data when the quadratic term is added we compare
2 2
the R s reported from equation A(xvii) in Chapter A with the R s from
equation 5(ix) for those ITCs with statistically significant slope
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A1 1 iance Trust .59 .62 -ve
Atlas Electric S Gen. .64 .67 -ve
Estates Duties .54 .59 -ve
Globe . 60 .62 -ve
St. Andrew .61 .63 -ve
Scottish Ontario • 70 • 72 -ve




Brunner .67 • 71 +ve
General Scottish .59 .61 -ve
London & Holyrood • 67 .70 -ve
Clearly the addition of the quadratic term has only a very marginal
effect on the overall goodness of fit. Indeed we note that the average
2
R across the full data base only increased from .64 to .65. Similarly
the overall effect on reported performance is not sufficient to
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suggest a noticeable performance relationship between market timing
25
and the Jensen statistics. However in order to substantiate
this latter point our second approach to the assessment of market
timing specifically tests for such a relationship by noting the results
of the following regression.
*12 = Ai + BiJ3 [fil -P,2
where;
o(j2 = Jensen performance statistic for the period 1/76 to
12/80 for the i^ ITC as estimated by equation 5(ix)
5(x)
= Market risk coefficient
the i^lTC as estimated
pJ2 = Market risk coefficient
the i^ ITC as estimated
for period 2/71 to 12/75 on
by equation 4(xvii)
for period 1/76 to 12/80 on
by equation 4(xvii)
The results of running this regression relating changing market risk
levels to achieved performance are as follows :
Of.
2 = "-02 + .17
fA A




The relationship is clearly weak and confirms the suggestion noted
above that little connection exists between reported performance and
25. We note that the Brunner results suggest that poor timing was more
than compensated for by successful security selection strategies!
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and management's attempts to time the market through varying market
risk levels. The alternative conclusion that it is evidence of
risk stationarity we would reject given our reported results on inter
period beta rankings. We note in passing that Main reported a
significantly negative beta change coefficient when working with
Jensen's original data indicating that those mutual funds that had
higher period 2 risk levels achieved higher levels of risk adjusted
r 26
performance.
We have now completed our presentation on the achieved performance
of ITCs during the decade and move on to a critique of the results
and methodology.
k. Investment Performance - A Critique : We detail our critique of
investment performance in the following three sub-sections.
(i) The Results - A Resume.
(ii) The Methodology and its Empirical Validation.
(iii) An Alternative Methodology.
(i) The Results - A Resume : Working with a CAPM methodology we have
presented empirical results covering
the relationship of risk exposure to management objectives
the consistency of risk measures
the levels of achieved diversification
the success of security selection policies
and the success of market timing policies.
We reported a weak relationship between risk exposure and management
26. N. Main, "Risk the Pricing of Capital Assets and the Evaluation of
Investment Portfolios : A Comment", Journal of Business, July 1977.
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objectives and noted that there was little inter-period
consistency between risk levels and what there was indicated
that total risk levels were more consistent than market risk
levels. ITCs achieved reasonable levels of diversification
throughout the decade although we identified a tendency for these
to be smaller over the second half of the decade. We suggested
a possible interpretation in terms of a tendency towards policies
involving security selection. In this context we noted that in
practice such a policy change would be consistent with the
policy options available to ITC managers during the later years
of the 1970s.
In terms of risk-adjusted performance achieved we reported first
of all on the necessity to relate performance measures to investor
requirements. Secondly we noted little evidence that over the
decade as a whole active management had resulted in superior
performance although during the second half of the decade a sub¬
stantially larger number of ITCs reported positive performance as
measured by the Jensen weighted statistic. This we suggested was
further evidence that policy changes towards adopting security
selection strategies had been adopted and were proving reasonably
successful. To the extent that ITCs were noted as moving away
from policies related to the provision of well diversified return
flows towards security selection policies then they would become
relatively less attractive to those investors not holding well
diversified portfolios. Indeed it may well be that such investors
should now consider holding small portfolios of ITC equities in order
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to achieve their desired levels of diversification. We also
noted that very much in the spirit of the received evidence on
efficient markets there did not appear to be a consistent inter-
period relationship between achieved performance levels. What
relationship there was we noted as being weak and negative.
Finally given the practical importance of market timing as perceived
by many ITC managers we examined whether any evidence of successful
timing strategies could be identified. Unfortunately we noted
no such evidence.
) The Methodology and its Empirical Validation : To a very large
extent our empirical results are based on the underlying usefulness
of the CAPM methodology. Clearly if this methodology is theoretically
suspect or is not consistent with empirical evidence our results
are weakened. We look first at the empirical validation of the
model and then at its theoretical foundations.
The empirical support for CAPM rests almost entirely on the
results of several large U.S. studies which test the basic CAPM
conclus ion;
In general the tests have attempted to show that if CAPM accurately
models the pricing mechanism for risky assets then;
1. On average and over relatively long periods of time there should




2. The intercept and slope of the relationship between systematic
risk and return should for the period under consideration
equal the average risk free return and the average market
risk premium respectively.
3. Unique or non-market risk should play no significant role
27 23 29
in explaining differences in the returns on risky assets. ' ' '
30,31,32.
The results of these various tests have been usefully summarised
by Myers and Pogue.^
"1. The evidence shows a significant positive relationship
between realized returns and systematic risk. However
the slopeof the relationship is usually less than that
provided by CAPM.
2. The relationship between risk and return appears to be
linear. The studies give no evidence of significant
curvature in the risk-return relationship.
3. Tests that attempt to discriminate between the effects of
systematic and unsystematic risk do not yield definitive
results. Both kinds appear to be positively related to
security returns. However there is substantial support
for the proposition that the relationship between return
and unsystematic risk is at least partly spurious - that
is it partly reflects statistical problems rather than the
true nature of. capital markets."
27. N. Jacob, "The Measurement of Systematic Risk for Securities and
Portfolios : Some Empirical Results", Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 1971, pp. 815-834.
28. M. Miller, M. Scholes, "Rates of Return in Relation to Risk : A
Reexamination of Recent Findings" in M. Jensen "Studies in the Theory
of Capital Markets", (New York) Prager, 1972, pp. 42-78.
29. M. Blume, I. Friend, "A New Look at the Capital Asset Pricing Model",
Journal of Finance, March, 1973, pp. 19—33 -
30. F. Black, M. Jensen, M. Scholes, "The Capital Asset Pricing Model :
Some Empirical Tests" in M. Jensen, "Studies in the Theory of Capital
Markets" (New York), Praeger, 1972, pp. 79-121.
31. E. Fama, J. MacBeth, "Risk, Return and Equilibrium : Empirical Tests;",
Journal of Political Economy, June 1973, pp. 607-638.
32. W. Sharpe, G. Cooper, "Risk Return Classes on the New York Stock Exchange1
Financial Analysts Journal, April 1972, pp. 46-54.
33- S. C. Myers, G. Pogue, "Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model" in
F. Modigliani, G. Pogue, "An Introduction to Risk and Return", Financial
Analysts Journal, June 1974, pp. 69-86.
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in the U.K. context very little work has been done on testing
the model partly because until recently extensive and accurate
data bases were not available and partly because of theoretical
problems associated with the market portfolio. However Guy working
with sample data from 99 U.K. companies for the period 1960-1970
and adopting a methodology similar to that of Fama and MacBeth
found only a weak positive linear relationship between beta and
3^
return.
We note that much of the empirical evidence relates to periods
earlier than the one we are primarily concerned with and while
this would be unimportant if CAPM represented the "true" risk
return relationship a considerable body of evidence has been
accumulating in more recent years that would seriously question the
35
Myers-Pogue conclusions and: in particular their third conclusion.
In Chapter 3 we reviewed several studies and presented some results
all identifying additional elements in the correlation matrix
of returns. Further evidence would include results reported by
•jc "37
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy and Basu. More recently work by
both Banz and Reinganum has suggested that market capitalisation
3 8 33
may well have an important role to play in the pricing of assets. '
3^. J. Guy, "The Stock Exchange, London : An Empirical Analysis of Monthly
Data from 1960-1970", Paper presented to the European Finance
Association, 1975, pp. 9~5^.
35- An interesting summary of the various extensions etc that have been
developed from the basic CAPM together with some indication of their
va1idity is given in; •
S. Ross, "The Current Status of the Capital Asset Pricing Model",
Journal of Finance, 33, June 1978, pp. 885-901.
36. R. Litzenberger, K. Ramaswamy, "The Effect of Personal Taxes and
Dividends on Capital Asset Prices", Journal of Financial Economics,
June 1979, pp. 163-195.
37- S. Basu, "Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to their
Price : Earnings Rations : A Test of Market Efficiency", Journal of
Finance, 32, June 1977, pp. 663-682.
38. R. Banz, "The Relationship between Return and the Market Value of Common
Stocks", Journal of Financial Economics, March, 1981, pp. 3-18.
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The latter author also noted that price : earnings ratios and abnormal
performance were significantly related although when returns were controlled
for the size effect this relationship virtually disappeared. We deal with
these two articles in more detail in Section 5 where we present results
based on the relationship between ITC size and performance.
Finally we note two points in connection with the adequacy of using the
FTA-AS index as the relevant source for market returns. First of all as
it represents the returns from an investment strategy that incurs no
management or transaction expenses it is arguable that we have set an
unrealistica11y high benchmark standard. Consideration was given to adding
back management and trading expenses to the ITC returns. We rejected such
an approach partly because of the difficulty noted in Chapter 1 of identify¬
ing ITC trading expenses and partly because one of the attractions of
assessing net returns against gross returns is that it does lead to performance
rankings that specifically account for the intermediation expenses involved.
Secondly ITCs have traditionally invested internationally and indeed we reported
in Chapter 1 that the sector usually maintains approximately 30% of its assets
overseas. It could be aruged that an internationally based series of market
returns would more adequately reflect the security population available to
ITCs. We justify the use of the FTA-AS index partly because of its wide
appeal in practice as a benchmark against which to assess the performance
of U.K. managed funds and partly because the available international indices
(e.g. Capital International's World Index) while obtaining international
spread do so at the expense of losing some domestic coverage. Consideration
of the appropriate surrogate for the return on the market portfolio leads
on to perhaps the most substantive criticisms of the CAPM methodology.
These criticisms have been formulated and delivered in a series of
, ... kO, 41, 42, 43.
papers by Rol1 .
53. M. Reinganum, "Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing : tmpirical /
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Roll's analysis of CAPM centres on the ex ante mean-variance efficient
market portfolio which as we noted in Chapter 4 is the only relevant
portfolio in equilibrium. He suggests that empirical tests of CAPM
that concentrate on validating the linear positive risk return
result shown in equation 5(xi) cannot be considered successful in
the sense that they fail to test for the ex ante efficiency of the
market portfolio. Myers and Rice usefully summarise the Roll
conclusions on testing CAPM as follows ;
"(a) The only testable implication of the model is that
the true market portfolio is mean-variance efficient.
(b) The return on the true market portfolio is not used
in any of the empirical tests to data and is virtually
impossible to measure. The theory is not testable
unless the exact value-weighted market portfolio of
a 11 assets is used.
(c) All tests of the model involve joint hypotheses,
one of which is that the market portfolio is
correctly measured. Since we know that the market
portfolio is not correctly measured, the rejection
of the joint hypothesis tells us very little." ^
Roll's arguments have been met with varying degrees of acceptance
and the controversy is by no means over. Those who support his
position and therefore reject much of the CAPM paradigm as
untestable are countered by those who suggest he takes too nihilistic
a view of financial theories. In particular the difficulty of
/Anomalies based on Earnings Yields and Market Values", Journal of
Financial Economics, March 1981, pp. 19-46.
40. R. Roll, "A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests. Part 1 :
On Past and Potential Testability of the Theory", Journal of Financial
Economics, 4, 1977, PP- 129-176.
4]. R. Roll, "Ambiguity when Performance is Measured by the Securities Market
Line", Journal of Finance, 33, 1978, pp. 1051-1069.
42. R. Roll, "Performance Evaluation and Benchmark Errors, Part 1", Journal
of Portfolio Management, Summer, 1980, pp. 5-12.
43. R. Roll, "Performance Evaluation and Benchmark Errors, Part 2", Journal
of Portfolio Management, Winter, 1981.
44. D. Myers, E. .Rice, "Measuring Portfolio Performance and the Empirical Content
of Asset Pricing Models", Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 1979, pp.3"28.
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testing a theoretical ex ante hypothesis with ex post surrogates
is one that is present in most economic models. To conclude
that the model and its implications should be rejected on these
grounds alone is too severe. There is an intuitive appeal about
the risk return relationship described by CAPM that is widely
accepted in spite of Roll's criticism as to its testability.
Indeed more generally lack of testability or even some evidence
refuting a theoretical conclusion are not necessarily sufficient
conditions for rejecting the conclusion or ignoring the insights
a particular model provides. In this context we note the
comment by Stigler quoted in the Myers and Rice article.
"The answer is that it takes a theory to beat a theory.
If there is a theory that is right 51% of the time
it will be used until a better one comes along."^5
In addition to examining the testability of CAPM Roll has also
explored the implications for performance assessment that result from
an inability to observe or accurately observe the ex ante market port-
rolio. As we noted above the measurement of investment performance
involves assessing ex post performance against the level of
performance that could have been expected. In terms of CAPM
expected performance is described by the ex ante security market
line. The relationship between return and risk described by the
ex ante security market line is of course strictly unobservable
and as we have done is usually estimated from ex post data. Roll
now presents a difficulty. If the security market line we actually
estimate is the "true" ex ante security market line then all
securities will plot more or less along the line and we will not
be able to observe either significantly inferior or superior
45. G. Stigler, "Theory of Price", Macmillan, 1964 (New York).
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performance. On the other hand if the market portfolio surrogate
we use to determine the ex post security market line is not ex
ante efficient then its use can hardly be justified on the grounds
that it represents the "true" risk return relationships in the
economy. Roll describes the differences between the ex ante
security market line and the use of an ex post surrogate that is
not ex ante efficient as "benchmark errors" and he investigates
their effects in some depth. In particular he shows how the use
of different ex post surrogates can result in different benchmark errors.
Indeed in a particularly revealing example he shows the conditions
that will lead to positive benchmark errors on one series of market
returns and negative errors on another when both are used to assess
the same portfolio. He concludes that the possibility of such
ambiguity existing reduces considerably if not completely the
validity of CAPM based performance measures. Again we suggest
this is too severe a criticism. The same reasons are relevant.
We must always use proxies as ex ante values are unobservable.
What Roll's criticisms do serve to remind us of is that great care
must be taken in both deciding the ex post surrogate to use for
assessment purposes and in fully appreciating the effects on
assessment that changes in the surrogate imply. We suggest that
this is a useful reminder of what most ITC managers would be only
too wel1 aware of 1
We note in passing that Myers and Rice have attempted to formulate
CAPM in a manner that will allow superior performance to be
46 47
identified. ' They do this by effectively weakening the key
46. D. Myers, E. Rice, "Measuring Portfolio Performance and the Empirical
Content of Asset Pricing Models", Journal of Financial Economics, 7,
1979, pp. 3-28.
47. R. Verrechia, "The Myers-Rice Conjecture - A Counter Example", Journal
of Financial Economics, 8, 1980, pp. 87-100.
equi1ibriating CAPM assumption of homogeneous expectations amongst
all investors. They suggest that information asymmetries
between market participants can be characterised by two categories
of investor - the informed and the uninformed. From this basis
they derive the CAPM conclusions with identifiable and superior
performance for the informed investor group. Unfortunately in
order to ensure that market wide risk return expectations are
formed by the dominant uninformed investor group they require
strong assumptions preventing the informed and successful group
from eventually dominating the market. As Cornell notes there
are many "... unsolved conceptual problems with introducing
48
asymmetric information into the CAPM"1
(iii) An Alternative Methodology : If one accepts the Roll criticisms
described above there is a clear necessity to provide an alternative
equilibrium theory of asset pricing or at least in the context of
performance assessment a methodology that avoids the performance
assessment ambiguities identified by Roll. On this latter point
Cornell has suggested, with Roll's apparent agreement that an
adequate method of assessing performance would involve observing
the investment weights of a given portfolio, estimating the mean
return on all individual securities within the portfolio and
then computing the portfolio's expected return over an initial
period. The actual return in a subsequent period would then be
recorded and the unexpected return calculated. We question whether
such a complete rejection of the pricing implications of risk is
48. B. Cornell, "Asymmetric Information and Portfolio Performance Measure
ment", Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 1979, pp. 381-390.
49. B. Cornell, "Asymmetric Information and Portfolio Performance Measure
ment, Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 1979, pp. 381-390.
50. S. Hemmerick, "Return to Simpler Methods : Roll" Pensions and Invest
/
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An interesting alternative approach to performance assessment
has been explored by Saunders, Ward and Woodward.They
argue that assessing performance on the basis of only the first
and second moments of return distributions ignores the possibility
that consideration of higher distributional moments may well
reveal superior performance. Stochastic dominance techniques allow
these higher moments to be examined. In applying this procedure
to the monthly returns of 30 unit trusts and the FT '650' index
between February 1975 and November 1977 they concluded that ;
"
... trusts as a group have generally outperformed the
market. ... when mean variance efficiency frontiers
were calculated for the same time period no superior
performance resulted for trusts as a group."
While the mean-variance framework has a definite "finance appeal"
in terms of risk and return it is not entirely clear what the
financial relevance of higher distributional moments is.
Perhaps the most interesting theoretical development in the area of
asset pricing has been the formulation of the Arbitrage Pricing
— 52 53
Theory (APT). ' The proponents of this theory suggest that it
avoids both the distributional assumptions of CAPM and the problems
we discussed above in relation to the central role CAPM ascribes
to the market portfolio.
The derivation of APT follows from an assumption that the return
/ Investments, August 18, 1980. (This article was a reported interview
between Hammerick and Roll.)
51. A. Saunders, C. Ward, R. Woodward, "Stochastic Dominance and the
Performance of U.K. Unit Trusts", Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, June 1980, pp. 323-330.
52. S. Ross, "Returns, Risk and Arbitrage" in Risk and Return in Finance,
(Ed. I. Friend, J. Bicksler), Massachusetts, 1972, pp. 189-218.
53- S. Ross, "The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing", Journal of
Economic Theory, 13, 1976, pp. 3^1-360.
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generating process for risky assets can be described as ;
R. E(R.) +/BnF, *pi2f2* +;iKFK + fri 5(xi!)
where;
F to Fv = Underlying and independent elements of return
I 1\
common to all risky assets.
th
An element of return unique to the i risky
asset




By considering equation 5(xii) at the portfolio level we can effectively
ignore the unique return terms which we assume are diversified away.
We can imply from equation 5(xii) that the return from a portfolio
of risky assets will be a linear combination of the return on the
risk free asset and the returns on the K factors. Alternatively we
can consider the returns on the risk free asset and the K factors
as linear combinations of the returns on K + 1 portfolios of risky
assets. As the returns on all portfolios of risky assets are
linear combinations of the returns on the risk free asset and the returns
on the common factors we can use our K + 1 portfolios to build
portfolios that will be perfect substitutes for any other portfolio.
We would expect perfect substitutes to command equal returns in the
market. If this were not the case then arbitrage profits would be
possible by going long in the portfolio with the higher return and
short in the portfolio with the lower return. In the world of APT
an individual investor holding a well diversified portfolio is
considered to be in equilibrium when it is not possible for him
to construct an alternative portfolio to. leave him better
off without involving either additional risks or requiring
additional funds. In other words the market is efficient enough
to ensure that perfect substitutes are equally priced and thus
when the market is this efficient equilibrium prices are established
based on the linear combination of the returns from the risk free
asset and the various factors.
Two points are clearly of critical relevance to the applicability
of APT. The first concerns the number of common factors and the
second their identification with financial variables. In Chapter
3 we noted that Roll and Ross had reported the presence of at least
five priced factors in their study of U.S. returns while our own
results also in Chapter 3 strongly suggested the presence of at
54least two common effects in the correlation matrix of ITC returns.
The usefulness of APT turns on their being considerably fewer
common factors than risky assets and this certainly appears to
be the case. The second point again noted in Chapter 3 is that it
is extremely difficult to establish a consistent relationship
between ex post explanatory "factors" and theoretically valid
r r r £
financial variables. The danger is that the model slips
from being a theoretical model of equilibrium pricing into an
ex post explanatory methodology.
In comparing APT to CAPM it is certainly true that APT does not
require a mean-variance framework nor does it ascribe a central role
5^. R. Roll, S. Ross, "An Empirical Investigation of Arbitrage Pricing
Theory", Journal of Finance, 35, December 1980, pp. 1073-1103.
55. J. Shankin, "The Arbitrage Theory - is it Testable?" Journal of
Finance, December 1982.
56. M. Reingamun, "Arbitrage Pricing Theory - Some Empirical Results",
Journal of Finance, December 1981.
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to the market portfolio. However this increased generality
carries with it a cost in terms of lost financial relevance.
This cost will remain until the various communalities underlying
the returns of risky assets have been more positively identified.
5. The Relationship between Size and Performance : While we suggest
that much work still remains to be done in firmly establish ing APT as a
useful equilibrium pricing theory the general approach has been applied
in the context of performance assessment. We provide an example of
its application to an aspect of performance that has particular relevance
to ITCs given the marketability comments often made with regard to
the sector.
The argument underlying the potential importance of the relationship between
size and performance runs as follows. The ITC sector is often
considered as extremely homogeneous with this lack of differentiation
being expressed in terms of the "poor marketabi1ity"of certain ITCs. If
different ITCs do have differing levels of marketability then we would
expect that in equilibrium those investors holding the less liquid or
less marketable ITC equities would be compensated in terms of higher
expected returns. In other words comparisons of ITC performance that
ignored the liquidity perspective would run the risk of overstating the
achieved performance of the less liquid ITCs.
The problem in attempting to identify a relationship between performance
and liquidity is to reach a definition of liquidity that is empirically
meaningful. One such definition assumes that market capitalisation
could well act as a surrogate for marketability. Indeed we suggest
that it is reasonable to assume that larger ITCs can in fact be considered
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more marketable than smaller ITCs. Such differences in marketability
may arise for several reasons including the greater likelihood of
informational asymmetries of the type discussed in Chapter 1 existing
in the market for small ITCs perhaps because they have proportionally
less floating equity as a result of director holdings or even because
of cross holdings with other ITCs under the same management group.
However we recognise that allowing market capitalisation to act as a
surrogate for marketability is in fact an important assumption and
one that is as yet intuitive rather than proven.
We first of all review the two major studies in this area and then
present some results for the U.K. ITC sector.
(i) Reported Results on the Relationship Between Size and Performance :
Banz has reported evidence on the importance of a size related
variable underlying asset pricing. His work is divided into two
sections and is based on monthly returns between 1926 and 1975 for
the full CRSP database.^ The first section tests the model;
E<Ri> - Jfo VfcPi [«ij
where;
E(Rj) = expected return of security i
= expected return on the zero-beta security
I = expected market risk premium
^2 = constant measuring the contribution of to the
expected return of security i
SI j ■ the market value factor of security i
57. R. Banz, "The Relationship between Return and Market Value of Common
Stocks", Journal of Financial Economics, 9 March 1981, pp. 3—18.
Banz used the portfolio-beta estimating procedures of Black and
Scholes, performed the monthly cross-sectional regressions based
on the above model and then very much in the spirit of Black and
A
Scholes used the from the following time series regression as
the ^2 estimator;^'"^
X 2t Rft + f 2 (Rmt " Rft^ + ^2t
We summarise Banz's results in Table 5(ix).
TABLE 5(ix)







1. Total Period :
1936 - 1975 -.00052 -2.92
2. Sub-Periods :
1936 - 1955 -.00043 -2.12
1956 - 1975 -.00062 -2.09
3. Sub-Periods :
1936 - 19^5 -.00075 -2.32
1946 - 1955 -.00015 -0.62
1956 - 1965 -.00039 1 .27
1966 - 1975 -.00080 1.55
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Over the total period the negative size sign strongly suggests
that the larger the company the smaller returns and vice-versa for
smaller companies. Interestingly the relationship is less
significant and highly variable over the shorter sub-periods.
Banz's second approach to examining the size performance
relationship is in essence based upon an arbitrage methodology.
Working with the same data as above he constructed three equally
weighted portfolios representing small, medium and large
companies. These were rebalanced monthly and in addition their
market risks were equated through leverage. He then calculated
the monthly differences between the three portfolios and regressed
the differences on a market proxy. The resulting constants
represent the average differences in return between the three







Returns on the small portfolios
Returns on the medium portfolios








1 r2 + r3.
58. F. Black, M. Scholes, "The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy
on Common Stock Prices and Returns", Journal of Financial Economies, 1,
1974, PP. 1-22.
59. This procedure is necessary to avoid bias introduced by using estimated
parameters as variables in the cross-sectional regression.
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Rj, R^ and R^ represent the arbitrage differences from a zero net
investment involving going long in one portfolio and short in
another. Thus R^ = R^ - R^ for example involves going long in
the small portfolio and short in the large.
Banz reported results based on portfolio size of 10, 20 and 50
securities for the entire 1931 - 1975 period and for successive
five year sub-periods between 1931 ~ 1975- We summarise Banz's
results for portfolios of fifty securities in Table 5(x).
Banz draws several conclusions from these results.
1. Over the whole period a strategy of small firm portfolio
investment would have been profitable over a strategy involving
either medium or large firm portfolios. (0.89% per month and
1.01% per month respectively for portfolios of fifty securities.
We note that the highest o< for the full period was reported
for portfolios of ten securities. This figure of .0152 is the
equivalent of approximately 19% p.a-)
2. As small firm portfolios typically have larger residual risk
than large firm portfolios the investor following the small
firm portfolio strategy would be left holding a poorly
diversified portfolio.
3. The results are not conclusive over the sub-periods.
Overall Banz while recognising a size effect is extremely cautious
both as to its importance and as to its interpretation. On reviewing
his work we would agree with this conclusion. Interestingly he does
draw on the work of Klein and Bawa to suggest that marketability
TABLE 5(x)
Size and Performance
Arbitrage Results of Banz
Period °s oi2 d 3
1931 - 1975 .0101 .0089 .0012
(3.07) (3.64) (.85)
1931 - 1935 .0427 .0326 .0101
(2.35) (2.46) (1.42)
1936 - 19^0 .0089 .0064 .0025
(.67) (0.65) (.49)
19^1 - 1945 .0269 .0228 .0041
(2.17) (2.02) (1.68)
1946 - 1950 -.0036 -.0029 -.0007
(-.97) (-.83) (-.38)
1951 - 1955 .0013 .0010 .0003
(.32) (.39) (.11)
1956 - I960 .0037 .001 1 .0026
(.89) (.45) (.97)
1961 - 1965 .0024 .0036 -.0012
(.31) (.77) (-.24)
1966 - 1970 .0077 .0071 .0006
(1.91) (2.43) (.27)
1971 - 1975 .0098 .0083 .0015
(1.45) (1.79) (.43)
Notes : 1. ci. s are expressed in terms of monthly returns
2. t statistics are shown in parenthesis
3. = small firms long large firms short
C^2 = small firms long medium firms short
o<2 = medium firms long large firms short.
A. Banz reported the following results for portfolios
of ten and twenty securities for the full 1931 — 1975
period.







premiums for small companies may well explain return differences.
The work by Klein and Bawa sources the marketability problems firmly
wfth the possibi1ity that information asymmetries may be greater in
the market for small rather than large companies.
61 62
The second major study in this area is the work by Reinganum. '
Working with daily returns from the CRSP data base between 1962 and
1978 he grouped the securities into ten equally weighted portfolios
on the basis of their December 31 market valuations. Thus rebalancing
was completed annually. The total number of securities involved
varied from 1457 to 2500.
The mean daily excess returns for each of the portfolios are shown
in Table 5(xi).
From Table 5(xi) is it clear that the average excess returns
available from the smaller value portfolios were considerably greater
than those available from the larger portfolios. Indeed the
return difference between portfolio 1 and portfolio 10 is 36%.
These results are of course presented without consideration of any
possible risk differences between the various portfolios. Such an
adjustment using Reinganum's OLS beta estimates would in fact widen
the return divergence between the smallest and largest portfolios.
However responding to a criticism raised by Roll that non-trading
60. W. Klein, V. Bawa, "The Effect of Limited Information and Estimation
Risk on Optimal Portfolio Diversification", Journal of Financial
Economics, 5, 1977, pp. 89-111.
61. M. Reinganum, "Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing : Empirical
Anomalies based on Earnings Yields and Market Values", Journal of
Financial Economics, 9, 1981, pp. 19-46.
62. M. Reinganum, "Abnormal Returns in Small Firm Portfolios", Financial













1 42 • 75 1 .69
2 26 r^OO 1 .64
3 22 .90 1 .55
4 17 • 96 1 .50
5 16 .98 1 .46
6 14 .97 1 .39
7 12 .95 1 .31
S 11 • 97 1 .27
9 9 • 95 1.13
10 6 • 98 .97
Notes : 1. Portfolios are listed 1 to 10 in order of
increasing value.
2. Reinganum reports his results in terms of mean
daily excess returns x 1000. We have presented
them in annual return format.
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bias would result in lower beta estimates and that this bias
may well be more pronounced amongst the lower value companies
Reingamum recomputed his results using the Dimson aggregated
64 65 66coefficients method we discussed in Chapter 4. ' ' However
even after this adjustment it is unlikely that the .72 beta
difference between portfolios 1 and 10 could account for the
observed difference in return levels. Indeed for it to do so
would imply an extremely large and unlikely market risk premium
of greater than 50%. (36%/.72)
These two U.S. studies clearly suggest an empirical link between
size and performance. In the U.K. a similar result is reported
67
by the London Business School. However work by both Moles and
Gurney on the relationship between unit trust size and performance
indicates only an extremely small and inconsistent relationship.^^
(ii) The Relationship Between ITC Size and Performance : Before
presenting the main empirical work it is worth considering a potentially
observable implication stemming from the result that size and
performance are related. Consider two ITCs identical in all
respects apart from size and the number of shares outstanding. In
64. R. Roll, "A Possible Explanation of Small Firm Effect", Journal of
Finance, 36, 1981.
65. M. Reingamum, "A Direct Test of Roll's Conjecture on the Firm Size
Effect", Journal of Finance, 37, 1982.
66. E. Dimson, "Risk Measures when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading",
Journal of Financial Economics, June 1979, pp. 197~226.
67. London Business School, "Risk Measurement Service", September 1981,
p.8.
68. P. Moles, "Components of Unit Trust Performance 1966-1975", Investment
Ana 1yst, 59, 1981.
69. J. Gurney, "Rank Correlation of Unit Trust Performance 1971-1975",
Investment Analyst, 46, 1976.
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particular note both that the only difference in the underlying
portfolios will be one of scale and that dividend payments per
share are equal. Given this albeit hypothetical situation how
would we expect to observe size influencing returns? The answer
is of course apparent when the phenomenon of the discount is
introduced. Indeed in this ceteris paribus example differential
returns can only come about when market participants express
different preferences between the two ITCs. More specifically
a wider discount on one ITC implies a larger return and vice-versa
for a narrower discount. The following example clarifies this
point:
ITC - A ITC - 1
Assets per Share lOOp lOOp
Share Price 80p 90p
Price Discount 20% ]0%
Dividend per Share 5p 5p
Assuming no change in the share price between tg and t^ the return
on an investment in each of the two ITCs will be :
ITC - A 6.25%
ITC - B 5.56%.
On the basis of this simple observation we will get some impression
as to whether or not size and performance are related if there is
a relationship between size and the discount level. However, it is
extremely important to note that the generality of any conclusions
based on discount levels is severely restricted. In particular we
know very little about the precise way in which the market assesses
330
individual ITCs and their respective managements. We observe
discounts and occasionally premiums but we cannot with any
quantitative certainty rank or perhaps even identify all the
various determinants. The model described above assumes not
only all other factors to be the same for both ITCs but that these
in fact are stationary over the time period considered. Conclusions
based on a discount approach are at best corroborative.
With this restriction in mind the average Spearman rank-order
correlation coefficient between portfolio size and discount levels
was calculated for 50 ITCs over the 36 months to December 1980.^
At -0.31 both the negativity and the weakness of the relationship
are confirmed. ' This would tentatively support the conclusion
that the smaller ITCs offered wider discounts and thus higher
returns in the period under review.
In order to assess more accurately the relationship between size
and performance we adopt Banz's arbitrage procedures described
above. The monthly market capitalisation of the equity database
ITCs were obtained for each of the 118 months to December 1980.
At the end of each month the ITCs were ranked by market capital¬
isation and then divided into three groups. The first group or
70. Discussion of the computation of discount levels is delayed
until Chapter 6 where we deal with the discount in more
detai1.
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or portfolio represented the largest 32 ITCs while the second
and third portfolios represented the ITCs ranked 33 to 64 and 65 to
97 respectively. The end result was 118 portfolios made up of
large ITCs, 118 portfolios made up of medium sized ITCs and
118 portfolios made up of the smallest ITCs. Thus although the
constituent ITCs making up these portfolios changed over time
a size based difference between small, medium and large was
maintained. Table 5(xii) details the size characteristics of
these portfolios at the end of December 1980.
TABLE 5 (x i i)
1nvestment Trust Companies
Size Characteristics of the Small, Medium and Large Portfolios
December 1980
(£m)
Characteristics Sma 11 Mediurn Large
Total Capitalisation 627.64 1286.90 3056.60
Average Capitalisation 18.46 37.85 89-90
Range of ITC Capitalisations
Mini mum 8.13 26.59 55.90
Maximum 26.36 54.53 253-80
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It is evident from Table 5(xii) that both a considerable size
range of ITCs was covered and that a substantial difference
in size existed between the small medium and large categories.
These points are important as it will be recalled that the
equity data base was compiled on the basis of the largest 97
ITCs in the sector. Thus we accept that our sample space is
biased towards the larger ITCs. However we suggest that the
size ranges as shown in Table 5(xii) are large enough to justify
a small medium and large categorisation.
With the ITC groupings complete 118 excess total return observations
were calcualted for each of the three portfolios. The returns
were calculated as before with the exception that the weightings
were the number of elapsed days between transactions rather than
the square root of the number of days. This method of weighting
allows the returns to be interpretated as average daily continuously
compounded excess total returns rather than estimated daily returns.
The more complex procedure for calculating estimated daily returns
necessary for the computation of CAPM risk measures was not considered
necessary for the arbitrage methodology and thus the perhaps more
intuitive average return approach was adopted.
Having established the time series of returns for each of the
portfolios the return differentials between the three portfolios
were calculated on the basis of equation 5(xiii), 5(xiv) and 5(xv).
Finally the market component underlying the return differentials
was removed by regressing the differentials on the average daily
excess total market return with the market again being defined as
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the total return on the FTA-AS index. The resulting constants
which we noted above could be interpretated as size effects are
reported in Table 5(xiii).
TABLE 5(xiii)
Investment Trust Companies
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Notes : "t" statistics are shown in parenthesis.
From Table 5(xiii) it is clear that the portfolios of large ITCs
have on average over the 118 month period outperformed the portfolios
of small and medium sized ITCs. However this outperformance is
not statistically significant. On examination it is apparent
that the bulk of this size based differential is sourced from
the differential performance of medium sized ITCs over small ITCs.
We are thus initially drawn to the conclusion that size and
performance are positively rather than negatively related as suggested
33b
by the work of Banz and Reingamum.
Several possible explanations for our results were explored.
Firstly as noted above none of our results are statistically
significant. It could be that observations over a longer time
period would give in a purely statistical sense more meaningful
results. On the other hand we did note in Section 3 the
difficulties associated in relating statistical significance to
financial relevance. Secondly we have made no adjustment for
differing risk levels between small, medium and large portfolios.
Thus in removing the market component from R^ , R^ and R^ we have
implied an assumption that the market risk levels of the three
portfolios were approximately equal. To test whether this was
a reasonable assumption or not R_. R.,_ and R, „ that is the excess
SL, MD LG
returns on the portfolios rather than the return differences
between them were regressed on the excess market return to obtain approximate
2 •
















f -TTCO • 92 • 96
(18.79) (21.73) (23.26)
R2 .75 Ooo OO M
Notes : I. "t" statistics are reported in parenthesis.
335
From Table 5(xiv) it is evident that while the three portfolios
share similar levels of diversification the small ITC portfolios
has a lower market risk coefficient. Thus a leverage adjustment
to the returns on the small portfolios would appear valid. Such
an adjustment would be expected to increase R^ which in turn would
reduce the negative differentials and R^. Unfortunately the
return increase that would result in removing the 1b% difference
between the beta of the small and large portfolios would not be
sufficient to account for the -3.^8% p.a. return difference. To do
so would imply a market risk premium of the order of 28.33% p.a.
(3.V.12). We suggest that this is un rea 1 i st i ca 11 y high. Indeed
we noted earlier in our discussion of performance estimators that
the cumulative (118 month) risk premium was only 25.608%. Thus
while differing risk levels may well be a contributory factor the
effects would be insufficient to acount for the observed differences.^
Throughout our study we have examined returns from the point of view
of a gross investor. It is possible that the higher returns on the
large portfolio are to compensate for distributions made in a
tax inefficient manner. More specifically given the higher rates
of taxation on dividend income as compared to capital gains did the
large ITCs tend to offer higher yields than the smaller ones? To
examine this possibility the percentage of the total market capital¬
isation of the 97 ITCs at December 31 1980 represented by the three
yeild groups used in Chapter k Section b were compared. The results
are shown in Table 5(xv).
As shown in Table 5(xv) the size proportions of the low, medium
7. The average market risk premium estimated by the LBS over the 1919—
1977 period was perhaps a surprisingly high 9-2% p.a.














Average Portfolio Yield 2.27 3.10 b.M
% of ITC Market
Capita1isat ion
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and high yield portfolios were approximately equal at December 31
1980. Thus it would appear unlikely that the larger ITCs are
associated with higher yields and hence the possibility of explaining
R^ on the basis of distribution policy is reduced.
Our final exploration into the results reported in Table 5(xiii) was
particularly revealing. To test for the consistency of the results
the 118 month period was divided into two equal halves and the three
regressions involving R^ , R2 and R^ were then performed on each of
the sub-periods. The results are reported in Table 5(xvi).
Although the results are again not statistically significant it is
obvious that the bulk of the overall excess differential in favour




Average Returns Associated with Size Differentials
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Notes : 1. "t" statistics in parenthesis,
a reversal taking place during the later period.
The first half of the 1970s was a period of crises in the financial
markets and it does appear that the larger ITCs were able to weather
this storm considerably better than their smaller counterparts. That
there may be a trend in more recent years towards reversing this
earlier position is of course as equally interesting and worthy of
explanation. Indeed such a result would be in line with the larger
studies of size and performance noted earlier. Unfortunately our
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empirical results on the later period can only be interpretated
as consistent with the above scenario rather than firm support for
the presence of liquidity premiums in the ITC equity market.
Summary : We have covered several aspects of the achieved
performance of ITCs in this chapter based primarily on performance
measures derived from CAPM. Overall the performance achieved
was not spectacular. In addition we pointed out several criticisms
of our methodology which we consider serious but not sufficiently
so to reject the CAPM approach. Finally we described an
alternative methodology the APT and suggested that its purported
advantages were less than might at first appear. However in the
context of APT we examined an interesting aspect of performance
involving the possibility of liquidity premiums existing in the
ITC equity market. Under the conditions of CAPM equilibrium such
premiums would not be expected. Our results were unfortunately
inconclusive with those from the second half of the decade providing
some support for the hypotheses and those from the earlier years
suggesting its rejection.
CHAPTER SIX









Reported Determinants of the
Discount
3^0
INTR0DUCT1ON : The most pervasive statistic that accompanies any
discussion of ITCs is "the discount". More specifically it is
frequently observed that ITC equity valuations are considerably
less than those for underlying portfolios. Rather less frequently
equity valuations in excess of portfolio valuations are observed.
These are referred to as premiums while the former are known as
discounts. The importance attached to differences between equity
and portfolio valuations varies considerably from commentator
to commentator. In general greater importance is attached to these
differences by those actively involved in the marketing of ITC equities
than by researchers. To a very large extent this is because the latter
group find it difficult to analyse a phenomenon that given any reasonable
level of market efficiency just should not exist. Why indeed should
one portfolio of assets attract two different market valuations? We
note Sharpe's comment;
"Explanation of the behaviour of closed-end fund prices
provides a challenge for the person who believes that
capital markets are perfectly efficient. For one not
, firmly committed to such a view, the purchase of shares
of closed end companies at prices sufficiently below
net asset value may provide an opportunity for superior
performance."'
While we find difficulty in explaining the levels and persistence of
discounts during the 1970s their effect on the ITC sector should not
be underestimated. In particular they made it difficult for new
funds to be raised. Perhaps more importantly they represented a
focus of criticism on the sector which has since the mid 1970s resulted
in the occasional take-over, increasing pressure to unitise and as we
noted in the previous chapter the adoption by managers of new investment
strategies.
1. W. Sharpe, "Investments", Prentice-Hall, New Jersey 1981, p.530.
Our approach to this chapter is not to present any new insight into
the reasons behind portfolio and equity valuation differences. We
confine ourselves to more modest objectives. In section 1 we
provide discount estimates for a sample of ITCs. In Section 2 we
review the financial characteristics of ITC portfolios. Finally in
Section 3 we discuss various reported hypotheses on the determinants
of discount.
1. Discount Estimates : Monthly estimates of the discount were
calculated for 50 ITCs for the 36 month period to December 1980. The
sample size and period covered reflected considerations of coverage
and data availabil i ty. These were averaged first of all to give a mean
discount per ITC over the 36 month period and secondly to give
an equally weighted monthly discount estimate for the full sample of
50 ITCs. Individual ITC discounts were calculated as follows :




D.^ = Discount on the i ITC at the end of month t
11
t h
N. = Net asset value of the i ITC at the end of
11
month t
E. = Market capitalisation of the ordinary equity
t h
of the i ITC at the end of month t.
Market capitalisations were obtained from our own database and where
necessary were adjusted to include the equity rights from any outstandi
convertible issues. Net asset values were made available by Wood
Mackenzie S Co. These were defined as
NAV (TA-CL) - PC 6(11)
where;
NAV = Net asset value including accrued dividends
TA = Total assets valued at market
CL = Current liabilities
PC = Prior charges valued at market.
Prior charges include all the balancing items with the exception
of ordinary equity which is defined to include the full conversion
rights of any convertible issues outstanding. Controverses occas iona 11 y
arises over the use of market rather than book valuation for prior
charges. However we suggest that such controversy is misplaced as
it is difficult to establish the precise economic content of book value.
As far as total assets are concerned all are valued at market with the
exception of unquoted securities which as we noted in Chapter 1 are
usually valued at the lower of cost of directors' valuation. During
the period of exchange controls the full premium was included in the
valuation of foreign securities with any surrender liability due on
unrealized foreign security gains shown as a contingent claim off the
balance sheet.
We report our discount estimates for individual ITCs in summary form
in Table 6(i) and in greater detail in Table 6(ii). The monthly average
sample discounts are plotted out on Graph 6(i).
Looking first at the individual ITC discounts perhaps the most interesti










of 23% over the 96 month period we need not be surprised that the
sector has experienced take-over and unitisation pressure from a
number of institutions. In addition the varying discount levels
between ITCs is really quite narrow with over kO of the sample lying
in the range 20 to 30%. It is clearly difficult to generalise and
indeed there are several outliers with very low discounts however
the narrowness of the band may suggest that there are common market
wide elements underlying discount levels.
While there is only a limited average discount range for individual
ITCs Graph 6(i) indicates that the monthly average discount for
the sample as a whole varied considerably between a low of approximately
12% in January 1975 and a high of almost 40% in October 1976. We




96 months to 12/80
Trust >'O Trust %
Alliance Investment 27.224 London & Holyrood 26.194
A11iance Trust 20.096 London Provincial 26.829
American 20.603 Monks 27.750
. Ashdown 27-539 Murray Caledonian 21.740
Atlas Elec S General 25.260 Murray Clydesdale 21 .484
Berry 27.970 Murray Northern 22.608
Bishopgate 29.316 Murray Western 22.058
Border & Southern 26.154 1928 22.185
British Assets 12.197 Northern American 22.888
Broadstone 22.027 Scottish American 14.995
Capital & National 26.831 Scottish Mortgage 24.768
Cardinal 27.188 Scottish National 25.010
Contin. & Industrial 18.846 Scottish Northern 12.770
Contin. Union 26.884 Scottish United 17.354
Edinburgh Investment 14.734 Securities 27.283
Electric & General 22.736 Sphere 26.844
First Scott. American 23.044 Ster1ing 24.550
General Consol. 24.341 Stockholders 22.451
General Funds 29.989 Throgmorton 13.014
Glasgow Stockholders 25.007 T rans-Ocean 25.264
Great Northern 24.403 Trust Union 25.447
Guard ian 24.408 UBS 26.896
Industrial & General 25.532 US & General 26.075
1nvestors 1 Capita1 20.391 Wi nterbottom 22.501
Lakeview 24.403 Wi tan 22.089
I
26 2? 36 3" 4i ji






34 40 61 62





















































































The average discount levels over the 96 month period can be
divided fairly easily into a low discount plateau lasting up
until mid-1976 and a high discount plateau from mid 1977 up
until the end of the decade. The high level of discounts in
this later period is particularly revealing. Indeed it is
clear that in spite of changes in investment attitudes towards
more active management strategies there was no corresponding
reduction in the potential for institutional pressure on the
^sector.
) The intervening period between mid 1976 and mid 1977 represented
a period of great instability in discount levels. We note
some of the general economic characteristics of this period in
Exh i b i t 6(i).
EXHIBIT 6(i)
General Economic Characteristics
Mid 1976 - Mid 1977
Date Description
1976 June £5,300m IMF facility announced
Septmebe r Threat of seamen's strike
September MLR raised to 13%
October Ster1ing col 1 apse
Octobe r MLR raised to 15%
December £3,900m IMF 3 year loan
1977 Janua ry Interest rates begin to fall
Feb rua ry Record trade deficit
Ma rch Interest rate reductions
June Successful BP rights issue
3^7
Given the economic instability of this period and in particular
of late 1976 it is perhaps not too surprising that this period
was one of considerable fluctuation in discount levels.
(i i i) Finally we identify two specific events. First of all as we
noted in Chapter 1 November and December 197^ saw the bottoming
out of a severe bear crash with January 1975 witnessing a very
substantial stock market rise. The average discount levels
for each of these three months were approximately 28%, 28% and
12% respectively. This apparently negative relationship between
market movements and discount levels in an area we look at in
more detail in section 3.
The second specific event to note is the removal of exchange
controls on October 2l+th 1979. Following the very swift abolition
of the investment currency market many ITCs had to make substantial
portfolio write-offs in order to remove the'premium content of
their foreign security holdings. Interestingly as the discount
widened in November 1979 to its highest level since mid 1979 it
would appear ceteris paribus that the price effect following the
removal of exchange controls was rather greater than the portfolio
effect!
We now move on to examine the financial characteristics of ITC portfolios
in more deta i 1 .
2. The Financial Characteristics of ITC Portfolios : Our approach to
this section is to estimate and comment briefly on portfolio return,
risk and performance measures. We do this in the context of comparing
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the portfolio results with those derived from ITC equities.
(i) Portfolio Returns : Monthly portfolio returns were calculated
for the 50 ITCs used in the previous section over the 36 month
period to December 1980. The return algorithm was similar to
that used for the computation of equity returns.
Rj = Log [[(NC - NO + DP)/N0] +1 ] 6(i i i)
where;
~ th
R. = Portfolio return on the i ITC for month t
i nt
NC = Closing net asset value as per equation 6(i i) .
NO = Opening net asset value as per equation 6(ii)
DP = Gross dividend paid.
Two points should be noted with regard to equation 6(iii) . First
of all the returns are not computed on a trade to trade basis.
We therefore do not account for non-trading amongst the constituent
securities. The observations used are based on month end mid-market
observations which as we noted in Chapter 3 do not necessarily
correspond to either a transaction date or value. While this is
clearly a data weakness we have no practical way of estimating
trade to trade returns short of reconstructing the portfolios and
their transactions. We note in passing that Dimson and Marsh in
2
fact offer such a service. The prob1 emsraised by this data
weakness are of course more acute in the context of risk measurement
which we deal with below.
2. E. Dimson, P. Marsh, "A New Approach to Measuring Selection Skills",
Investment Analyst, No. 60, 1981.
3^9
Secondly note that we consider the dividend disbursement date as
the relevant date on which to add in the dividend component of
total return. While equity prices are affected on the XD date
portfolio values will be reduced on the date that the company
accrues the dividend payable. Strictly speaking this accrual can
only be formalised after the directors' dividend proposals have
been approved .. by the members. However in practice it is
accrued from the announcement date. We noted earlier that our
net asset values contain an estimated dividend accrual and while
it would be more accurate to reverse the actual accrual and not add
in any dividend disbursement we follow the rather simpler practice
of adding in the dividend paid at the disbursement date. The
cost of this simplification will be to increase the observed
variance in total returns.
It is clear from the various explanatory points raised in our
discussion of portfolio returns and net asset values that a char¬
acteristic of empirical work in this area is that the apparent ease
with which portfolio statistics can be computed does rather hide
several important definitional points. These would include the
use of equity diluted by convertible rights, the valuation of
unquoted securities, in some cases the valuation of prior charges
and in our own work the dividend assumption. We suggest that
awareness of these problems is at least as useful in interpretating
results as any, possibly arbitrary attempts, to correct for
data deficiencies. In this context we are reminded of our
arguments in Chapter 3 on whether or not to make a tax adjustment
to equity returns.
Our portfolio return measures are reported in summary form in
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Table 6(iii). We also include in this Table summary results
for the equity returns on the 50 ITCs and the FTA-AS index over
the same 96 month period.
The equity returns are computed on the basis of trade to trade
returns discussed in Chapter 3.
Individual ITC results are shown in detail in Table 6(iv). Before
discussing these results it should be noted that we have adopted








96 Month Returns = [[Antilog [2- ^0
i = l
where;







Average Portfolio and Equity Returns - Summary
50 ITCs : 96 months to 12/80
(%)
Equ i ty Returns Portfolio Returns
Year
Average Mini mum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum
FTA-AS
1973 -36.859 -*49.0*47 -19.877 -31.080 -*40.239 -23.966 -30.385
197*4 -*47.463 -66.679 -30.253 -*42.83*4 -58.678 -30.800 -*49.803
1975 128.9*49 98.377 186.9*42 107.*470 *40 .958 170.*468 150.262
1976 -1 .*47*4 -18.395 12.2*41 16.227 1 .0*42 66.801 1 .*432
1977 *40.890 9.*459 87.531 20.960 1 .906 103.139 50.082
1978 7.23*4 -9.212 29.8*41 13.273 0 . *4*41 27.801 9.135
1979 -1.031 -22.672 17.559 2.395 -7.268 16.76*4 8.931
1980 59.918 37.150 98. *48*4 *43.026 29.979 55.665 33.982
96 mths to
12/80





50 ITCs : 8 years to 12/80 (%)
T rust 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 96 months
to 12/80
Alliance Investment -31 766 -42.692 114.548 12.604 21.986 18.861 4 .927 52.742 119.528
A11iance Trust -29 .431 -32.370 77.351 11 .989 21.470 8.175 -3 .896 34.600 61 .119
American -36 .442 -56.730 123.859 20.821 24.940 8.661 6 .395 45.950 56.814
Ashdown -29Ml -40.684 112.771 14.484 15.838 12.486 0 .459 47.950 97.283
Atlas Elect. £ Gen. -31 .841 -48.971 160.799 3.984 40.465 12.456 -0 .210 47.291 118.994
Berry -39 .208 -38.949 50.598 36.917 9,600 27.006 10 .392 54.614 81 .817
Bishopgate -29 .953 -52.724 129.329 11,418 36.515 10.412 1 .882 45.085 88.523
Border £ Southern -28 .133 30.800 77.309 10.589 21 ,757 17.278 -1 .452 41.811 94.652
British Assets -36 .199 -58.602 125.407 37.940 19,369 15.672 8 .053 29.979 59.258
Broadstone -31 .325 -42.486 127.728 11.473 25.650 11.712 0 .577 46.414 107.254
Capital £ National -28 .979 -36.857 98.512 15.226 19.396 14.751 0 .203 39.285 96.143
Ca rdina1 -30 .478 -46.275 111 .234 7.220 28.654 9.298 16 .764 50.392 109.038
Contin. £ 1ndustria 1 -25 .082 -51.092 171.468 16.686 20.637 4.856 7 .528 39.913 120.877
Contin. Union -30 .032 -44.401 140.944 7.648 24.702 9.618 -2 .544 39.541 87.566
Edinburgh Investment -31 .080 -41 .192 100.472 17.961 26.480 7.739 14 .541 55.665 131 .926
Electric £ General -39 .057 -52.192 65.378 66.801 4.362 18.418 3 .484 45.499 49.556
First Scott. American- -31 .552 -39.811. 100.867 15.451 14.790 13.318 -6 .268 37.503 60.171
Gene ra1 Consolid. -27 .345 -42.256 108.784 14.172 27.681 10.935 8 .115 34.225 105.562
General Funds -36 .554 -34.267 101.819 12.045 23.397 27.801 3 .359 45.381 140.386
Glasgow Stockholders -32 .195 -41.331 111 .794 14.527 13,521 7.512 12 OO OO 41 .510 88.123
Great Northern -28 .728 -46.508 114.633 3.459 32.758 8.105 1 .361 35.376 66.720
Guardian -35 .648 -50.998 157.673 5.784 26.868 0.441 -1 .124 44.671 70.744
Industrial £ General -25 .856 -45.373 121 .323 7.116 30.539 12.939 5 .330 40.751 109.870
Investors Capital -37 .604 -36.222 123.054 20.347 2.569 12.493 0 .733 44,581 79.514




T rust 1973 197*4 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
96 months
to 12/80
London & Holyrood -29.55A -33.081 90.775 11 .076 23 .92*4 12.288 0.833 *43 .375 100.960
London Provincial -25.658 -3*4.032 92.*4 *47 15.*40*4 13.59*4 12.899 -2.725 39.69*4 89.791
Monks -29.079 -39.256 96. *471 17.596 6.726 8.367 5.636 39.909 70.136
Murray Caledonian -30.981 -39.95*4 7*4.218 23.178 7.782 20.18*4 -5/673 *45.189 58.8A1
Murray Clydesdale -32.369 -*40.7*47 78.773 23.103 8.231 19.2*48 -7.293 *45.*4 *42 53, A73
Murray Northern -32.3^9 - *41 .290 77.050 21 .158 7.186 17.666 .-*4.626 *45 .352 50.192
Murray Western -32.07*4 -38.9*42 76.999 22.830 8.769 18.290 -5.2*4*4 *4*4.560 58.915
1928 -27.881 -*4l .771 122.61*4 1*4.039 16.129 15.923 -2.618 39.623 95-lAl
Northern American -32.*403 -*43.*458 105.932 17.026 15.113 15.7*40 -7.268 *41 .0*49 60.513
Scottish American -32.783 -56.0*4*1 91 .332 20.115 *47.723 5.296 1*4.792 *43 .702 7A.229
Scottish Mortgage -28.695 -32.806 75.399 18.387 *4.590 8.092 *4.726 38.122 62.698
Scottish National -32 .*499 -*43.817 117.72*4 13.171 1*4.311 8.929 7.107 *43 .772 79.177
Scottish Northern -31 .73*4 -58.678 112.377 17.*483 *42.*428 10.903 16.577 *43 .*457 85.927
Scottish United -27.29*4 -32 . *481 87.521 21 .838 1 .906 21 .391 *4.109 *40 .059 102.307
Secu rities -*40.329 -*42 . 355 130.*487 20.232 21.886 11.832 -2.821 37.983 Ik.222
Sphe re -31 .392 -46.052 139.517 7.822 26.962 13.3*41 -2.559 AO.639 88.A96
Ste r1ing -21 .*429 -38 .*432 90.169 16.0*46 15.682 12.127 -3.*4 *47 32.275 76.8A9
Stockholders -29.293 -37.99*4 92.055 12.983 21 .935 13.990 -2.*40*4 55.A01 99.659
Throgmorton -30.378 -57.73*4 1*40.733 1 .0*42 103.139 30.533 10.87*4 30.177 176.029
T rans-Ocean -29.092 -37 .*477 112.397 16.065 19.3*41 10.911 -0.733 AA .A29 107.399
Trust Union -28.161 -*41 .321 126.3*45 2.955 3?. 1:32 10. *457 3.899 AA.258 11A.888
UBS -23.966 -35.8*41 95.022 11 .726 16.892 13.006 -2.037 39.579 91.988
USA General -28.3*41 -*41.210 118.626 13.357 1*4.172 9.885 3.127 AO.382 89.630
Wi nterbottom -3*4.501 -*48.*429 117.*471 22.9*45 *4.938 8.235 10.986 A6.8A5 67.180
Wi tan -36.*465 -*4*4.29*4 82.273 18.299 16.189 17.789 -2.829 53-A 18 55.661
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The following points should be noted from Tables 6(iii) and 6(iv) :
(i) Average portfolio returns over the 96 month period were
marginally higher than those achieved by ITC equities.
(ii) Both average portfolio and average equity returns were less
than those achieved on the FTA-AS index.
(iii) The range of average portfolio returns (126.473%) was
considerably less than that for average equity returns (150.627%)
(iv) There is a broad similarity in the year to year movements
between the average portfolio and equity returns and indeed
between these returns and those on the FTA-AS index.
What Tables 6 (i i i) and 6(iv) fail to disclose is whether or not
the average results are hiding substantial differences in achieved
return at the individual ITC level. To remedy this the cumulative
96 month equity and portfolio returns for each of the 50 ITCs were
plotted out. These are shown in Graph 6(ii) .
From Graph 6(i i) we observe further evidence of the similarity
between equity and portfolio returns. The relationship is clearly
close and positive. Indeed the Spearman rho between the sets of
returns was noted as 0.848.
It is difficult to find any controversial points in these results.




Cumulative Portfolio (Navret) and Equity (Equret) Returns




assets we would clearly expect to find a close relationship.
Perhaps the most interesting observation is the absolute difference
in achieved returns. We noted that on average portfolio returns
slightly out-performed equity returns but that both were less
than those achieved on the FTA-AS index. Interestingly Corner
and Matatko working with 92 ITCs between 197^ and 1979 report
average annual portfolio returns of 23.^% and average annual
equity returns of 26.1%. If these averages were valid over our
8 year period then significant differences would exist between
3
our results and those of Corner and Matatko. However after
adjusting Corner and Matatko's results by the inclusion of our
estimates for 1973, 197^ and 1980 a reasonable reconciliation is
possible. We show this in Exhibit 6(ii).
While noting that there is a 2.022% p.a. (8.166% - 6.l4A%) portfolio
return differential and a 0.8A4% p.a. (7-613% " 6.769%) equity
return differential we suggest that the net annual differential
of 1.178% p.a. (0.553% + 0.625%) is negligible especially after
consideration of sample size differences.
(ii) Portfolio Risk : Total market and unique risk measures were
calculated for each of the 50 ITCs on the 96 monthly observations
to December 1980. Again the procedure adopted was similar to
that used for the computation of equity risk measures with the
important exception that monthly rather than trade to trade returns
were used. As we noted in Chapter k where non-trading is ignored
the dates of the transaction observations on the independent
dependent variables may not be aligned. This result is an
underestimate of the covariance term relating the two variables.
3. D. Corner, J. Matatko, "Investment Trust Portfolio Performance - Measure¬





Corner and Matatko Lyal 1
A] Portfolio Returns :
Cumulative Returns (Log form)
5 years to 12/79 (23.4% p.a.)


















B] Equity Returns :
Cumulative Returns (Log form)
5 years to 12/79 (26.1% p.a.)


























The potential severity of this problem is unfortunately rather
difficult to estimate. Interestingly the alternative beta estimates
calculated by Reinganum using both OLS and aggregated coefficients
methodologies suggest that the under estimation may well be quite
serious.^ We reported Reinganum's results in Table 5(xi).
Unfortunately we can do no more than be aware of this problem.
The three risk measures were calculated as follows :
A
Total Risk (t) - £ (R. )i n t
XV
Market Risk (m) = B. L{r' )
f i nm <• mt
y2 2(t - m )
The market risk coefficient was estimated from the following
equation.
^, A A -V, -y
R. = o<. + B. R + £. 6(iv)int in / inm mt int
where;
R. = R. - Rr4.int int ft
R
* = R . "mt mt ft
wi th;
Rjnt = as per equation 6(i i i)
R^t = Log ((FTC - FTO + D)/FT0) +1 )
Rft = Log (((TBt_1)/12 (1-TBt_])) +1)
k. M. Reinganum, "A Direct Test of Roll's Conjecture on the Firm Size







As with our equity risk measures we present them in annual return
format as follows
I
TotaPrisk (T) = ((Antilog (JC^(R. ).12 )) -1) 100
Market risk (M) = B. ((Antilog (J <^(R' ) . 12)) -1) 100
/ i nm mt
Unique risk = J
Our portfolio risk results are summarised in Table 6(v) along with the
comparative equity risk measures calculated using the trade to trade
returns as described in Chapter k over the same 36 month period.
The individual ITC measures are shown in Table 6 (vi) .
We make the following points with regard to Tables 6(v) and 6(vi).
(i) The coefficients of determination interpreted either as
"goodness of fit" statistics or as levels of diversification
are very similar for the equity and portfolio risk estimating
equations.
= Closing FTA-AS index value for month t
= Opening FTA-AS index value for month t
= Annual equivalent of the 3 month Treasury Bill
= discount rate
= (DY.FTC)/I200
where DY s Dividend yield on the FTA-AS index
at the end of month t.
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TABLE 6(v)
1 nvestment Trust Companies
Average Equity and Portfolio Risk Measures Summary
50 ITCs : 96 months to 12/80 (%)
Equity Risk Portfolio Risk
T rust
Average Mini mum Maximum Average Mini mum Maximum
Total Risk 33.830 30.406 56.950 29.327 23.957 35.077
Beta 0.963 0.708 1 .185 0.727 0.501 0.972
11^-11 15.36 9.88 OCMCM 15-95 7.83 27.52
"SE" 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.048 0.026 0.074
Market Risk 30.478 22.411 37.573 24.824 17.084 33.145
Unique Risk 23.850 15.479 42.796 14.991 6.474 24.274

















Ma rket R i sk
Un i que
Risk
R2T £im M >/(T2-M2) Pirn M ^(T2-M2)
Alliance Investment 29.353 .761 25.950 13.712 .751 London £ Holyrood 26.867 .703 23.972 12.131 .751
A1 1 iance Trust 24.344 .611 20.835 12.590 .675 London £ Provincial 23.957 .605 20.631 12.177 .682
Ame rican 32.436 .828 28.235 15.964 .758 Monks 27.528 .685 23.359 14.565 .680
Ashdown 29.129 .761 25.950 13.232 .761 Murray Caledonian 26.692 .575 19.631 18.085 .503
Atlas Electric £ Gen. 34.237 .945 32.225 11.563 1888 Murray Clydesdale 26.999 .592 20.187 17.828 .525
Berry 25.208 .501 17.084 18.535 .423 Murray Northern 26.824 .575 19.608 18.304 .500
Bishopgate 33.680 .911 31.065 13.011 .847 Murray Western 26.824 .591 20.153 17.702 .529
Border £ Southern 24.172 .613 20.903 12.138 .687 1928 29.487 .775 26.428 13.078 .773
British Assets 33.634 .742 25.302 22.159 .563 Northern American 29.771 .740 25.234 15.796 .696
B roadstone 31 .430 .823 28.064 14.151 .780 Scottish American 28.459 .647 22.063 17.976 .571
Capita1 £ Nationa1 25.730 .680 23.188 11.151 .765 Scottish Mortgage 24.560 .568 19.369 15.100 .573
Ca rdina1 32.711 .643 21.926 24.274 .434 Scottish National 30.568 .782 26 .666 14.944 .738
Contin. £ Industrial 34.983 .972 33.145 11 .190 .862 Scottish Northern 35.077 .874 29.803 18.498 .726
Continental Union 31.886 .856 29.190 12.832 .836 Scottish United 27.838 .556 18.960 20.383 .435
Edinburgh Investment 30.840 .791 26.973 14.952 .743 Securities 31.795 .801 27.314 16.274 .724
Electric £ General 28.771 .541 18.448 22.078 .388 Sphere 32.298 .857 29.224 13.752 .807
First Scottish American 28.060 .715 24.382 13.888 .719 St i r1 ing 26.079 .660 22.506 13.175 .595
General Consolidated 28.282 .785 26.803 9.025 .857 Stockholders 26.867 .638 21 .756 15.764 .515
General Funds 29.263 .688 23.461 17.490 .615 Th rogmorton 33.726 .855 29.156 16.952 .748
Glasgow Stockholder 30.794 .774 26.393 15.864 .714 T rans-Ocean 28.771 .724 24.688 14.772 .704
Great Northern 28.104 .802 27.348 4.574 .903 Trust Union 31 .385 .854 29.121 11.704 .841
Guard ian 34.563 .951 32.429 11 .956 .884 UBS 24.258 .642 21.892 10.449 .750
Industrial £ General 29.891 .837 28.542 8.878 .836 US £ General 28.727 .762 25.984 12.250 .785
Investors Capital 31.704 .685 23.359 23.359 .529 Wi nterbottom 32.895 .783 26.700 19.214 .650
Lakeview 25.861 .669 22.813 22.813 .725 Wi tan 29.039 .669 22.813 17.967 .589
(ii) Similarly the "t" statistics and standard errors around
the beta estimates for both equations are also very
close.
(iii) The average total risk and average market risk estimates
are considerably less for the ITC portfolios than for the
corresponding equities.
As with the portfolio and equity returns we examine whether our
averaging hides ranking differences. The relevant Spearman rank
correlation coefficients are shown in Table 6(vii).
TABLE 6(vii)
Investment Trust Companies
Equity and Portfolio Risk Comparisons





It is clear from Table 6(vii) that very little relationship at all
exists between the total and market risk estimates of ITC portfoli
and ITC equities. Similar results were reported by Corner and
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Matatko. They reported "little relationship" between portfolio
and equity betas. in addition they reported that the levels of
total and market risk were lower for portfolios than equities.
Interestingly we also noted this result in our review of reported
market risk coefficients which is summarised in Table 4(iv).
The result that portfolio risk levels are neither related to nor
have the same magnitude as equity risk levels is a particularly
revealing and indeed surprising observation. Given our comments above
on non-trading and the data weaknesses underlying net asset value
computation we recognise that reasons for at least part of these
differences may be due to data and estimation causes. However we
do return in section 3 to consider the implications such differences
if valid hold for our understanding of the discount.
) Portfolio Performance : Two performance measures the Sharpe varia-
bility and the Jensen weighted were calculated for the 50 ITCs over
the 48 month period to December 1980. The use of the 48 rather than
the 96 month period was justified by two considerations. First of
all the use of the 96 month period covering as it did the severe bear
depression of 1974 resulted in the portfolio performance being assessed
against negative risk premium benchmarks. We noted the possible
ambiguities that can arise in this situation when we dealt with
performance estimators in Chapter 5. Secondly as we were primarily
interested in comparing the equity and portfolio performance assessments
and in particular given the methodological differences in the computation
of risk and return their ranking consistency it was considered reasonable
to use the more financially stable later part of the decade.
Equations 4(xvii) and 6(iv) run over the 48 months to December 1980
were used to estimate the Jensen weighted statistic. As before
these are presented in cumulative simple return format the





Antilog o(. /p.in fin
48 -1 100
As discussed in Chapter 5 the use of estimating equation 4(xvii)
results in alpha statistics in terms of average daily abnormal
returns. Therefore the appropriate multiplier was 1460 rather than
48.
The Sharpe variability measures for the ITC portfolios were
calculated as follows :
Sharpe Variability (Portfolio) = S
48
z, R.- f ;1=1 int Int
where;
Rj t = as defined in equation 6(iv)
/(R.' ) = Estimated 48 month standard deviation,
int
The appropriate market benchmark was defined as;
48






as defined for equation 6(iv)
/\ /
/(R ) = Estimated 48 month standard deviation,
mt
As before the performance statistics are presented in simple
return format. The appropriate transformation being:
Sharpe Variability (Portfolio) Anti1og S -1 100
The Sharpe variability measures for the ITC equity returns
and market benchmark were calculated over the same k8 month period
using the estimating procedures described in Chapter 5-
Our results are presented in summary form in Table 6(viii) and in
more detail in Table 6(ix).
We strongly caution against reading too much into Table 6(viii).
The different methods of performance computation, one based on
trade to trade returns and the other on monthly returns lies, in all
probability at the root of the differences between the two sets of
statistics. To the extent that comparisons can be made it is
clear that a far more favourable performance assessment is given of
ITCs when the equity performance is considered.
Perhaps more important than the scale difference is whether or not
ranking differences distinguish the two approaches to performance
assessment. Corner and Matatko report a rank correlation between
equity and portfolio Jensen statistics of .70.^ Our results
shown in Table 6(x) confirm their findings and also report
the high correlation between the different measures a result that
is consistent with our earlier findings in this area reported in
Chapter 5.
5. D. Corner, J. Matatko, "Investment Trust Portfolio Performance -




Equity and Portfolio Performance Summary








Average Minimum Maximum No. of Positive
Stat i st i cs
No. of Statistics
than market
Jensen Weighted 6.410 -23-064 -40.656 23 23 -11 .356 -32.922 49.634 9 9
Sharpe Variabi1ity 118.670 14.668 403-982
i
50 12 83.108 4.07 390.36 50 6
Notes : 1. The market benchmark for the Sharpe portfolio index = 194.326%
2. The market benchmark for the Sharpe equity index





Jensen Weighted (J) Sharpe Variability (S)
50 ITCs : 48 months to 12/30
(%)
Trust J S Trust J S
Alliance Investment 8.14 151.96 London & Holyrood -19.43 42.43
A11iance Trust -28.83 9-74 London Provincial -25.86 18.01
American 3.66 133.31 Monks -29-72 10.11
Ashdown -18.07 40.97 Murray Caledonian -21.14 23.90
Atlas Elec S Gen. -1.49 155.79 Murray Clydesdale -24.91 15.18
Berry 26.71 164.64 Murray Northern -24.76 15.78
Bishopgate -9.64 102.43 Murray Western -24.04 18.60
Border S Southern -11.24 77.30 1928 -22.62 31 .59
British Assets -10.00 54.28 Northern American -25.47 17.89
Broadstone -9.56 85-99 Scott. American 36.79 339.95
Capita1 S Nationa1 -15.85 56.50 Scott. Mortgage -32.92 3.08
Cardina1 15.53 202.65 Scott. National -16.95 51 .44
Continental S Indus. -21 .35 43.52 Scott. Northern 19.90 245.80
Continental Union -22.03 38.67 Scott. United -19.94 25.61
Edinburgh Investment 7.62 196.63 Securities -22.07 31.19
Electric S General -15.73 47.17 Sphere -15-95 63.51
First Scott. Amer. -30.16 59.30 Ster1ing -29.04 4.07
General Consol. -17.28 86.75 'Stockhol ders -5.32 95.13
General Funds 22.20 231.81 Throgmorton 49.63 390.36
Glasgow St'holders -15.71 57.00 T rans-Ocean -17.52 48.59
Great Northern -15.80 73.03 Trust Union -7.35 116.41
Guardian -15.69 68.17 UBS -21.97 32.76
Indus. & General -4.77 126.76 US & General -22.29 33-59
Investors Capital -29.86 4.55 Winterbottom -18.71 36.08




Portfolio and Equity Performance Measures
Ranking Consistency
50 ITCs : 48 months to 12/80
l
Performance Measures Spearman Rho
Sharpe Portfolio and
Jensen Weighted Portfolio 0.941
Sharpe Portfolio and
Sharpe Equity 0.739
Jensen Weighted Portfolio and
Jensen Weighted Equity 0.732
Working with a sample.. of 50 ITCs we have in this section
presented a comparison between the financial characteristics
of ITC portfolios and equities. As we would expect the respective
financial profiles are very similar. The most notable differences
were found in comparing total and market risk levels. We suggested
that differences in estimation procedures may well account for
/
a proportion of the difference between the higher equity and lower
portfolio betas.
/
With these probable risk differences in mind we turn now to review
various reported results on the discount phenomenon.
3. Reported Determinants of the Discount : There have over the
years been many attempts at "explaining" the presence of price
discounts on ITC and closed end fund equities. While it would be
unfair to suggest that we are as far as ever from an understanding
of discounts the lack of a strong theoretical base from which to
develop empirical tests is an over-riding drawback to work in this
area. In the U.K. context we note that most stockbroking firms
provide elementary trading rules based on ex post discount movements
and the identification of current discount "anomalies". These
"anomalies" are best defined in terms of current deviations from
historical norms. We noted in Table 6 (i i) that average discounts
on different ITCs are fairly tightly bunched in the 20 to 30% range.
This would perhpas suggest only a limited potential for identifying
profitable individual ITC "anomalies". However Thompson working
with monthly data from 23 closed end funds between 19^0 and 1976
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reports that the use of relatively simple trading rules based
on the level of discounts at the beginning of each year end
with rebalancing at the end of each year wouldhave led to
superior returns over those provided by the ex post SML benchmark.^
While there is obviously the danger inherent with all work
involving trading rules that "a model can always be found to fit
ex post data" Thompson is cautious in his conclusions and suggests
that methodological weaknesses in particular the adequacy of CAPM
as the pricing model for closed-end shares may lie at the centre
of his results.
In the U.K. context Thomas and Feldman have reported a profitable
"anomaly" model based on the relationship between the discount and
a series of variables including portfolio performance, gearing,
U.S. exposure, yield and fixed interest exposure.^ We suggest
that there is little academic merit in the broad empirical approach
of Thomas and Feldman. Recently Woodward and Matatko have reported
results relating the discount to fifteen variables including
g
management expenses, size, price volatility and performance. Again
we question the relevance of this "shotgun" approach to empirical
work. Their results perhaps unsurprisingly fail to provide consistent
pred ictions of discount levels.
More specific attempts at explaining discount levels for the most
part centre around various accounting type problems. The argument
6. R. Thompson, "The Information Content of Discounts and Premiums on
Closed-End Fund Shares", Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 1978,
pp. 151-186.
7. D. O'D. Thomas, K. Feldman, "The Development of a Model to Explain
Investment Trust Prices and Discounts", Investment Analyst, September,
1977, pp. 39-51.
8. R. Woodward, J. Matatko, "Factors Affecting the Behaviour of U.K.
Closed-End Funds", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 3k,
1982.
371
runs as follows. If the securities market is efficient then
the pricing of ITC shares will be such that it reflects their
expected returns. The observation that portfolio valuations
differ from equity valuations is merely a reflection of incorrectly
valued portfolios. Two broad categories of estimation difference
can be identified - those relating to the management function and
those relating to cash flow differences.
The management function is most certainly not included in portfolio
valuations. That the market tends to discount the management input
by pricing ITC equities at less than portfolio valuations is argued
to be the market's assessment on the net value of the management
function. Attempts have been made to relate various aspects of
this management input to discount 1evels?'^^^ These
include portfolio turnover, management expenses, trading expenses,
performance and portfolio yield. Unfortunately the results are
unconvincing. Perhaps the general conclusion is best summarised in
terms of the management function being a contributory rather than a
complete explanation of the discount.
9. R. Roenfeldt, D. Tuttle, "An Examination of Discounts and Premiums
on Closed-End Investment Companies", Journal of Business Research,
1973 pp. 129-140.
10. K. Boudereaux, "Discounts and Premiums on Closed-End National Funds:
A Study in Valuation", Journal of Finance, 28, (May 1973)pp•515-522.
11. B. Malkiel, "The Valuation of Closed-End Investment Company Shares",
Journal of Finance, 22 June 1977, pp. 847-859-
12. M. Mendelson "Closed End Fund Discounts Revisited", Working Papers
1977- Centre for Study of Financial Institutions, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
13- T. Mclnish, "Publically Traded Investment Company Discounts and
Premiums. Baylor Business Studies, 11, 1980, pp. 17~24.
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The cash flow explanation of the discount turns on timing differences
that are recognized in the equity prices but not in the portfolio
valuations. For example contingent claims such as in the U.K.
context corporation tax on unrealized portfolio gains and the
surrender tax on unrealized foreign securities would not be reflected
in net asset values but given reasonably efficient markets we would
expect prices to reflect estimates of the ultimate liabilities.
Although working with U.S. data and therefore with different accounting
and tax regimes Malkiel and Mendelson have both found evidence
1A 15
relating discounts to this form of timing effect. ' Again
however they are insufficient to account for the level of discounts
observed. In the U.K. context we note that the two contingent
liabilities described above are now no longer necessary given the removal
of both exchange controls and taxation on realized portfolio gains.
Unfortunately even with their removal discounts show no sign of
abating. This would strongly suggest that only a minor role should
be ascribed to timing differences.
Both the management function and the cash flow effect are arguments
consistent with efficient markets where prices are established through
the risk-return relationship described by CAPM. The presence of a
discount is merely a reconciling item between all encompassing
equity valuations and rather more restricted portfolio valuations.
We note that the argument supporting management function as a discount
determinant would also allow an explanation for the presence of
premiums. Indeed it is quite feasible that the market could ascribe
a positive value to a particular management function. The equity
14. M. Mendelson, "Closed-End Fund Discounts Revisited", Working Papers
1977, Centre for Study of Financial Institutions, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
15. B. Malkiel, "The Valuation of Closed-End Investment Company Shares",
Journal of Finance, 22 June 1977, pp. 8A7-859-
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price would then reflect an additional element equivalent to
the valuation of this management effect net of its capitalised
expenses.
Unfortunately for these accounting type arguments the fact that it
has proved remarkably difficult to complete reconciliations between
portfolio and equity valuations would suggest that other factors may be
relevant. Similarly if Thompson's results which we reported above are
interpreted in the context of CAPM as reflecting the "true" risk-
return relationship for ITC equities then the assumption underlying
the accounting approach that the market for these securities is
1 g
efficient would be misplaced.
We now turn to three arguments which are strictly incompatible with
the two parameter pricing approach. The first suggests that because
of transaction costs a demand for diversification services exists but
that the portfolios returns being supplied by ITCs are for one reason
or another less than perfectly diversified. The result is that the
repackaged product is valued at less than the sum of the parts.
We suggest that this argument fails to consider the diversification
effects of holding a small portfolio of ITC shares. Recall the
considerably higher coefficients of determination we reported for
portfolios of small, medium and large ITCs as compared to the full
sample average of 0.64. See Table 5(x'v)- The ease with which
even an individual investor could remove the unique risk attached to
ITC equities would strongly suggest rejection of this argument.
16. R. Thompson, "The Information Content of Discounts and Premiums on
Closed-End Fund Shares", Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 1978,
pp. 151 -186.
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The second argument is based on a weakening of the CAPM equi libr.iating
assumption of homogeneous expectations. Zweig for example has
suggested that discounts and premiums are caused by differential
expectations between (informed) professional investors and (uninformed)
non-professional investors.^ As closed-end fund shareholders tend
to be dominated by individuals the equity prices of these funds will
reflect non-professional expectations. He argues that widening
discounts will occur when these non-professional investors become
bearish and that narrowing discounts will be observed when they are
bullish. Professional investors on the other hand will not follow
the non-professionals into the extremes of bull or bear expectations.
On the basis of this Zweig hypothesised that reversals in professional
expectations should be preceded by non-professional expectation
changes in the opposite direction. Thus there should be a negative
relationship between a market-wide price movement and the preceding
change in discount levels. Working with 260 weekly observations on
2b closed end funds between 1965 and 1971 Zweig reported that there was
following a discount change a ;
"
... high probability that stock prices will reverse
towards the unanticipated direction."
In the U.K. context we noted in Chapter 1 that changes in ITC ownership
patterns reflected the market wide movement towards institutional
ownership. Therefore if anything the ITC ownership group is becoming
more informed and more homogeneous perhaps even to the extent that
it is now dominated by so-called professional investors. Clearly
there may be groups of institutional investors distinguished from
one another by expectationa1 characteristics. However we suggest
17- M. Zweig, "An Investor Expectations Stock Price Predictive Model
Using Closed-End Fund Premiums", Journal of Finance, 28 March
1973, pp. 67-78.
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that these differences will not be of a magnitude comparable with
Zweig's professional:non-professional categories. In addition
we would have expected some reduction in discount levels as the
expectational differences between different market participants
narrowed. We noted no evidence of such a trend in Section 1 of
this chapter. If anything discounts at the end of the decade were
on average higher than those in the earlier years. We would suggest
then that there is only limited scope for Zweig's expectational
differences insight into the discount problem.
Similar arguments supporting an expectational solution to the
18 19discount have been put forward by Malkiel among others. ' Malkiel
suggested that discounts reflected investor expectations in much
the same way as sales and redemptions by the holders of units in open-
ended funds did. Working with data from 2k closed end funds between
1967 and 197^ Malkiel estimated a linear regression with discounts
as the dependent variable and net redemptions as the independent
variable. As the resulting coefficient although positive was
unfortunately statistically insignificant Malkiel could not
substantiate the expectational explanation for discounts.
Finally we examine an argument that gained wide exposure during the
mid 1970s and which has at first pass considerable appeal. It is v
suggested that a major cause of the discount is an excess supply of
ITC equity over and above the amount demanded by investors. As a
result of this excess supply prices drop until a market clearing
18. B. Malkiel, "The Valuation of Closed-End Investment Company
Shares", Journal of Finance, 23 May 1968, pp. 389-^16.
19. E. Miller, "Risk, Uncertainty and Divergence of Opinion", Journal
of Finance, 22 September 1977, PP- 1151,1168.
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level is established. A corollary to the over supply argument is
that a reduction in the quantity of ITC equity available would
result in the reduction if not the complete removal of the discount.
The sensitivity of the discount to changes in the quantity of
ITC equities available clearly depends on the elasticity of demand
for ITC equities. Indeed we suggest that the demand curve would
have to be substantially inelastic in order that supply reductions
could remove discount levels of 20 to 30%. Note also that the not
inconsiderable member and size of amalgamations and take overs during
the 1970s which we mentioned in Chapter 1 has not resulted in any
reduction of average sector discount levels.
Unfortunately while there is no direct evidence on the elasticity of
demand for ITC equities what there is for equities in general would
20 21
strongly suggest a demand curve that is highly elastic. ' In
addition an implication of a relatively inelastic demand curve is
that some degree of segmentation exists between ITC equities and the
rest of the equity market. The evidence we reviewed in Chapter 2
on the efficiency of the stock market would argue against such
segmentation. As with the other arguments reviewed above it is
difficult to conclude that an excess supply of ITC equity is a
convincing explanation of the discount.
From our review of the various explanations suggested as underlying
equity and portfolio valuation differences it is clear that considerable
work still has to be done in establishing a firm theoretical framework
within which to examine the discount. Following Sharpe and Sosin
20. M. Scholes, "The Market for Securities : Substitution versus Price
Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices", Journal
of Business, 2, April, 1972.
21. P. Marsh, "Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the U.K. Stock
Market". Journal of Finance, 3^, ^ September, 1979-
377
perhaps the best way forward is to start with a more thorough under-
22
standing of the discount's constituent elements. For example
the key difference we noted earlier between the equity and portfolio
returns appeared to centre on the lower levels of risk reported
on the portfolio returns. We suggested that estimation difficulties
may provide part of the reason although we noted that market risk
levels reported by other authors tended to be lower for unit trusts
and open-ended funds than for ITCs or closed-end funds. Concentrating
On the market risk levels it is interesting to consider the implications
that stem from the observed difference in market risk levels being
in fact correct. Nothing that co-variance terms are additive then;
A
Equity market risk coefficient.
Portfolio market risk coefficient
Implied market risk coefficient on the discount.
The clear implication from this perhaps obvious point is that discount
levels tend to move against the market. We noted earlier in this
chapter some slight evidence from the December 197^ - January 1975
stock market turn around that this might be the case. Why this should
be so is slightly more difficult to establish. A possible reason
which would owe more to the importance of the market making function
in securities markets than to the risk-return relationship of CAPM
22. W. Sharpe, H. Sosin, "Closed-End Investment Companies in the
United States : Risk and Return". Papers and Proceedings of the









would be a secondary stock hypothesis. The argument would run
as follows. ITC equities are perceived by investors not as a
first choice investment but as a second choice. Thus in bull
markets it is only after it becomes too expensive to purchase
securities directly that investors take the secondary route via
ITC equities to their chosen securities. A purchasing switch to
ITC equities would result in relatively higher price rises for ITC
equities than the portfolio securities with a resultant discount
reduction. At the start of bear markets ITC equities are first to
go as managers attempt to obtain some insurance against equity
losses by going liquid. The choice of selling ITC equities rather
than "primary" equities may be partly in a desire to retain as much
of the "central" portfolio as possible and partly in the possibility
that ITC equities are more marketable at the start of bear markets
than towards the bottom. Relatively higher selling pressure on
ITC equities as compared to the portfolio securities would result
in wider discounts.
We do no more than suggest an investment scenario that is consistent
with the negative relationship between the discount and the market.
If such a scenario is to have any validity it must first of all be
developed theoretically. It may well be that such a theory should
centre on the role of the market maker and in particular the stock
market's well accepted but rarely examined objective namely to
provide 1iquidity.
Summary : In this chapter we have reviewed discount levels and
trends, the financial characteristics of ITC portfolios in the
context of a comparison with their equity counterparts and reported
on various hypothesised discount determinants. Average discount
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levels were noted to be fairly similar for different ITCs but varied
considerably over time. The financial characteristics of ITC
portfolios were found to be very similar to those of ITC equities with
the possible exception of risk levels and in particular market risk
levels. Finally we reported that the various explanations of the
discount suggested in the literature were not convincing and left
an uneasy feeling that the whole question of the discount was being
approached from the wrong direction. We suggested that a possible
alternative methodology would be to concentrate on what differences
could be observed between ITC equities and portfolios. In
particular we noted an investment scenario that was consistent with
the observed negative discount-market relation and which held out
the possibility of theoretical development when considered in the context
of two areas not present in the world of CAPM namely market-making




Our examination of the ITC sector during the ten years to December
1980 has covered arguments suggesting a raison d'etre for ITCs,
the institutional frameworking within which ITC managers had to
operate and an assessment of the performance achieved by ITCs during
the decade. We argued that two broad categories of intermediation
funct.'ian are open to ITCs. The first involves exploiting the
possibility that different market participants are faced with different
transaction cost functions in their attempts to gain access to the
securities market. In general the access costs are likely to be
greater for individual investors than for institutional investors.
As this former category of investor are unlikely to hold diversified
portfolios their interest in holding an ITC stake will primarily be
in order to receive a return flow closely correlated with that of the
market. However the increased institut ionalisation of the stock
exchange has meant that the ITC equity ownership group now consists
of a relatively small number of institutional investors. Given the
large and well diversified portfolios that these investors hold it
is not at all clear that access to a well diversified return flow
is the most appropriate service ITCs should be offering this particular
group. To the extent that institutional ownership groups insist
on this service being provided then there will be significant
restrictions on the operational scope of ITC managers. Indeed such
management activity that is undertaken will consist in the main of
gearing decisions when interest rates allow together with some
foreign exposure.
We suggest that during the period from the end of World War II up
until the mid 1970s the intermediation services being offered by ITCs
were characterised by this "transaction cost" approach. However
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from the mid 1960s onwards changes in the economic and institutional
environment led to the relevance of this approach being increasingly
questioned. In particular individual investors found through the
intermediation services being offered by pension funds and insurance
companies a more tax efficient route to the securities market. Secondly
the high interest rates that characterised the late 1960s and a good
part of the 1970s removed the "access to the leverage" justification
for institutions to hold ITC equities. It is little wonder then that
the ITC sector found itself under increasing pressure to provide a
rationale for its continued existence.
Given these pressures together with the level of discounts during most
of the decade it is perhaps surprising that more ITCs have not been
unitised or taken over. The reasons for this are difficult to
specify precisely. However changes in the intermediation service
being provided and a greater awareness of the need to market ITC
services are undoubtedly contributory elements. We also note that
defensive measures such as ITCs holding equity stakes in other ITCs
may well have played a part.
We suggested in Chapters 4 and 5 that there was some evidence pointing
to a successful re-orientation by several ITCs away from intermediation
services based on a "transaction cost" approach towards those based
on the production and utilisation of price sensitive information. This
re-orientation was characterised by the adoption of what we termed
security selection policies. In practice these policies usually
involve significant amounts of spec i a 1isat ion . The adoption of such
policies certainly allow ITC managers to be seen "to be managing". Indeed
individual ITCs may well develop considerable expertise and
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knowledge in particular geographic or industrial areas. Thus
holding an ITC equity could provide a useful additional element
of exposure to an institutional portfolio.
However there are strong reasons suggesting that even this re-orientation
of the services provided by ITCs will not be sufficient to allow them
to successfully retain an intermediation function. At the theoretical
level we noted in Chapter 1 that there is considerable doubt as to
whether or not information production alone justifies investment inter¬
mediation. It may well be that in the absence of any comparative
tax or statuory advantages over other financial intermediaries a
whole series of inter-related financial services such as investment
advice, insurance, bookkeeping and tax services should be offered
to ITC equity holders. Unfortunately there already exist a
considerable number of financial intermediaries that offer these
services and to suggest that ITCs can successfully expand into these
areas is perhaps too optimistic.
A considerably bleaker scenario for ITCs follows from the possibility
that risky assets are priced in accordance with CAPM which in turn
would imply an extremely strong form of market efficiency. Under such
a market regime there would as we noted in Chapter 4 be no role for
security selection policies and indeed the management function would
be reduced to one of meeting investor risk requirements through
levering or unlevering the market portfolio. To the extent that these
models are both theoretically valid and are reflected in the real
world then institutions may well be less likely to consider an ITC
stake in terms of a management function delegated to those with an
expertise in producing and utilising price-sensitive information and
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more likely to consider it in terms of an opportunistic investment
purchased in expectation of the ITCs ultimate liquidation or unitisation.
While we suggest that the most optimistic role for ITCs lies with the
production and utilisation of information the theoretical difficulties
noted above certainly restrict the extent of this optimism. Unfortunately
even leaving aside these theoretical points there still remain a
considerable number of practical difficulties that may well hinder
attempts to re-oreintate the 1TC product.
Firstly institutional owners perhaps sensitive to the theoretical
points made above may well object to any attempts at change. A recent
example of this was the proposed re-organisation of the ITCs under
the management of Investment Trust Services. We note that a similar
re-organisation was in fact successfully carried out by the Touche
Remnant management group who now manage a group of highly individual
and specialised ITCs.
Secondly the large size of many ITCs could preclude effective
specialisation. For example it may well just not be possible to
find a sufficient number of acceptable investment opportunities in
a particular area of specialisation to allow successful selection
policies to be reflected in superior performance. To the extent
that a large ITC counters this shortage by specialising in more than
one investment area then it runs the risk of slipping back into a
policy of providing investors with a diversified return flow!
Interestingly ITC managers that have chosen to specialise in either
small or unquoted companies may well be currently facing this very
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problem. Several investment managers have suggested to the author
that there is at present a shortage of acceptable investment projects
in these areas. This is particularly unfortunate for two reasons.
First of all such investments involving as they do both the
introduction of elements of illiquidity into portfolios as well as
the need for considerable amounts of management time and expertise
may not be ideally suited to other intermediaries such as pension
funds and insurance companies whose investment policies are perhaps
more related to the nature of their ultimate liabilities than to
investment search procedures. These institutions may well prefer to
control their exposure to this investment area though holding a
more marketable and perhaps more easily managed ITC stake. Secondly
from the arguments in Chapter 1 on the importance of information
and liquidity to the workings of the securities market ITC stakes
in these small investment opportunities may well act as _ useful
"qua 1 ity signalin the case of unquoted companies and a source of
increased marketability for those companies already quoted. While
these effects will be to the benefit of the market as a whole the public
good aspects of the information production process may well prevent
the full rewards returning to ITCs.
To the extent that there is a role for ITCs in exploiting the types
of investment opportunities described above then it is prudent to
ask whether the various institutional parameters described in Chapter 2
facilitate this role. We suggest that the importance attached to
diversification and quoted securities by both company and tax law as
well as the restrictive nature of the internal regulations of many
ITCs may act to hinder the full adoption of these new investment
policies. However what is perhaps more important and perhaps more
difficult to change are investment attitudes. In particular we noted
above the shortage of "acceptable" opportunities in the investment
areas of unquoted and small companies. We suggest that to an ITC
equity holder protected by the limited liability structure of the
1TC "acceptable" may imply a higher exposure to business risk than
many ITC managers are willing to take on. The extent to which
management attitudes must change is difficult to assess. We suggest
that over the sector as a whole it may be considerable.
Thirdly and finally we note that specialisation whether it is
geographic, industrial or small company is an area already covered
by many unit trusts. It may well be that any disadvantages such
as an inability to gear that are sourced in the fiduciary nature of
the trust vehicle are more than offset by their already having
considerable expertise in a whole range of specialised investment
areas.
In conclusion we suggest that the future of the ITC sector is by no
means secure. While significant changes have been made to the
policies followed by many ITCs it is not at all clear that they
provide more than a temporary respite for an investment vehicle that
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